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Abstract 
There is rising interest in information privacy management through 
information accountability (IA) in the computer science discipline. Although 
accountability is a well established concept in many other disciplines, it is fairly new 
to computer science. The principles of IA are, therefore, unclear. However, the 
underlying concept of IA shows potential for information privacy management in the 
electronic world. 
eHealth is one of the most complex man-made informatics ecosystems in the 
world. Information security and privacy issues have hindered its’ proliferation since 
its emergence. Conventional information security and privacy management measures 
are deemed unsuitable for a specialised and information intensive domain such as 
healthcare and therefore, eHealth. In this thesis, we introduce IA to eHealth as a 
means of information privacy management. To that end we present an Information 
Accountability Framework (IAF) and introduce Accountable-eHealth (AeH) 
systems, which deal with information privacy issues arising from internal user 
activities (i.e. information access and use by healthcare professionals - HCP). Three 
main aspects related to information accountability are addressed in this thesis, 
namely: social aspects, technical aspects and legal aspects, which create the 
Information Accountability Framework (IAF). 
We delve into the problem by defining a set of principles of IA and 
contextualising them to eHealth based on a series of domain specific stakeholder 
requirements, which reveal that information privacy management in eHealth involves 
balancing competing concerns arising from the different stakeholders’ eHealth 
requirements; namely, patients and HCPs. To address the technical aspects, first, we 
introduce a novel access control model that can reach a balance between eHealth 
stakeholder requirements. Second, we present an architecture for AeH systems with 
IA capabilities. We use the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) as the rights 
expression language for AeH systems to show how privacy and usage policies can be 
managed in AeH systems. 
 iv Practical Issues when Designing an Information Accountability Framework for eHealth Systems 
To address the social and legal aspects of AeH systems, questionnaire surveys 
and a case study are presented. The first stage of the survey focuses on the attitudes 
of future healthcare professionals towards the designed AeH system. An empirical 
research model is designed and validated that can predict the acceptance of AeH 
systems. The second stage focuses on the consumers’ perspective on AeH systems. A 
second empirical research model is designed and validated. The case study focuses 
on the Australian eHealth system and shows how AeH systems can be implemented 
in the existing eHealth system and legal framework in Australia. 
This thesis contributes to the existing body of knowledge in several principal 
aspects. First, it identifies a set of principles of IA and contextualises them in 
eHealth. Second, it presents and validates two empirical research models that can 
predict users’ intention to adopt AeH systems. Third, it presents and validates a novel 
access control model that captures stakeholder requirements towards building AeH 
systems. Fourth, it presents and validates a technical architecture for AeH systems 
together with an approach of policy representation and management in the 
architecture using a DRM technology. Fifth, it presents a case study that shows how 
the designed IAF is feasible within the current eHealth system and legal framework 
in Australia. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 1 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
In this chapter, we contextualise the research project. Section 1.1 presents an 
outline of the research. Section 1.2 presents the background of the research and 
section 1.3 identifies a knowledge gap. Section 1.4 presents the research problem and 
section 1.5 formulates the objectives and the research questions. Section 1.6 
identifies the significance and scope of the research. The research methodology is 
presented in section 1.7 and a conceptual map of the research is presented in section 
1.8. Finally, the chapter is concluded with an outline of the remaining chapters of this 
thesis in section 1.9. 
1.1 OVERVIEW 
An immense growth in the use of Information and Communications 
Technology (ICT) in healthcare has been witnessed during recent times. It has 
produced many different applications for providing better quality healthcare in a 
more effective and efficient manner. The use of ICT in healthcare has given rise to 
several disciplines such as medical informatics, health informatics, biomedical 
informatics and clinical informatics that have a common underlying goal. The 
primary goal of use of ICT in healthcare is to improve the delivery of healthcare to 
the patients and maintain the quality by protecting the integrity of the information. 
The complex nature of the healthcare domain itself is one of the main impediments 
to the successful use of ICT in healthcare. This makes it a challenging undertaking 
that needs to be successfully executed in order to provide quality healthcare as of 
public demands. 
Given the recent advancements of ICT and its role in healthcare, the needs of 
the modern healthcare practitioners as well as the public (patients) are different from 
what we have seen and experienced in the recent past. Healthcare professionals want 
easy and timely access to reliable information to assist in the decision making 
process to help improve the quality of care. Patients want control of their health 
information and demand better management of their sensitive healthcare information 
for better information privacy and assurance. The healthcare industry generates a 
huge volume of data from hospitals, primary care surgeries, clinics, laboratories etc. 
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It is still a challenge to manage such information in spite of decades of experience in 
the successful application of ICT in other information-intensive industries. Despite 
the complexity of use of ICT in healthcare, countries such as Australia (among 
others) have embraced the new technologies and are working towards bringing their 
benefits to the consumers. On the 1st of July 2012, the Personally Controlled 
Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system was made available to the Australian 
public. The PCEHR system enables every Australian to create and manage an 
individual electronic health record (EHR). The primary goal of the PCEHR is health 
information sharing. It gives patients the control over their healthcare records and 
allows them to manage documents within their EHR. The PCEHR was launched after 
two years of extensive research and development by the National E-Health 
Transition Authority (NEHTA). Although there have been meticulous efforts by both 
NEHTA and government departments in the development of the PCEHR, it is said to 
reach its full potential in 10 years. This highlights the gravity and complexity of 
using ICT in healthcare delivery processes. 
With the practical benefits of using ICT in healthcare come many inherent 
drawbacks. Information interoperability, information security and information 
privacy concerns are high on the agenda. Current developments in this domain have 
recruited the Internet as the main communication media. These developments are 
called eHealth applications. Manipulating sensitive patient information using the 
Internet means that the vulnerability of information being disclosed to unintentional 
entities is far greater. This aspect, among others, augments the aforementioned 
information security and information privacy issues. Information privacy concerns of 
patients in eHealth applications are a significant factor that contribute to the 
impediments for eHealth systems and has to be addressed appropriately. 
The application context which this research focuses on is eHealth. eHealth is 
becoming a more familiar term in the society as ICT support in healthcare practices 
increases and becomes available for different applications in daily life. When the 
term becomes broader, underlying concerns such as information privacy and other 
related issues like trust and adoption also expand and become more significant. 
Recently, we have seen many attempts made to address these issues to make eHealth 
systems more robust and to increase the trust towards high consumer adoption. These 
efforts are focussed mainly on security related technologies such as rigid access 
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control for healthcare information systems, in other words, preventive technologies. 
But for a complex, specialised and knowledge driven domain such as healthcare, 
purely preventive approaches are inapt. 
As regards to the above concerns, we introduce information accountability 
(IA), a concept that is based on appropriate-use of information followed by after-
the-fact accountability for intentional misuse of information, to eHealth. We show 
that IA can be used to address the information privacy conundrum and can 
successfully balance eHealth requirements. We present an Information 
Accountability Framework (IAF) and introduce Accountable-eHealth (AeH) 
systems, eHealth systems that utilise IA. Throughout this thesis we assume that an 
operational electronic health record (EHR) system exists in a secure and trusted 
environment that links to the eHealth application we are focused on. 
1.2 BACKGROUND 
Healthcare is the world’s largest most complex manmade ecosystem (Mills, 
2007). It is a fundamental human need and right. As stated above, the impact of ICT 
in the progression of healthcare is immense mainly with the increasing demand for 
efficient and cost effective healthcare delivery (Grimson, Grimson, & Hasselbring, 
2000). The users of eHealth technologies can be categorised into three; the 
healthcare authority (HA), the healthcare professionals (HCP) and the beneficiaries 
or consumers (patients). A healthcare authority can be the department of health and 
ageing, state and territory health authority (e.g. Queensland Health), health statutory 
boards, hospital executives/management. Healthcare professionals include doctors, 
nurses, pharmacists, diagnostic clinicians, allied health and clinical support staff who 
provide services to patients in care delivery settings and consumers are individuals 
who receive care from the health services of the country, including citizens, 
permanent residents, work permit holders and others. The successful use of ICT in 
healthcare that is fair to all categories is a challenging undertaking that needs to be 
successful in order to provide quality healthcare. 
Healthcare is a domain driven by information and specialised expertise. A 
purely preventive approach for data protection governed by the consumers, similar to 
most available approaches (e.g. access control in eHealth), is not suitable to 
healthcare because not all consumers have the relevant knowledge to make a 
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decision as to what information is required to make a decision in a given episode of 
care. The consumers, therefore, need be encouraged not to withhold any medical 
information from their caregivers which could be valuable for making a potentially 
lifesaving decision. But the nature of the information and the ramifications of 
inappropriate use of that information such as embarrassment, insurability, harm to 
social status, employability etc. could prevent consumers from disclosing valuable 
information about their medical history to their caregivers. As stated by Goldman et 
al. (2000), 
“[without] trusting that their most sensitive health information will be 
safeguarded, patients are reticent to fully and honestly disclose their personal 
information and may avoid seeking care altogether” (Goldman & Hudson, 
2000).  
The Australian Department of Health and Ageing state that;  
“Privacy is a fundamental principle underpinning quality health care. 
Without an assurance that personal health information will remain private, 
people may not seek the health care they need which may in turn increase 
the risks to their own health and the health of others. Indeed consumers 
regard health information as different to other types of information and 
consider it to be deeply personal” (Australian Government Department of 
Health and Ageing, 2004). 
This calls for a sense of trust need to be conferred to consumers to encourage them to 
fully and honestly disclose their medical history to healthcare providers via eHealth 
systems. 
All relevant/required information must be available to the HCPs who make 
critical decisions about a person’s health. In the mean time, consumers has to be 
assured that the information they have disclosed would not be misused resulting in 
information privacy breaches. The use of information therefore needs to be 
controlled. However, if tight access restrictions and rigid security barriers are 
enforced on healthcare information, the decision making time and effort of HCPs 
will increase and critical time will be lost that could have made the difference 
between life and death of a patient. So, How can healthcare information be made 
readily available to those who require it and yet be kept safe from being 
unnecessarily exposed? 
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1.2.1 The eHealth Ecosystem 
eHealth promise benefits to patient care through enhanced access to 
information and efficiencies in healthcare delivery (Scott, 2010). The World Health 
Organisation (WHO) defines eHealth as ‘the combined use of electronic 
communication and information technology in the health sector’ (World Health 
Organisation, 2012). Considering the current developments, this broad definition can 
be narrowed down to state that eHealth uses the Internet as the medium of 
communication allowing for an assortment of capabilities to be introduced to the 
healthcare domain. Many definitions to the term eHealth have been put forward by 
researchers in the domain. 
According to Eysenbach (2001), eHealth is; 
“[the] intersection of medical informatics, public health and business, 
referring to health services and information delivered or enhanced through 
the Internet and related technologies. In a broader sense, the term 
characterizes not only a technological development, but also a state-of-mind, 
a way of thinking, an attitude, and a commitment for networked, global 
thinking, to improve health care locally, regionally, and worldwide by using 
information and communication technology” (Eysenbach, 2001). 
This definition of eHealth highlights that eHealth encompasses a range of 
different aspects that cannot be addressed through a set of common policies and 
guidelines suitable for all. Each separate eHealth initiative must consider the 
characteristics of its target community (state, territory or country) such as its own 
unique expectations, healthcare system, economic status, legal framework and even 
the nature of its population and geographical characteristics. Similar definitions have 
been put forth by others (Deluca & Enmark, 2000). eHealth is a combination of 
technologies such as the Internet, computer telephony/interactive voice response, 
wireless communications. Contextually, these technologies can be referred to as 
eHealth technologies, the Internet being the most prominent.  
The proper implementation of eHealth systems will be the solution to many 
problems associated with today’s healthcare. As Kwankam (Kwankam, 2004) agrees 
by saying, 
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“E-Health systems are essential to keeping pace with the exponential growth 
of health information and to applying this knowledge to resolving world 
health problems”. 
These efforts have resulted in the introduction of new legislation such as HIPAA 
(Mercuri, 2004), and healthcare standards such as HL7 (Beeler, 1998; Schloeffel, 
Beale, Hayworth, Heard, & Leslie, 2006), openEHR (Beale, Heard, & Kalra, 2007), 
ISO 27799 health information (Fraser, 2006), CEN 13606 health information 
(Schloeffel, et al., 2006) and several other standards introduced by OASIS. These 
standards aim to achieve a consistent baseline for reusability, interoperability and 
scalability. 
Impact of eHealth 
The Internet has become a source of healthcare information for many patients 
as a means of gaining knowledge of their medical conditions. According to Harrison 
and Lee (2006), 86% of people who have access to the Internet have used it to search 
health related information. 50% of consumers have demonstrated interests in 
accessing their information through the Internet. 33% consider switching providers to 
communicate electronically to their physicians. Ball and Lillis (2001) claim that 
today the Internet facilitates crucial components of healthcare delivery, including 
consumer education, disease management, clinical decision support, 
physician/consumer communication and administrative efficiencies. The word 
‘patient’ is slowly transformed into ‘consumer’ because of the Internet and the 
demand for a more active role in their own care. According to Deloitte and Touche, 
as stated by Ball and Lillis (2001), “[patients] do not receive literature about their 
medications. They, therefore, take the education to their own hands”. In 1999, 74% 
of US Internet users searched for online medical information. This has resulted in a 
change in the physician/patient relationship (Xie, Dilts, & Shor, 2006). 
The nature of the Internet and that of the healthcare domain raises a number of 
concerns in regards to the security and integrity of the information. Health 
information is considered one of the most sensitive in any informatics domain 
(Cavoukian, 2006) thus, ensuring the security of the information is paramount for 
eHealth systems to be successful in delivering the capabilities it promises. But the 
medical environment has a poor history of uptake and implementation of security 
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measures, as security has traditionally been seen as a business concept (P. A. 
Williams, 2007). 
Electronic Health Records 
The main information repository for eHealth systems are electronic health 
records (EHR) and electronic medical records (EMR). In the heart of eHealth we find 
EHRs and EMRs. Ferriera et al. (2003) agrees to this notion by referring to EHRs 
(referred to as electronic patient records or EPRs) as the “Holy Grail” of electronic 
healthcare information systems. Miller and Sims (Miller & Sim, 2004) say; “of all 
the health information technology in current use, the electronic medical record 
(EMR) has the most wide-ranging capabilities and thus the greatest potential for 
improving quality”; thereby agreeing that EMRs are one of the most important 
components of electronic healthcare. 
Even though EHRs and EMRs are used synonymously in literature, there is a 
subtle difference between these two terms. Garets and Davis (2005), as cited by 
Kahn and Sheshadri (2008), defines EMR and EHR as follows; 
An EHR is, 
“[an] application environment composed of the clinical data repository, 
clinical decision support, controlled medical vocabulary, order entry, 
computerized provider order entry, pharmacy, and clinical documentation 
applications. This environment supports the patient’s EMR across inpatient 
and outpatient environments, and is used by healthcare practitioners to 
document, monitor, and manage health care delivery within a healthcare 
delivery organisation” (Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008). 
An EHR is, 
“[a] subset of each care delivery organisation’s EMR, and is owned by the 
patient; it has patient input and access that spans episodes of care across 
multiple healthcare delivery organisations within a community, region, or 
state (or in some cases, the entire country)” (Kahn & Sheshadri, 2008). 
Essentially, EMRs are medical records of a consumer created and maintained 
locally by an HCP (or healthcare organisation) and an EHR is a comprehensive 
medical records shared by all HCPs. Hence a consumer may have more than one 
EMR but only one EHR. EHRs are a powerful tool for HCPs given their 
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completeness and availability. EHRs are more beneficial than EMRs mainly because 
care givers are capable of accessing a patient’s entire medical history rather than 
parts of it as with EMRs. An EHR system can be made available to care givers from 
anywhere with a suitable Internet facility. For example, HCPs can access it from 
their local practice, use all capabilities provided for them by the EHR system without 
having to invest in an expensive EMR system which can be a significant and costly 
investment for many practices (Yaffee, 2011).  EHR systems however, bring with 
them their own risks. 
1.2.2 Information Privacy in eHealth 
As stated above, information privacy is a key issue which arises in eHealth and 
is a key governing principle of the patient-physician relationship (Appari & Johnson, 
2010). Information privacy itself can be viewed through two distinct lenses: patient 
privacy and provider privacy. Although provider privacy is an issue that has to be 
addressed, the more significant barrier for eHealth adoption is consumers concerns of 
information privacy (Anderson, 2006). A patient’s health record contains sensitive 
information such as medical diagnosis, medical images, treatments, psychological 
profiles, employment history, and physician’s subjective assessments of personality 
and mental state (Appari & Johnson, 2010; Mercuri, 2004) and the inappropriate 
disclosure of these types of information could render the patients to issues such as 
embarrassment, insurability, child custody cases, and even employment (Cannoy & 
Salam, 2010; W. Pratt, K. Unruh, A. Civan, & M.M. Skeels, 2006a). When using 
sensitive information about patients through the Internet and other communication 
media (eHealth activities), the danger of the security of information being 
compromised is increased. Given the complex flow of health information in modern 
healthcare systems (see Figure 2.6), these concerns are further augmented.  
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Figure 1.1 Information flow in a healthcare system (Appari & Johnson, 2010) 
The complexity of the modern information manipulation processes has given 
rise to new threats to healthcare information (Mercuri, 2004). In light of these 
threats, the patients demand better protection of their sensitive information. And the 
success of eHealth systems depends on how well these issues are tackled and 
delivered to the consumers. The National E-Health Transaction Authority (NEHTA) 
believes that the success of eHealth systems is clearly based on the privacy 
awareness of the Australian community (National E-Health Transition Authority, 
2011b). Legislation such as the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) (Annas, 2003) of 1996 in the USA are results of attempts to address 
information privacy in the eHealth domain. 
It is clear that the most significant impediment for the proliferation of eHealth 
systems is patient privacy concerns (Chen, Chang, & Wang, 2010). Therefore, 
increasing consumer trust in the eHealth systems by addressing information privacy 
is critical for their success. In order to achieve this, clear attributes for role-based 
access, policy development, rules on patient privacy at home, data mining rules and 
technological measures will be needed to ensure the security and privacy of medical 
data (Meingast, Roosta, & Sastry, 2006). 
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1.2.3 An information privacy conundrum 
Defining information privacy is difficult (Culnan & Williams, 2009; Smith, 
1993; Tsai, Egelman, Cranor, & Acquisti, 2011). The most widely accepted 
definition of privacy by Alan Westin states that, 
“[it is] the claim of individuals, groups, or institutes to determine for 
themselves when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to others” (Westin, 1967).  
This definition implies a sense of control of information by the owners or 
subjects. Privacy concerns are usually coupled with information security which 
mainly involves unauthorised access by external entities. But addressing data 
breaches by authorised users pose the biggest challenge and it is a significant aspect 
for eHealth systems. Some even claim that privacy threats are internal factors and not 
external (Kierkegaard, 2011). Therefore, patients have an expectation of 
confidentiality in their dealings with any qualified clinician or HCP (Croll, 2011). 
In health informatics, the definition of privacy encompasses confidentiality, 
integrity, availability and accountability (Ishikawa, 2000). The protection of patient 
privacy has been governed by the Hippocratic Oath (Lasagna, 2001), which says “I 
will respect the privacy of my patients, for their problems are not disclosed to me 
that the world may know”, where the patient-physician relationship remained a 
cooperative one. But, with the advancement of technology there is a shift in this 
relationship towards a more regulation and policy driven one (Parks, Chu, & Xu, 
2011).  
1.2.4 Information privacy threats 
Issues and threats to information privacy in eHealth come from several 
different directions. Data collection, data use and disclosure, unauthorised access, 
secondary use, errors, balance between privacy policies, clinical users and patient 
expectation, awareness of privacy practices, EHR design and lack of standards 
(Parks, et al., 2011). 
The collection of healthcare information must be for defined purposes and its 
use must be for those intended purpose (Croll, 2011; Culnan & Williams, 2009). 
Healthcare professionals may at times have to disclose patient health information to 
other healthcare professionals to make informed decisions for better healthcare 
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delivery (Ishikawa, 2000). But such disclosure may lead to negative ramifications for 
patients (Neubauer & Heurix, 2011; Sadan, 2001). Unauthorised access to 
information itself has two categories; internal breaches and external breaches. 
External breaches occur when outside entities gain access to the system via hacking 
or other measure. These threats are addressed to a satisfactory level where such 
incidents are very rare. As regards to internal breaches, the sensitivity of the 
information has made it necessary for the need-to-know principle to be applied when 
access to healthcare information is concerned (Blobel, Nordberg, Davis, & Pharow, 
2006; Ishikawa, 2000; van der Linden, Kalra, Hasman, & Talmon, 2009). It is a 
measure used to prevent unauthorised access to information by authorised users 
(internal users). Internal users may abuse their rights due to curiosity reasons or for 
other ulterior motives (Culnan & Williams, 2009). Thus, access to information by 
internal users is controlled by preventive measures such as access control, e.g. Role 
Based Access Control (RBAC), which enforce rigid barriers. But these are not 
unsuitable for a specialise domain such as healthcare. There is evidence to suggest 
that the lack of adequate patient information has given rise to serious medical errors 
(P. Williams, 2011) which threaten patient health. The availability of timely, 
unrestricted and relevant patient health information to the appropriate HCPs is thus 
vital. 
1.2.5 Privacy preserving technologies (approaches) in eHealth 
According to Kind & Silber (Kind & Silber, 2004), because of the open 
architecture of the Internet, organisational policies and procedures are needed to 
guarantee the privacy of and integrity of eHealth systems. These policies need to 
focus on data security as well as other ethical issues pertaining eHealth. Privacy 
preservation in eHealth is a highly active research area. It encompasses issues such 
as anonymity, authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, deniability, unlinkability 
and EHR data structure (Slamanig & Stingl, 2010). Despite a range of different 
efforts by researchers, information privacy still hinders the proliferation of eHealth 
systems. Although most privacy related research is based on information governance 
policies, technical solutions have also been proposed. Most of the technical solutions 
proposed for this problem are based on rigid access control measures. 
Comprehensive reviews of the related work are given in chapters five and six. 
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1.2.6 eHealth Requirements 
Following a careful investigation of the healthcare related expectations of 
eHealth stakeholders, we have identified two types of eHealth requirements. These 
requirements have to be carefully addressed in order for a successful eHealth system 
to be implemented. 
Requirements of Healthcare Providers 
Timely and relevant information to the healthcare providers is a fundamental 
requirement in the healthcare domain. As regards to healthcare professionals, we can 
formulate a set of requirements that are deemed necessary for healthcare 
professionals. The following requirements of healthcare providers (both individual 
and the healthcare organisation) were identified that need to be addressed in the 
development of an eHealth system. 
1. A healthcare authority should have the capability to define their 
security policies within an organisation: We identified that a governing 
health body should have the capability to formulate policies with regards to 
information access (Ray & Wimalasiri, 2006). These policies, however, 
should be within the available legislation regarding health information 
manipulation. 
2. Healthcare professionals need easy access to the relevant information in 
a non restrictive and timely manner: Rigid restrictions to health 
information could hinder healthcare delivery (P. Williams, 2011). Therefore 
a suitable policy should be put in place for information availability for 
healthcare providers. 
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3. Healthcare providers need to have the capability to share patient health 
information with other health specialists to make well informed 
decisions: Information sharing is seen as a valuable capability and powerful 
tool (Adler-Milstein & Jha, 2012) for health professionals whilst making a 
decision (Richardson & Asthana, 2006; Whiddett, Hunter, Engelbrecht, & 
Handy, 2006a). This capability should not be identified as a special 
circumstance and be addressed separately. Rather it has to be a familiar 
activity to health professionals within the EHR system such that when in 
doubt information can be shared amongst other health professionals to make 
a well informed decision. Therefore, we believe that this activity should be 
integrated to be easily achieved within the EHR system.  
4. A healthcare authority should have the power to override the patients’ 
security settings in certain circumstances: Policies set by patients give the 
caring health professionals a sense of what the patient requires in terms of 
confidentiality. But the policies set by a patient may not always be 
beneficial to the patients, e.g. in a life threatening emergency situation. In 
such or other justifiable circumstances, the caring health professional should 
have the capability to override policies set by patients towards delivering 
appropriate care to the patient (Ferreira et al., 2006).  
5. The need to distinguish between data items and access and usage 
policies assigned to them: This requirement follows from the need to 
segment health information contained in EHRs to enable information to be 
shared amongst healthcare professionals, which would not otherwise be 
possible due to privacy requirements of the patients. This requirement also 
addressed issues related to data collection and the definition of indented 
purposes. This has also been identified by the standards and Interoperability 
framework in their data segmentation for privacy pilot study (The Standards 
and Interoperability Framework, 2012). 
In some circumstances it has been identified that the health professionals need 
to hide certain information from the patients. For example in mental health related 
situations (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008). This is a very sensitive subject within the 
healthcare domain itself. We consider these as special circumstances. The specific 
health information in question can be removed or hidden from the patients from the 
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point where the EHR is created at the health authority’s end. But the caring health 
professional (a mental health specialist) will have the access to relevant information 
with the consent of a party nominated by the patient as for example the next-of-kin at 
the point of EHR creation. Therefore, we do not consider this as general requirement 
for healthcare professionals. 
Requirements of Consumers 
A patient’s healthcare information may contain sensitive information such as 
sexual health, mental health, addictions to drug or alcohol, abortions, etc. This makes 
such a patient demand strong security for their eHRs. These requirements cannot 
conflict those discussed above to prevent legitimate healthcare activities from being 
hindered. We note however, that in the PCEHR (National E-Health Transition 
Authority, 2011a) system proposed by NEHTA, all privacy settings are set by the 
patients. Therefore such conflicts will not arise in their proposed system and will 
hinder healthcare professionals’ information needs. The following capabilities were 
identified as requirements of a patient with an eHR in terms of access control. 
6. Patients need to be able to allow only a preferred (selected) set of 
healthcare professionals to access their EHR: A patient needs to have the 
capability to determine which health professionals have access to their 
health record (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008; Ray & Wimalasiri, 2006). These 
healthcare professionals are considered as trusted health professionals. But 
their use of information will still be governed by underlying usage policies 
set by the governing health authority. 
7. Patients need to be able to hide certain health information from health 
practitioners who already have access to their EHR: Patients prefer to 
hide certain health information such as their sexual health details from 
certain healthcare professionals who already have access to the EHR 
(Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008). However, the information patients hide from a 
healthcare professional should not hinder their care delivery activities. For 
example, a patient cannot hide his sexual health details from a dermatologist 
because there is a strong relationship between those two data types. These 
relationships can be captured by the policies defined by a healthcare 
authority. 
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8. Patients need to have the capability to see how their EHR is 
manipulated by users who have access to it: Although access to the 
information is managed by access policies, the usage of the information 
after retrieval is still an open question. Therefore, a patient may be capable 
of monitoring how the health professionals use the information they retrieve 
from the EHR. 
9. The administration process of the security settings need to be easy to 
understand and handle: Patients cannot always be considered to have a 
certain degree of technology competency. Therefore, the systems developed 
should take in to consideration the ability of the general public of managing 
such a system (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008). The management of their EHR 
therefore need to be an easy task which is familiar to them. 
It is important to note that access restrictions might not always be beneficial to 
the patient. While fulfilling these privacy requirements under no circumstance must 
the patients’ health compromised. In the following chapters, we will refer back to 
these requirements and show how each of them are satisfied. 
1.3 A GAP IN THE KNOWLEDGE 
The above requirements reveal that information privacy and the need for 
healthcare information are competing concerns and need to be addressed 
appropriately considering domain constraints. To that end, we have identified a series 
of requirements from both the consumers’ and the healthcare providers’ perspectives. 
The current approaches are limited in addressing these requirements towards 
reaching an appropriate balance of requirements. As a solution we propose the said 
IAF for eHealth systems. To that end, we observe a gap in the knowledge in terms of 
information accountability as a measure for privacy management in the eHealth 
domain. Principally, information accountability has not been defined in eHealth and 
its underlying principles are unclear. In order for such a concept to be applied to a 
complex domain such as healthcare, it is imperative that issues such as its technical 
aspects, stakeholder perspectives and legal aspects are investigated in detail. 
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1.4 RESEARCH PROBLEM 
Challenges in the eHealth domain relate to balancing the requirements of its 
different stakeholders to achieve the maximum benefits of what eHealth has to offer. 
Patients expect a certain degree of confidentiality from the health professionals who 
treat them (Croll, 2011) whilst the healthcare professionals demand easy access to all 
relevant information related to their patients health. We believe that the concept 
called information accountability (IA) can be utilised in the eHealth domain to 
achieve this balance. IA means “the use of information should be transparent so it is 
possible to determine whether a particular use is appropriate under a given set of 
rules and that the system enables individuals and institutions to be held accountable 
for misuse” (Weitzner et al., 2008). 
Figure 1.2 shows a realistic scenario of information flow between different 
entities and domains. It also shows how information accountability fits in an existing 
eHealth framework. 
 
Figure 1.2 eHealth Scenario (Gajanayake, Iannella, & Sahama, 2011). 
In the scenario, we can see how a patient’s healthcare information might flow 
in the eHealth domain. We identify that when information flows between the two 
domains, a mechanism should be in place to control the way in which the data is used 
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by the professionals and to ensure the public of the security of their sensitive 
information. This mechanism can be implemented as an information accountability 
framework (IAF). 
In this research, we focus on appropriate-use of sensitive health information by 
healthcare providers in an eHealth system. To our knowledge, there are no available 
methods or guidelines for applying IA to address the abovementioned issues of 
eHealth. Therefore, we undertook this research project to lay the foundations towards 
utilising IA in eHealth. We investigate the concept of IA in the eHealth domain. We 
investigate how IA, being a fairly new concept to computer science, can be applied 
to the eHealth domain to overcome its drawbacks in terms of balancing the 
information privacy needs of patients and the information needs of healthcare 
professionals. We believe this balance must be achieved in order to have a 
successfully implemented eHealth system that is adopted by the stakeholders. We 
also investigate how such systems, if developed, would be accepted by the future 
consumers of eHealth. 
1.5 OBJECTIVES 
This thesis aims to identify the applicability of information accountability 
when addressing eHealth requirements related to consumer information privacy and 
the design of an information accountability framework (IAF) for eHealth. The 
specific objectives of this study can be identified in terms of the research questions in 
section 1.5.1. 
1.5.1 Main Research Question 
The key question answered in this research is: 
“Can information accountability address the issues related to information 
requirements and information privacy requirements in the eHealth context?” 
The research question above can be subdivided into specific objectives that 
answer the thesis of this research. They are as follows: 
1. Identify the requirements of eHealth stakeholders that need to be addressed 
relating to healthcare information. 
a. Identify the information requirements of healthcare providers. 
b. Identify the information privacy requirements of patients. 
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2. Identify the principles of information accountability. 
a. Identify the principles of information accountability in computer 
science. 
b. Identify the principles of information accountability in the eHealth 
context. 
3. Identify the technology solutions that address the requirements identified in 
question 1 in terms of information accountability? 
a. Identify the access control requirements of eHealth in terms of 
information accountability. 
b. Design a technical architecture for an IAF in eHealth. 
c. Identify the technology requirements to meet the capabilities of the 
IAF in an eHealth environment. 
4. Identify the impact of information accountability on stakeholder acceptance 
of the IAF in terms of empirical research models. 
a. Identify the aspects related to the acceptance of information 
accountability by future healthcare professionals. 
b. Identify the aspects related to the acceptance of information 
accountability by eHealth consumers. 
5. Identify the implementation aspects of the IAF within an existing eHealth 
environment; namely, in the Australian context. 
a. Identify the current approach to eHealth in Australia. 
b. Identify how the designed IAF fits within the current Australia 
eHealth landscape. 
c. Identify the legal issues related to the IAF in Australia. 
By achieving these research objectives, we make a valuable contribution to the 
existing body of knowledge as to how eHealth systems can be implemented with the 
use of IA principles to overcome the barriers discussed. The research questions are 
addressed by each chapter as follows. 
Section 1.2 addressed research objective 1 by identifying a series of 
requirements of eHealth stakeholders. Chapter two addresses research objective 2 
and formulate foundations for the subsequent chapters. Chapters three and four fulfil 
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research objective 4 though quantitative and qualitative survey results. In chapter 
five a novel access control model is presented that captures the essential elements for 
the design of a technical architecture for the IAF and fulfils research objective 3(a). 
Research objectives 3(b) and 3(c) are addressed in chapter six with the design and 
validation of the said architecture. Chapter seven presents a case study of the 
applicability of the IAF in an existing eHealth infrastructure focusing on the 
Australian eHealth system, which fulfils research objective 5. 
1.6 SIGNIFICANCE AND SCOPE 
As we have seen, conventional restrictive approaches to managing information 
are not suitable for an information intensive domain such as healthcare. We have 
identified that information privacy of eHealth consumers is a significant factor in 
their proliferation in the healthcare domain. Although important, we do not consider 
the privacy requirements of healthcare professionals, which are not currently seen as 
significant contributing barriers for eHealth adoption. Thus, information privacy 
concerns of eHealth consumers are addressed through information accountability in 
this thesis. 
Information accountability has not yet found its way into common practice, 
especially in eHealth. Through this research study it is intended that there will be a 
significant contribution to knowledge in the eHealth domain in terms of information 
accountability and a better understanding of the concept in eHealth. It is also the 
expectation that this work will assist in future research that will also contribute to the 
knowledge which will ultimately be adopted in the healthcare sector for better 
delivery of healthcare services for the general public. 
In an exploratory study of this nature it is important to perceive the limitations. 
Given the time constraints and the requirement of the knowledge and expertise of 
several other domains including medicine, we do not aim at implementing a working 
prototype of the IAF. Proposed semantic reasoning capabilities are not implemented 
in this thesis. Although technical protocols that have been designed are formally 
defined and expressed using formal specification languages, a mathematical 
formalism will not be considered given the exploratory nature of the study. Such 
formalisms, which require the consideration of implementation constraints, may be 
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done in future work. This thesis will serve as a starting point for work in information 
accountability in eHealth applications, which is absent in the eHealth domain. 
1.7 METHODOLOGY 
The approach of the research project is illustrated in this section. The research 
project was divided into four phases. Figure 1.3 depicts the different phases of the 
research project. Phase 1 involved a comprehensive literature review and problem 
definition. Two surveys were conducted, including a pilot survey, to measure the 
attitudes towards information accountability in the eHealth domain in phase 2. Phase 
3 involved the technical aspects of the research project. The results from the survey 
were taken into consideration for the development of a novel access control model 
for AeH systems, which was validated via a Web based prototype. A technical 
architecture was designed and validated via the same prototype and a model 
checking approach. The final phase of the research was the investigation of different 
aspects of the IAF to demonstrate its functionality and suitability in the Australian 
eHealth system via a case study. The results from the four phases validate the 
designed IAF. 
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Figure 1.3 Research outline 
1.8 RESEARCH MAP 
The chapters of this thesis are interrelated to form a logical structure beginning 
from theoretical foundations of IA and then investigating them in the social domain 
proceeded by the presentation of technical aspects of IA in eHealth and finally with 
the presentation of a case study, which primarily discuss the legal aspects related to 
the IAF in the Australian eHealth system. Figure 1.4 shows a map of the research 
with all the components. The IAF in question consists of three main aspects: social, 
technical and legal. The IAF is presented in the form of these components by 
providing supporting evidence for each component. 
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Figure 1.4 Research map 
The social aspects of the IAF are addressed in the first part of the thesis in 
chapters three and four. Part two of the thesis consists of an access control model and 
a technical architecture for AeH system presented in chapters five and six 
respectively. Part three presents the implementation aspects of AeH systems, 
focusing mainly on the legal aspects as depicted in Figure 1.4, in the form of a case 
study of the Australian eHealth system in chapter seven.  
1.9 THESIS OUTLINE 
The rest of this thesis is arranged as follows. 
Foundation 
• Chapter 2: Principles of Information Accountability 
Part One: Social Aspects 
• Chapter 3: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: A Survey of 
Future Healthcare Professionals 
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• Chapter 4: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: A Consumers 
Perspective 
Part Two: Technical Aspects 
• Chapter 5: Access Control Requirements for Accountable-eHealth 
Systems 
• Chapter 6: A Technical Architecture for Accountable-eHealth Systems 
Part Three: Implementation Aspects 
• Chapter 7: The IAF in the Australian eHealth System: A Case Study 
Closure 
• Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work 
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Chapter 2: Principles of Information 
Accountability in eHealth 
 
In this chapter, we present the principles of information accountability. The 
chapter follows work done on information accountability in computer science in 
general and establishes a series of principles that must be present in accountability 
systems. These principles are then contextualised in eHealth to emphasise how they 
must be used to address the contextual requirements towards successful 
implementation of eHealth systems augmented with information accountability. We 
introduce Accountable-eHealth (AeH) systems; eHealth systems augmented with 
information accountability principles and discuss their characteristics to conclude the 
chapter. 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information accountability (IA) is a solution for usage control on the 
decentralised Web (Feigenbaum, Hendler, Jaggard, Weitzner, & Wright, 2011; 
Weitzner et al., 2008). Appropriate policy representation, policy aware transaction 
logs and policy reasoning are key components of IA on the Web (Weitzner, et al., 
2008). IA is about holding the information users answerable for their actions and the 
ramifications of those actions. Weitzner et al. (2008) propose a transparent audit 
process which gives the users incentives to abide by the policies put in place and the 
ability to determine whether a particular use of information is policy compliant. 
Though the concept is nothing new, IA is a comparatively new concept to computer 
science and ICT and has been interpreted in various dimensions by computer 
scientists. These approaches have been carefully systematised by Feigenbaum et al. 
(2012) and have made a valuable contribution by stating that the term 
“accountability” is far broader than just anonymity, identification or exposure and 
that it allows actions to be tied to consequences and violations to be tied to 
punishment. The approaches considered by Feigenbaum et al. (2012), however, 
define IA in a general point of view. Being a concept of various dimensions, IA has 
to be defined contextually for its applicability to be better understood. The lack of 
contextual definitions of its underlying principles makes it difficult to apply in 
complex domains. Information systems which utilise the principles of IA are called 
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accountability systems. Current technological advancements, especially in the 
semantic web domain, eliminate the technical barriers previously present in 
implementing this type of systems. The success of any accountability system 
depends on the policy formulation, which in turn depends on the context in which the 
systems are designed. 
IA can address many different issues in a vast array of disciplines. Usage 
control is one area of interest to computer scientists through which the privacy 
conundrum can be addressed. Privacy has been and still is a major obstacle when it 
comes to information systems’ adoption and trust. When dealing with information 
privacy, we have to consider several factors: the type of policies, the type of 
participants and their requirements, data ownership, data provenance, and the nature 
of the information (such as sensitivity and availability). These aspects differ 
significantly with the context. As already discussed in chapter one, in terms of 
information management through electronic media such as the Internet, privacy can 
be defined as the degree of control given to the subject of the information (Westin, 
1967) although have argued that confidentiality addressed privacy. But 
confidentiality is a matter of giving the owner, not the subject, the control of the 
information. It is important, therefore, that the roles of users are clearly defined 
within the context when looking to address information privacy. Here again, we 
point out that data ownership depends on the context we consider. Within a given 
context, the policies differ in terms of user requirements and other external factors 
such as government regulations and organisational policies. Data provenance is 
another important aspect when it comes to dealing with violations of policies or 
misuse of data. It can also play a critical role when the trustworthiness (Alhaqbani & 
Fidge, 2009) of the data and users become factors. The nature of the information is 
the main reason why privacy becomes a critical factor for information systems in the 
first place, as is the case in the healthcare domain. It is crucial that the nature of the 
information is properly evaluated and the proper policies are put in place to govern 
its use. 
Therefore, as a means of addressing the issues identified in section 1.2, we 
introduce information accountability to the eHealth domain. To this end, we 
formulate a series of principles drawn from prior research and the general 
requirements for information accountability to be implemented in computer science. 
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We contextualise them to eHealth and lay foundations for the remainder of the thesis. 
We begin with a critical review of the related work. 
2.2 RELATED WORK 
What is accountability? According to Boyd (Boyd, 2003), responsibility and 
accountability are used interchangeably by many people. They are like the two sides 
of the same coin. Responsibility, Boyd says, involves what we are required to do, i.e. 
our duties. Accountability is when someone holds us answerable for our actions and 
their outcomes. In other words, responsibility reflects only up to the point of decision 
and accountability focuses on the ramifications after the decision is made (Boyd, 
2003; Eriksen, 2002). Emanuel et al. (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1996) have this to say 
about what accountability is. “Accountability entails the procedures and processes by 
which one party justifies and takes responsibility for its activities”. The essence of all 
this, when focusing on information accountability, is that the user of the information 
is held liable to explain, justify or answer for their use of information, when 
requested by the party to whom the information belongs. The significance of 
information accountability in information intensive domains is highlighted from the 
statement below. 
 “Information is widely available and the use of that information needs to be 
controlled. Rather than enforcing rigid up-front control over the use of 
information, there is a need to accommodate fair use. The control over the 
use of information is imperfect and exceptions are possible, but violators can 
be identified and held accountable” (Weitzner, et al., 2008). 
When investigating information accountability, transparency is one of the most 
important aspects that also need to be taken into account. Transparency and 
accountability will be critical in helping the society to manage the privacy risks that 
accumulate from the explosive progress in communication, storage and search 
technology  (Weitzner et al., 2006). The subjects of information must have the 
privilege to observe how their information is used and by whom. Transparency can 
be defined differently in two contexts. In business ethics and information ethics, it’s 
likely that transparency refers to the visibility of information. In computer science 
and ICT, it is more likely to refer to the invisibility of information (Turilli & Floridi, 
2009). Despite the contradicting definitions in different contexts, by transparency 
what we mean here is that information held about a consumer is visible to that 
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consumer (giving consumers the right to see the data held about them) and so is the 
use (access to) of that information by anyone else so that any action could be traced 
back to an individual. As Weitzner et al. (2008) state, “transparency and 
accountability makes bad acts visible to all concerned”, hence referring to the 
visibility of information usage, clarifying our distinction.  
According to Ferreira et al. (2003) the lack of success in large information-
dependent areas such as hospitals is due to its deficient usability and poor security. 
Unlike paper-based systems, that have evolved through many years, where 
accountability processes are well understood, digital systems have very different and 
complex processes. The need for transparency and accountability is ever more 
important in information systems which are becoming ever more complex and 
decentralised (Weitzner, et al., 2006). 
“Transparency in data manipulation and inference enables users to have a 
clear view into the logical and factual bases for the inferences presented by 
the system. Accountability in data manipulation and inference enables users 
or third parties to assess whether or not the inferences presented comply with 
the rules and policies applicable to the legal, regulatory or other context in 
which the inference is relied upon” (Weitzner, et al., 2006). 
Another aspect that comes to light related to accountability is provenance. 
When holding someone accountable for access and use of a particular set of 
information, the reliability of the information as well as the information known about 
the transactions are also important to guarantee the correctness of the accountability 
process. Provenance deals with the history of information so that the source of the 
information can be traced back when needed to guarantee that the information is 
authentic. Cheney et al. (Cheney, Chong, Foster, Seltzer, & Vansummeren, 2009) 
say that provenance is not easy to define. Many have defined this according to their 
different needs and applications. In general, provenance can be defined as 
information about the origin, context or history of the data. They believe that 
provenance will help develop many factors of quality information use including 
transparency and accountability. 
What is provenance in electronic data? Moreau et al. (2008) point out that 
electronic data does not have the necessary historical information that would help 
end-users, reviewers or regulators make the necessary verifications. In computer 
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systems, a data’s provenance is represented by process documentation, says Kifor et 
al. (2006). Guaranteeing the provenance of information on accountability is without 
doubt one of the most important questions that need to be addressed when 
developing an accountability framework. 
2.2.1 Theoretical background of information accountability in computer science 
Information accountability is a relatively new concept to computer science and 
ICT. Though limited, there is much effort in the current state of research to formalise 
information accountability in computer science. We will present an account of these 
efforts here. 
Information accountability is the subject of many researchers. They have either 
defined or implicitly used the term accountability in various dimensions. A serious 
concern for accountability systems is the lack of formal foundations. Formalising 
information accountability has been widely explored by several prominent 
researchers, especially in the information privacy domain (Feigenbaum, Hendler, et 
al., 2011; Feigenbaum, Jaggard, & Wright, 2011; Jagadeesan, Jeffrey, Pitcher, & 
Riely, 2009; Sloan & Warner, 2010; Weitzner, et al., 2008). It is the claim that a 
purely preventive approach to security and privacy is inadequate (Feigenbaum, 
Hendler, et al., 2011; Kagal & Abelson, 2010) that has driven work on information 
accountability in recent times. Feigenbaum et al. (Feigenbaum, et al., 2012) 
investigate some existing frameworks for accountability and explore whether 
deterrence is a better term than accountability and puts forth a formal model for 
accountability in terms of punishment (Feigenbaum, Jaggard, et al., 2011). 
Jagadeesan et al. (2009) make an effort to develop formal foundations for 
information accountability in terms of the privacy policies which define appropriate 
sharing of information among agents and provides algorithms that can be used by an 
auditor to check for compliance with rules. In their approach they focus on after-the-
fact verification with recorded audit logs capable of detecting ‘untrusted’ access of 
information and assign blame when the privacy contract is violated. They rely on a 
principle underlying accountability concept that the fear of being caught will deter 
users from misusing information. A solution to the question of compliance of privacy 
policies was proposed by Weitzner et al. (2008) by tracking all transactions and 
making them transparent. They assume that appropriate policy rules exist with a 
formal representation, policy-aware transaction logs and a policy-reasoning 
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capability which would enable accountability systems to hold information users 
(individuals and organisations) accountable for their actions. 
Sloan et al. (2010) address information accountability in a broader scope than 
what has been done by Weitzner et al. (2008) by considering both social policies and 
technical aspects. They point out that automated checking for compliance of privacy 
policy is a necessity for accountability systems and without the adequate foundations 
in both formal models and public policy issues they are unlikely to do so. Many of 
these approaches to accountability assume that the appropriate policies exist and the 
requirements and contextual dimensions are captured by them. Sloan et al. (2010) 
believe that policies required to developing accountability systems are informational 
norms and state that a proper balance between privacy requirements and competing 
concerns is necessary to sustain the architectural and social aspects introduced by 
Weitzner et al. (2008). It should be highlighted that the above mentioned policies and 
the informational norms are all dependent on context. 
Trust is another aspect related to accountability in terms of human interactions 
(Friedman & Grudin, 1998; Friedman et al., 1999). Due to the interactions people 
have through electronic media, trust and accountability play a significant role in how 
people perceive different aspects of their interactions. 
Systems that utilise information accountability thus must incorporate many 
aspects that are not present in current applications. These systems therefore inherit 
specific characteristics and goals towards information security, information privacy, 
trust and adoption. The next section discusses accountability systems in detail. 
2.3 ACCOUNTABILITY SYSTEMS 
A common measure for managing access to information by authorised users is 
access control. In computer science, access control and accountability are closely 
related. Access control is about imposing restrictions on users. In other words access 
control is about prevention. Users are required to prove their authenticity before 
access to information is granted. These approaches have proven to be successful in 
the past and in current information systems but brings with them inherent drawbacks. 
One such drawback is the hindrance to legitimate users to access information. If not 
that, it is an accepted fact that a purely preventive approach to information security 
and information privacy is inadequate (Feigenbaum, et al., 2012; Kagal & Abelson, 
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2010). Information accountability on the other hand is about deterrence. But the 
after-the-fact aspect of accountability may raise concerns over information abuse. 
This means that a violation must occur for it to be acted upon. This of cause is an 
inherent characteristic of accountability systems and is addressed through its 
underlying principles. It is argued that with accountability mechanisms in place, the 
online world would be more like the offline world where potential violators are 
deterred by the prospect of negative consequences (Feigenbaum, 2010). To this end 
we identify certain goals for accountability systems and are shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
Figure 2.1 Goals of accountability systems 
Accountability systems aim at reaching specific goals in terms of how 
information is manipulated. The main goal is to be non-restrictive. They aim to 
provide information to legitimate users without rigid access restrictions. To this end, 
they implement appropriate use of information. Accountability systems achieve 
appropriate use by deterring users from intentionally misusing information. A fear 
of being caught is delivered with the presence of accountability mechanisms which 
is appropriately conveyed to the users. Incentives are given to the users to follow the 
procedures and enforce appropriate use. Accountability systems aim at increasing 
consumer trust in the system. Without consumer trust, it is difficult to implement 
non-restrictive access/use of information. With the implementation of appropriate 
use as shown in Figure 2.1, accountability systems hope to gain trust of the 
consumers. With increased trust, systems are better adopted. 
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Creating proper incentives that would make consumers follow rules of 
accountability systems is an important aspect of accountability systems (Sloan & 
Warner, 2010). For an information user, the fear of getting caught for intentional 
misuse of information is an incentive to follow system rules. A strong assurance of 
security should be given to consumers as an incentive to prevent them from 
withholding information or enforcing rigid restrictions on data which would be their 
obvious cause of action to secure their information from being unnecessarily or 
wrongfully being disclosed. 
2.4 PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY 
In this section we will formulate and discuss principles of IA which aid in 
fulfilling the goals of accountability systems mentioned above. A map of the IA 
principles and some related attributes are shown in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2 Principles of information accountability 
In computer science, information accountability is built up on several key 
principles. Accountability systems must adhere to these principles in order to achieve 
the expected accountability capabilities and to reach their goals to be non-restrictive 
and fair use systems. Participation of users in an accountability system is a 
fundamental principle of IA. Users participate in information systems activities to 
fulfil a purpose. A user’s purpose or intention to participate in system activities can 
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be either to fulfil a requirement, because of responsibility or because of other 
motivations for example gathering demographic data for research purposes, which is 
although not directly related to the normal system operations but is a considerable 
interaction with the data. Capturing the actual intention of an information user is of 
great importance to accountability systems and helps in defining usage policies for 
data objects and users within the system. The role a user plays within an organisation 
requires him to fulfil certain tasks by manipulating information. Hence a user is said 
to have certain goals of strategic interest (Bresciani, Perini, Giorgini, Giunchiglia, & 
Mylopoulos, 2004). The users perform various tasks to fulfil these goals. It is the aim 
of accountability systems to manage the way these various tasks users perform 
within the system to promote fair use of information. Therefore, accountability 
systems must have the capability to monitor user interactions with the system. IA 
principles discussed here facilitate this capability. Capturing user intentions and 
defining the extent to which a user can participate in the information manipulation 
process is heavily contextual. 
The definition of a resource is a fundamental principle of IA and so is in any 
informatics discipline. In the digital arena, resources are digital assets or information 
artefacts. The account number of a person’s bank account is a digital asset. Each 
asset is different from each other in terms of quality, quantity, sensitivity etc. E.g. 
Given a person’s bank account, he may have only one account number associated 
with it, but may have more than one credit/debit card with their own unique card 
numbers associated with that same account. Hence, the data should consist of certain 
inherent characteristics from the time of creation. The clear representation of the 
characteristics of digital resources is fundamental but is worth mentioning. This clear 
definition is vital for accountability systems because the nature of the resource brings 
with it usage constraints for users. We can couple three types of actors to information 
resources, the subject of the resource, the owner of the resource and the consumer of 
the resource. Each of these actors will have inherently different roles to play within 
the system. 
Transparency is a principle of IA that is of utmost importance. All relevant 
users must have the capability to observe how information is used and by whom. 
Transparency can be defined differently in two contexts. In business ethics and 
information ethics, it’s likely that transparency refers to the visibility of information. 
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In computer science and IT, it is more likely to refer to the invisibility of information 
(Turilli & Floridi, 2009). But Weitzner et al. (2008) states that, “transparency and 
accountability makes bad acts visible to all concerned”, hence referring to the 
visibility of information usage. Therefore, despite the context which we are focused 
on, by transparency we mean that information transactions are visible to the required 
entities. This allows for the actions performed by data consumers to be traced back to 
an individual or process. According to Weitzner et al. (Weitzner, et al., 2006), 
transparency and accountability will be critical in helping the society to manage the 
privacy risks that accrue from the explosive progress in communication, storage and 
search technology. The need for transparency and accountability is ever more 
important in information systems which are becoming ever more complex and 
decentralised. 
Provenance of electronic data deals with the history or a record of transactions 
performed on a data object. A record of such would enable computer systems to 
reason over the life cycle of a data object. As Moreau et al. (2008) point out, 
electronic data does not have the necessary historical information that would help 
end-users, reviewers or regulators to make the necessary verifications. The 
availability of computer based provenance aware systems enable the users to decide 
whether they trust the electronic data in a computer based information system. 
Provenance can provide facts about the authenticity of a data object but it plays an 
even bigger role in accountability systems. When holding someone accountable, the 
trustworthiness of the data about the inappropriate transaction(s) or the evidence is 
crucial. Hence, provenance of data and metadata is a significant factor in IA. In IA, 
provenance is facilitated using appropriate transaction logs which are an essential 
component in current information systems (Lampson, 2009). These transaction logs 
are meant to be policy aware so that the system itself is capable of identifying 
inappropriate use of data or a breach of policy. Provenance data can be stored in 
transaction logs in a format that can facilitate policy reasoning within the system to 
give the users the capability to reason about misuse and against claims of misuse. 
The reasoning process includes inquiries about potential misuse of data by the 
subjects or owners of the data and justifications about the usage by data consumers. 
Data consumers have a right to be informed of the underlying policies and the 
ramifications of breach of policies especially when the system facilitates a tracking 
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process which monitors the transactions by every user. Therefore users of an 
accountability system should be well informed, i.e. a notification process where users 
are informed about underlying policies before an action occurs must be put in place. 
For example, a user will be notified whether he is authorised to access/use a 
particular set of data he is trying to access and the ramifications if he proceeds 
regardless of the warning. This will also help in facilitating non-repudiation which is 
a significant aspect in information security. 
In the case where an inappropriate use of information has occurred, the 
ramification of that occurrence towards the information user needs to be well defined 
in terms of appropriate penalties or negative consequences. In accountability 
systems (inappropriate) participation is entailed by negative consequences. A sense 
of awareness has to be delivered to the data consumers in a form they understand in 
terms of financial, professional, social or legal penalty. This awareness of the 
consequences is meant to deter users from inappropriate use of information in 
accountability systems. It will also give the victim or the claimant a sense of one’s 
rights in terms of the use of their information by a third party. It will also aid in 
increasing consumer trust in the system. These penalties evidently require a legal 
framework where they can be properly defined. 
It is important to understand that the principles presented above must all be 
governed within a legislative framework which defines each aspect clearly. The 
legal foundations are a critical aspect of accountability systems. For example, if clear 
definitions of the penalties for violations are not given, the threat of negative 
consequences that deters users from misusing information will not be conveyed thus 
failing to provide the necessary incentives to abide by the rules. The legal aspects of 
IA and accountability systems in the healthcare context are discussed in detail in 
chapter nine. Next we will discuss IA principles in the healthcare context. 
2.5 INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY IN HEALTHCARE 
Accountability, in general, is a significant issue in healthcare. This entails 
ethical and professional conduct, professional negligence and other such related 
issues. Accountability relating to healthcare information manipulation arises mainly 
as a result of information privacy concerns. According to Emanuel et al. (1996) it is 
important to clearly identify the different parties in healthcare that can be held 
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accountable, the issues for which a party can be held accountable and the appropriate 
mechanisms for accountability in healthcare in order to understand the concept of 
information accountability in healthcare. The components of accountability, Emanuel 
et al. (1996) say, are who, what and how. “Who” relate to the different parties that 
can be held accountable and the parties that can hold other accountable. ‘How’ are 
the mechanisms for holding someone accountable. ‘What’ as they define it are the 
domains in which someone is held accountable in. Another important component that 
had to be but was not considered in their approach is the reason or the significance of 
why hold someone accountable for their actions, or the ‘Why’ in accountability. 
Emanuel et al. (1996) delineate three models of accountability; professional 
accountability, economic accountability, and political accountability. They continue 
to say that one model of accountability is simply not enough for a complicated 
system as healthcare. And, also, the models of accountability should not be confused 
with the different facets of the healthcare system. 
According to Ferreira et al. (2003) the accountability information should be 
made usable by many stakeholders, each one having a different purpose and, 
therefore, different access to the information. The Joint Group of the General 
Practitioners’ Committee and the Royal College of General Practitioners as cited by 
Ferreira et al. (2003) says, in healthcare, this would allow a patient to review some of 
the actions associated with their electronic patient record (referring to an EHR). 
Healthcare professionals and auditors would be able to browse summary events as 
part of their normal work and to search further in extraordinary cases. They state that 
the main objective of accountability systems is to provide a means to verify, analyse 
and investigate users’ actions. More importantly though, its presence tends to ensure 
procedures are correctly followed. 
2.5.1 The need for Information Accountability in Healthcare 
Accountability can address a wide range of aspects of healthcare such as 
medical negligence, unethical practice, pharmaceutical abuse, etc. In terms of usage 
control, information accountability mechanisms in healthcare allow to ensure that 
patient health information is not misused by care providers or other stakeholders. In 
other words, information is used for the purpose for which they have been collected 
and only for the benefit of the patient and other legitimate purposes. If we are to 
achieve information accountability in healthcare, the aforementioned purposes have 
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to be comprehensively defined. This is a process that must be carried out with the 
required (domain) knowledge and expertise to determine the relationships (mapping) 
between data in EHRs and purposes. A simple representation of this is shown in 
Figure 2.3. This mapping will identify which data element in an EHR is linked to 
which defined purpose(s). A healthcare professional that is authorised to access a 
particular data element can access and use it for only the linked purpose(s). But 
healthcare professionals are allowed to access data which they are not authorised to 
access but will have to provide justifications for their actions. 
 
 
Figure 2.3 EHR data and intended purposes mapping 
As brought to notice earlier, data ownership is a critical factor that needs to be 
properly understood if data usage control is to be achieved. In the healthcare domain 
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it is difficult to define who owns health information. It is clear that patients are the 
subjects of health information. But patients are not always medical professionals; 
hence it is impossible to give them complete control of their health information. 
Privacy policies of a patient should accompany policies from a professional health 
body such as a trusted medical practitioner or a central health authority. But it is 
important to balance between the patient’s privacy requirements and the 
requirements of the healthcare providers or the care givers (competing concerns). 
In section 1.2.6, we identified requirements of eHealth stakeholders. We note 
that the healthcare domain demands that while fulfilling these requirements of 
stakeholders, under no circumstances must the health of the patient be compromised. 
Clear procedures for overriding usage policies in emergency situations should be 
defined to this extent. The nature of the healthcare domain demands the 
implementation of a break-the-glass approach in such situations (National E-Health 
Transition Authority, 2011a). 
Healthcare professionals have a responsibility towards the patients to deliver 
the best possible care. This responsibility comes with the acquisition of the 
specialised knowledge which governs healthcare practice. Healthcare professionals 
seek a degree of confidence in the policies and protocols within an eHealth system 
and a guarantee of the accuracy of the health information itself. The proper 
mechanisms should be put in place to deliver this level of confidence of healthcare 
professionals who are responsible for making decisions towards the wellbeing of 
their patients. 
Defining clear attributes for role-based access, policy development, rules on 
patient privacy at home, and data mining rules and technological measures will be 
needed to ensure the security and privacy of medical data (Meingast, et al., 2006). 
The appropriate management of health information in eHealth systems is therefore a 
crucial factor. The data contained in eHealth systems can be considered as digital 
assets. The policies that govern the use of these assets can then be formulated and 
represented using digital rights management technologies. These policies should 
cover the requirements of all participants in healthcare and must encompass usage 
control features in order to gain the trust of patients and the confidence of healthcare 
professionals. 
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Controlling how authorised users use information is challenging. As regards 
this control, we raise the question; “Will users only use data for the intended 
purpose(s)?” In a complex domain such as healthcare which is driven by specialised 
knowledge, controlling the usage of information by those specialists (HCPs) is 
somewhat a sensitive matter. It is not always the correct cause of action to impose 
restrictions to information access and usage on HCPs. But in terms of the privacy 
requirements of patients some degree of restriction to the usage is necessary to fulfil 
those requirements. Information accountability with its defined principles can 
address this issue by reaching a correct balance of the previously identified 
requirements. 
2.6 MOTIVATING CASE SCENARIO 
The following case scenario illustrates how different eHealth stakeholders 
would behave in a care setting. The policy formulation and manipulation processes 
that are discussed in chapters five and six will follow this case scenario. The case 
scenario is designed to capture and illustrate how the policy formulation and 
manipulation protocols fulfil the information privacy and information access 
requirements identified in section 1.2.6. The activities presented in this scenario can 
be generalised into any other eHealth scenario that involves similar activities. 
Patient X has a comprehensive electronic health record which is managed by a 
central health authority in his home state called StateHeath. StateHealth is 
responsible for securely storing EHRs of residents of its state and providing certain 
capabilities to them. StateHealth is also responsible for managing the state’s 
healthcare professionals including physicians, nurses, lab technicians and other 
relevant staff. StateHealth defines health policies and intended purposes for the data 
collected and stored in EHRs. These policies fulfil requirements of healthcare 
professionals and StateHealth itself. Patient X is also capable of setting his own 
policies on the data elements in his EHR. These policies mostly consist of his privacy 
requirements. Patient X maintains a list of trusted healthcare professionals who can 
access all or parts of his EHR depending on the trust level Patient X and StateHealth 
has assigned for them. All healthcare professionals are required to specify the 
purpose for which they require access to a set of data before access is granted to 
them. 
 42 Chapter 2: Principles of Information Accountability in eHealth 
 
Figure 2.4 Motivating healthcare scenario 
After noticing a skin rash, Patient X visits his trusted dermatologist Dr. S for a 
check up. After the preliminary examination, Dr. S thinks that Patient X’s skin 
condition could be linked to a known sexually transmitted disease (STD). Patient X 
does not have a sexual health specialist in his list of trusted health professionals. 
However, Dr. S wants to share Patient X’s details with a sexual health specialist, Dr. 
B, in order to get a specialists’ opinion on the situation. Dr. B has a default access 
level set by StateHealth by being assigned the role of a sexual health specialist. Since 
Dr. S is in Patient X’s list of trusted health professionals, she can initiate a request to 
share Patient X’s (relevant) details with other health professionals. Patient X, 
however, is notified of this action by Dr. S. After Dr. B gets (and accepts) this 
request from Dr. S, he initiates a usage request to use the data for diagnostic 
purposes. Patient X has a history of mental illness and does not want anyone else 
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other than his GP (Dr. P) and a trusted mental health specialist who has treated him 
before (Dr. M) to know about it. Dr. B suspects that Patient X’s skin condition could 
be stress related and tries to access his mental health record. At this point, because 
Dr. B is not authorised to access Patient X’s mental health details, he is warned by 
the EHR system of this fact and Dr. B refers Patient X to Dr. M. Dr. M as Patient X’s 
trusted mental health professional, investigates Patient X’s condition and makes a 
diagnosis. Dr. M may or may not include Dr. B as a specialist in the diagnostic 
decision making process. After Patient X’s illness has been diagnosed and a 
treatment plan is decided, his EHR is updated by the treating physician(s). 
Depending on the policy StateHealth has set on EHR updates; Dr. S, Dr. B, Dr. M or 
Dr. P will make relevant updates to the EHR. After or during this episode of care 
Patient X may decide to add Dr. B as a trusted healthcare professional in his EHR. 
We assume that certain medical conditions have relationships between them that give 
rise to the fact that a particular health professional e.g. a dermatologist who has 
access to a patient’s dermatology details by default (set by StateHealth) should also 
have default access to the patient’s sexual health details. In our scenario above, Dr. S 
has default access to dermatology details and sexual health details of her patients’ 
and Dr. Bs’ access is also set likewise because of the relationship between skin 
conditions and STDs. 
We will use this case scenario primarily to contextualise the principles of 
information accountability, which is given next, and to demonstrate the protocols 
presented in chapters five and six. However, the case scenario is referred to in 
chapters three and four to maintain connectivity of the chapter.  
2.7 PRINCIPLES OF INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY IN eHEALTH 
In this section, we revisit the principles of information accountability discussed 
above and contextualise them to eHealth. We show how a number of eHealth 
requirements given in section 1.2.6 are satisfied by the principles of information 
accountability. The above case scenario is used for this contextualisation. 
2.7.1 Participation 
In healthcare it is important that responsibility and accountability are carefully 
balanced (Emanuel & Emanuel, 1996). The reason for this is that healthcare decision 
making is driven by specialised knowledge and expertise. If accountability measures 
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are put in place to govern how healthcare professionals, whose knowledge and 
expertise is invaluable, should participate in healthcare activities there has to be a 
fine balance between the responsibility and accountability measures. Therefore, as 
eHealth requirement 1 states, the healthcare requirement must be expressed in terms 
of policies set by a governing healthcare authority. Accountability begins where 
responsibility ends. After making a decision which one is responsible for, the 
decision maker is accountable for the ramifications of that decision imposed on the 
subjects or in this case the patients concerned. Each participant in a healthcare 
scenario can be categorised into roles within the healthcare domain. These roles can 
be thought to carry out professional tasks to fulfil their responsibilities, requirements 
and motivations. Hence, the information access requirements must be adequately 
satisfied, again referring to eHealth requirement 1. We do not however intend to 
define a comprehensive record of the tasks associated with each role in a healthcare 
organisation. However we point out that NEHTA (National E-Health Transition 
Authority, 2011a) has identified several types of roles with different capabilities in 
their new Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system as 
individuals, nominated representatives, authorised representatives, providers and 
nominated providers. Policies should be developed that address the different 
capabilities of roles within the industry. In our healthcare scenario, Patient X has 
three main rights; the right to decide whether or not to undergo medical treatment, 
after receiving a reasonable explanation of what the treatment involves and the risks 
associated with the treatment, the right to be treated with reasonable care and skill by 
a healthcare provider and the right to confidentiality of information about medical 
conditions and treatment1. Therefore, Dr. S, Dr. B and Dr. M have a responsibility 
towards Patient X to make the appropriate communications with him and make 
decisions regarding his health. 
2.7.2 Transparency 
As discussed in the previous section, transparency is a fundamental principle 
of IA (Weitzner, et al., 2006). In the eHealth scenario, Patient X, as the subject of the 
information, has the right to view what is contained in the EHR, who has access to it 
and what they do with the data they retrieve as specified in eHealth requirement 8. 
                                                 
 
1 Legal Services Commission of South Australia. (2012). Law Handbook Online.   
http://www.lawhandbook.sa.gov.au/ Retrieved 23 May, 2012 
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This gives Patient X the confidence to disclose his sensitive health information to the 
EHR system. StateHealth is responsible for providing this capability to Patient X and 
all who are registered with them and own an EHR. This transparency can be 
facilitated through transaction logs which record all transactions of users of the 
system. Transparency also covers the capability of the patients to make enquiries 
about suspicious activity by information users, in this case about any potentially 
suspicious actions performed by Dr. S, Dr. B, Dr. M, or Dr. P and also by 
StateHealth itself. 
2.7.3 Policies 
Patients have a fundamental right to confidentiality of information about 
medical conditions and treatment (Croll, 2011). This should allow patients to set 
their privacy policies within a healthcare information system that manages his/her 
medical information, thus satisfying eHealth requirements 6 and 7, which can be 
specified in their privacy policies. However, in a domain such as healthcare it is not 
always possible to allow every privacy policy of the patients to be operationalised. 
As stated earlier, healthcare is a highly specialised area which requires specialised 
medical knowledge to make an informed decision. Therefore, the policies that govern 
the control of information within EHRs need to also encompass policies formulated 
with a healthcare perspective, thus we refer back to eHealth requirement 1. In our 
case scenario, Patient X sets his privacy settings and relevant access rights for the 
health professionals in his access control list (ACL). StateHealth will also set access 
policies for the health professionals depending on the role they play in the 
organisation. For example, Dr. S will be assigned the role of a dermatologist; Dr. P 
will be assigned a role of a general practitioner and so on. These two policies will 
then have to be combined to set the final operational policy for the system. In this 
process, Patient X will be notified of any changes made and the final state of the 
policy. 
2.7.4 Provenance 
Data provenance is a subject vital to any informatics domain (Moreau, et al., 
2008). Here we will briefly discuss what role provenance plays in an eHealth 
environment. Provenance is an important aspect of any information system, 
especially if they are Web based. Unlike traditional information systems with 
network connections to known locations, Web based systems interact with users 
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from anywhere in the world. This makes it a factor to be able to trace a particular 
transaction to its source. The open architecture of the Web raises concerns over the 
legitimacy of the data being recorded and updated. In an eHealth environment this is 
a significant issue since the data retrieved from eHealth systems are used for 
diagnosis purposes to treat patients, and if not accurate could lead to adverse effects. 
Hence provenance plays a significant role in any health related information system. 
Groth et al. (2012) point out the significance of provenance and presented 
requirement for provenance on the Web using three hypothetical scenarios. They 
identified three major provenance dimensions; content, management and use. They 
raise the issues of reusability of the content of provenance data. This can be directly 
related to interoperability issues that are of concern in the health informatics domain. 
Once provenance data is correctly stored in systems, the management of data 
becomes an issue. To what extent should provenance data be exposed to system 
actors? Besides providing evidence about the history (e.g. origin, authenticity, 
creators etc) of a data element, provenance can also provide insights in to the life 
cycle of a data element. In accountability systems, this relates to making 
justifications about information use by a consumer with the use of appropriate 
transaction logs stored with provenance data. In the scenario we presented, if Dr. B 
has viewed Patient X’s mental health records despite being warned not to do so, a 
notification would have been sent to Patient X informing him that Dr. B’s action 
could be of intentional misuse of his health information. At this point Patient X is 
able to lodge an enquiry asking for a justification from Dr. B as to why he accessed 
his mental health records. Under the conditions that users of the systems fall under, 
Dr. B would then have to provide a justification as to why he accessed Patient X’s 
mental health details. This relates to the requirement that patients should be capable 
of seeing how their information is being used, as stated in eHealth requirement 8. 
2.7.5 Informed 
If accountability measures are in place, a proper notification process should 
also be in place to keep the users well informed, in order to prevent repudiation and 
unintentional misuse of information by delivering the appropriate incentives 
(Feigenbaum, Hendler, et al., 2011). The system users are aware of the policies in 
place within the system, their rights and capabilities and the ramifications of breach 
of policies. These notifications together with the provenance and transaction logs can 
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also facilitate non-repudiation within the system. They will also give the patients the 
confidence they need to disclose their sensitive information. However, because 
healthcare is highly specialised, patients cannot be given the ability to enquire about 
every transaction and request a justification for the actions from the healthcare 
professionals. This may hinder the health professionals’ professional activities. The 
system itself should be able to identify possible misuse of data and the patients are 
given the chance to request a justification for those actions. 
2.7.6 Penalties and Legislative support 
Legislative support is imperative for accountability systems (Sloan & Warner, 
2010). In healthcare, information and privacy are governed by appropriate 
legislation. The Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) took on the task to 
review the Privacy Act 1988 to inquire the extent to which it continued to provide an 
effective framework for the protection of privacy in Australia. In their report, the 
ALRC made recommendations towards the legislation focused on healthcare 
information and privacy in Australia (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2008). In 
a health information system governed by IA principles, the issues concerning 
information privacy and security as well as the appropriate methods of accountability 
in terms of penalties should be addressed by appropriate legislative constructs. In 
Australia, the operation of eHealth is subject to several Commonwealth, State and 
Territory privacy and information protection legislation (Australian Government 
Department of Health and Ageing, 2004; Australian Law Reform Commission, 2008; 
Office of Legislative Drafting and Publishing, 2010) and an individual’s ability to 
control who can access their information in certain circumstances are addressed in 
these legislation (National E-Health Transition Authority, 2011c). Even though there 
is much attention to the information security and privacy issues in healthcare in a 
legal perspective, for accountability systems to successfully reach their goals in the 
healthcare domain, all aspects of IA principles discussed above must be completely 
and sufficiently covered by proper legislation, especially the aspects of appropriate 
penalties. 
2.8 ACCOUNTABLE-eHEALTH SYSTEMS 
So far in this chapter, we have introduced information accountability and 
formulated a series of principles in the eHealth domain. Towards a novel model of 
 48 Chapter 2: Principles of Information Accountability in eHealth 
eHealth augmented by IA, in this section we introduce Accountable-eHealth (AeH) 
systems. We defined AeH systems as eHealth systems which adhere to IA principles.  
Introduction to AeH systems 
The goal of AeH systems is to be non-restrictive in terms of information 
availability to legitimate users. They provide incentives to the users to implement 
appropriate use of information. These incentives take the form of accountability 
entailed by penalties (Feigenbaum, Jaggard, et al., 2011). The underlying principle is 
that when users are aware that such use of information would lead to a negative 
outcome, they would be deterred from engaging in such activities. Thus, allowing 
information to be made available for the legitimate user more openly and effectively. 
In terms of the information owners’ perspective, the knowledge of the existence of 
accountability mechanisms and the transparency of system activities are incentives 
towards increasing their trust in the system. 
The presence of IA mechanisms deters users from intentionally engaging in 
inappropriate activities. This is more profound in the offline world than in the online 
world (Feigenbaum, Hendler, et al., 2011). This deterrence is governed by social 
norms that are accepted by the majority of the society. But it is not the case in the 
online world. Such norms are still in their embryonic stages and are not clearly 
defined nor widely accepted in the society. This creates problems for AeH systems. 
But it is the intention that ones such systems become available and used by the 
majority of the community, the practices will become norms themselves. 
An overview of the accountable-eHealth model 
In our model, we consider three types of users; a central health authority, 
patients, and HCPs. The health authority is the governing body responsible for 
managing the EHR system and managing its employees i.e. HCPs. The health 
authority defines default access levels for each HCP relevant to their role within the 
healthcare domain. The patients define their own access policies for the HCPs they 
nominate to give access to their health records according to individual privacy 
requirements. Using a predefined protocol, the two policies are combined such that 
the final operational policy assigned for each HCP satisfies both the patient’s privacy 
requirements and the HCP’s information requirements. HCPs who have been 
nominated by a patient to have access to his EHR will lodge usage requests 
containing the required data types and the intended purpose(s) for access. These 
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requests are processed using a knowledgebase containing EHR data types and related 
purposes. All usage of EHR data by HCPs is stored as transaction logs for after-the-
fact accountability purposes. In an event of a possible misuse of a patient’s health 
information by a HCP, the patient is capable of lodging an inquiry to the relevant 
HCP asking for a justification for his actions. The HCP is then required by the 
system to provide a valid justification for the particular usage. If the HCP fails to do 
so, he is held accountable for the ramifications of his actions. Figure 2.5 shows a 
simplified AeH model. 
 
Figure 2.5 Accountable-eHealth Model (Gajanayake, Iannella, Lane, & Sahama, 2012) 
A simple use case diagram for the AeH model is shown in Figure 2.6. 
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Figure 2.6 Use case diagram for AeH systems (Gajanayake, Iannella, Lane, et al., 2012) 
2.8.1 Characteristics of AeH systems 
In this section we will discuss the characteristics and protocols of AeH systems 
arising from the principles IA discussed earlier. The characteristics also follow the 
eHealth requirements identified in section 1.2.6 in chapter two. 
Control of health information 
Delegating control of personal information to the subjects has been seen as a 
means of addressing privacy in information sensitive domains (Haas, Wohlgemuth, 
Echizen, Sonehara, & Müller, 2011). AeH systems extend control of health 
information to the patients as well as a governing health authority thus adhering to 
eHealth requirements 1, 6 and 7. This will ensure that fulfilling patient privacy 
requirements would not lead to a hindrance to healthcare delivery by HCPs. Policies 
for how information must be used are set either by the patients, a relevant authority 
or by both as seen in Figure 2.5. Therefore, in some circumstances a patient’s privacy 
policy may be overridden by that of the health authority, thus adhering to eHealth 
requirement 4. Patients nominate preferred HCPs to access information in their EHR, 
adhering more specifically to eHealth requirement 6. The HCPs are assigned specific 
levels of access as defined in the aforementioned policies. 
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Information usage and justifications 
Health information must be used for the purpose of healthcare delivery for the 
patients. AeH systems require a comprehensive record of purposes for which 
information can be used by HCPs. These predefined purposes are maintained by the 
health authority. Although predefined policies govern the use of information in AeH 
systems, HCPs are allowed to access information that is outside of those policies to 
ensure that the required information is available to the HCPs in unforeseeable 
circumstances. This characteristic of AeH systems thus adheres to what is stated in 
eHealth requirement 2. This will however trigger an event in the system where the 
patient in question can request a justification for the use of information from the 
HCP. The HCP is obligated to justify his actions regarding the patient’s health 
information. A patient may or may not choose to request a justification given the 
nature of the incident. Providing this capability to the patients enable AeH systems to 
be more open and patient centric. But it is also important to view this aspect in a 
HCP’s perspective by considering their responsibilities towards providing quality 
healthcare to their patients. The inquiry and justification process must not hinder the 
normal healthcare activities of the healthcare professionals. Patients must only be 
allowed to make inquiries about incidents which cannot be resolved by the 
information accountability service. The attitudes towards this function will be further 
investigated in chapters three and four. 
Notification 
To enforce transparency, AeH systems propose a notification process where all 
participants are kept informed about the policies and the activities of the system. In 
this process the HCPs are notified of actions (access to information) that are outside 
of their allowed capabilities and patients are informed of possible misuse of their 
health information by HCPs. This would enable patients to be aware of how their 
health information is being used (see eHealth requirement 8) and HCPs to be more 
alert towards inadvertently accessing the wrong information. 
Provenance 
Provenance of electronic data deals with the history or a record of transactions 
performed on a data object. A record of the activities in the system must be kept in 
the form of policy-aware transaction logs which act as accountability information 
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used to validate the above mentioned justifications by HCPs in the event of a 
conflict. 
Penalties and redress 
Adequate measures must exist to minimise the extent of negligent or 
intentional misuse of health information by an HCP. Such measures should ideally be 
designed to operate both as deterrence against such behaviour as well as incentive for 
HCPs to act appropriately. These penalties must be communicated to the users such 
that they are aware of the consequences of intentional misuse of sensitive 
information. 
2.9 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Information accountability is a fairly new concept to computer science and 
ICT. The term has been defined in several dimensions by researchers in the computer 
science arena. We made the argument that information accountability should be 
defined in a contextual perspective to convey the sagacity of its principles. We have 
identified and presented the principles of information accountability which 
accountability systems should adhere in order to reach their intended objectives. We 
have identified healthcare as a potential domain which can benefit from the 
principles of IA and the accountability systems goals. Healthcare is a complex 
information domain due to the nature of the information used and its complexity and 
specialised knowledge driven nature. The use of specialist knowledge in healthcare is 
an obstacle to system developers because the requirements of the stakeholders 
conflict with many aspects of system mostly in terms of policy. The requirements of 
healthcare consumers have to be fulfilled together with the requirements of the care 
providers such that conflicts of policies are addressed in such a way that a domain 
(healthcare) sensitive compromise is achieved. A health record of a patient has to be 
complete and readily accessible for it to be useful to the care provider. 
Information accountability is focused around the way users participate in the 
system and the policies associated with the data elements they use. It is important for 
accountability systems to capture the intentions of the users. Users fulfil their 
intentions by performing certain tasks towards achieving a specific goal. These goals 
are to be defined within the context the systems operate. In healthcare, a 
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comprehensive list of intended purposes associated with the data will be defined by 
an entity with the relevant domain knowledge to do so. 
Data in an EHR and the actions users perform on data should have a clear 
record of provenance in the form of a policy-aware transaction log in order for 
accountability to be achieved. Provenance of data is a subject of many different 
aspects. Here we have considered in general the importance of data provenance in 
healthcare. 
Accountability systems have an inherent drawback. This is the fact that actions 
are taken for misuse of data after the incident has occurred. This after-the-fact issue 
would itself be reason enough for consumers to be concerned of their information in 
an accountability system. But the concept behind IA is that users will be aware of the 
consequences of their actions and will deter from misusing data due to the fear of 
negative consequences, more like in the offline society we live in. So it is a matter of 
facilitating this awareness (informed) and a sense of responsibility (participation) in 
the consumers through the IA principles. 
Accountable systems contain audit logs of every transaction within the system. 
These logs may become the focus of legal issues which occasionally occur in the 
healthcare domain. In most of these issues the healthcare professionals are blamed 
for misconduct or negligence towards the patients. The presence of these types of 
audit logs may contribute to, for example, the insurability of a health professional 
who might agree to use such systems. Therefore, health professionals may not accept 
these accountability mechanisms as a practicable option. This could hinder the 
accountability systems greatly. This however, can be addressed through proper 
policies supported by legislation. Proper legislation plays a major role for these types 
of systems to take effect, particularly the definition of the appropriate methods of 
accountability in terms of consequences for misuse of data. 
In this chapter, we have presented the principles of information accountability 
in the healthcare context. We have argued that information accountability is a 
concept better defined in context than in a general sense. With the proper definition 
of the principles, we identified how eHealth systems should be designed with the use 
of information accountability to address information privacy and related issues. It is 
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important to understand that it is next to impossible to fill the analog and digital 
holes present in any information system2. In our case scenario we are dealing with 
the visibility of health information to the appropriate user. Once a person obtains the 
required data, how can we prevent him from showing these data to a bystander on a 
computer display? How do we track this sort of action? These remain open questions 
for ethical and professional conduct and cannot be control by policies enforced 
within computer systems (all trust is within the system). 
The development of an accountability system for healthcare involves the 
collaborative effort of computer scientist, healthcare professionals, legal experts, 
social scientists and IT professionals. From the available literature, it is clear that 
information accountability has not been addressed in a healthcare context than in 
other domains. Together with the developments in ICT and consumer awareness of 
those technologies and its application in the healthcare domain, information 
accountability could pave the way forward in terms of information privacy 
management and usage control of electronic health resources altogether. 
 
 
                                                 
 
2 Sandhu, R. (2012) Grand Challenges in Data Usage Control. Keynote speech at the WWW 2012 
Workshop on Data Usage Management on the Web (DUMW), April 16, Lyon, France. 
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Chapter 3: Views on Information 
Accountability in eHealth: A 
Survey of Future Healthcare 
Professionals 
 
In this chapter, we present the results of a survey conducted to measure the 
attitudes towards information accountability in eHealth. A research model and 
descriptive analysis of the survey data are presented. The survey data used in this 
chapter consists of quantitative and qualitative data from 334 completed online 
questionnaire survey responses from university students studying medicine, nursing 
and various other health related courses in three leading universities around 
Queensland, Australia. The findings relate to the attitudes of the participants towards 
electronic health records and characteristics of AeH systems as presented in chapter 
two. This exploratory survey was done as an investigation into how the concepts 
behind an information accountability framework (IAF) would be accepted by 
potential future healthcare professionals. The results from the survey support, to a 
certain degree, the applicability of IA principles in the eHealth domain. The findings 
indicate that there is support from the professionals’ perspective for the technological 
aspects of an IAF presented in chapters five and six. Research objective 4(a) is 
addressed in this chapter. 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Designing systems that cater for eHealth requirements of different stakeholders 
is a complex undertaking because balancing these requirements is both a complex 
and sensitive undertaking. In chapter two, we established a series of principles that 
govern the use and control of health information which we introduced as principles 
of information accountability. We saw potential behind those principles for achieving 
the aforementioned balance of requirements when dealing with EHR systems. There 
are however no such systems available that can be tested and evaluated. 
Nevertheless, it is important to measure how these systems, if developed, will be 
accepted by the eHealth stakeholders. 
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This chapter draws from the results of chapter two and develop and test a 
conceptual research model on the acceptance of the IAF in eHealth as well as a 
descriptive analysis of results of a questionnaire survey as a measure of the attitudes 
towards the IAF. The research model is primarily based on the Unified Theory of 
Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh, Morris, Gordon, & 
Davis, 2003), a well established and frequently used model of technology acceptance 
in information systems research. Justification of the hypotheses and the logical 
reasoning are also drawn from previous technology acceptance research in the 
healthcare domain. 
The survey utilised in this study aims to measure the perceived intention to 
adopt the proposed EHR system with IA measures for information management by 
future healthcare professionals. This scope is significant given that the 
implementation and operation of such a system will require a significant amount of 
time, resources and require extensive legislative support, which are only recently 
being initiated; for instance, in Australia (Further information related to the legal 
aspects of IA in healthcare is available in chapter seven). 
The analysis of the results from the survey was conducted in two stages. Firstly 
a descriptive analysis was performed on the quantitative and qualitative data using 
IBM SPSS Version 19 (SPSS Inc, 2012). From the descriptive analysis, an 
assessment was made about the attitudes of the respondents towards the IAF 
characteristics. Secondly, the measurement model and the structural model were 
tested by focusing on the relationships of the model constructs and the hypotheses 
respectively. The partial least square (PLS) method of structural equation modelling 
(SEM) was used for this analysis. The analysis tool used was smartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, 
Wende, & Will, 2005). 
3.2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH MODEL DESIGN 
Using existent theory to develop testable models of health information 
technology benefits both research and practice (Holden & Karsh, 2009). The research 
model designed and tested in this chapter draws from prior research in the field of 
technology acceptance in general, technology acceptance research in healthcare 
informatics and the findings from chapter two. The research model is primarily based 
on the UTAUT model (Venkatesh, et al., 2003) but is adopted to fit the survey cohort 
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and the IAF to be tested. Additional constructs have been introduced to measure the 
impacts of the IAF characteristics on the perceived intention to adopt the system. 
3.2.1 Methodology 
The method used in the study was a quantitative and qualitative questionnaire 
survey. The results presented in this chapter are of the first of a two phase survey 
which was designed and conducted to capture both the healthcare professionals’ 
perspective and a patients’ perspective on the IAF acceptance respectively following 
a successful pilot survey. The questionnaire was developed to capture well 
established technology acceptance constructs from previous research and the 
influence of the new characteristics introduced to the eHealth context by the IAF on 
those constructs together with the overall attitudes on the IAF characteristics. The 
primary goal of the survey was to assess the acceptability of the IAF in eHealth and 
the validation of a research model that can be used to measure technology acceptance 
of accountable-eHealth systems. 
3.2.2 The Research Model Design 
The UTAUT model has a high exploratory power resulting from its 
comprehensiveness and the care taken in its development (Schaper & Pervan, 2007). 
The research model shown in Figure 3.1 was designed to capture its already accepted 
relationships and was amended to fit the application context and the nature of the 
expected survey participants. The amendments also included previously untested 
constructs. A detailed account of the hypotheses is given in section 5.2.4. 
 
 
 
 60 Chapter 3: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: A Survey of Future Healthcare Professionals 
 
Figure 3.1 Hypothesised research model 
3.2.3 The application of the UTAUT Model 
The UTAUT model (Venkatesh, et al., 2003) was developed based on eight 
prominent technology acceptance models: the Technology Acceptance Model 
(TAM) (Davis, 1989), the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975), the Innovation Diffusion theory (IDT) (E. M. Rogers, 1995), the Theory of 
Planned Behaviour (TPB) (Ajzen, 1991), the Motivation Model (MM) (Davis, 
Bagozzi, & Warshaw, 1992), the Model of PC Utilisation (MPCU) (Thompson, 
Higgins, & Howell, 1991), the combined TAM and TPB (Taylor & Todd, 1995) and 
Social Congitive Theory (Compeau, Higgins, & Huff, 1999). UTAUT has four main 
constructs: performance expectancy, effort expectancy, social influence and 
facilitating conditions. The primary moderators of the model are gender, age, 
experience and voluntariness of use. 
Although the model is applicable to a wide range of industries and disciplines 
including healthcare (Schaper & Pervan, 2007), its application in this study faced 
several limitations. Firstly, the survey participants were university students studying 
medicine, nursing or other health related courses. Although postgraduate students 
were within the cohort, the majority was undergraduate students. Therefore, 
constructs such as facilitating conditions were not included in the research model. 
Secondly, the type of eHealth system in question has not been implemented and the 
participants did not have a working experience of such a system. Determinants such 
as social influence therefore could not be included in to the research model.  
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3.2.4 Research Hypothesis 
Technology acceptance in healthcare has been studied in the research domain 
for many years. Schaper et al. (2007) proposed a research model designed towards 
examining the ICT acceptance and utilisation by Australian occupational therapists. 
This model was based on the UTAUT model itself and a generic technology 
acceptance framework proposed by Chau et al. (2002b). They used three dimensions 
of technology acceptance: individual context, technology context and 
implementation context to capture the factors affecting the intention to use ICT. 
Together with the UTAUT model, we also focus on this work as a foundation for the 
designed research model presented here. 
In our study, the hypotheses were formulated to capture both previously 
validated technology acceptance relationships and characteristics of the IAF. We 
adopt the individual context and the technology context constructs from Schaper et 
al. (2007) and introduce an information context, which deals with aspects relating to 
healthcare information manipulation within the IAF. The implementation context 
used by Chau et al. (2002b) and Schaper et al. (2007) were not utilised due to the 
specific focus and intention of the study being the perceived intention to use the 
proposed EHR system. A measure of the actual use of the system can only be 
measured once the proposed system can be implemented in a controlled healthcare 
setting, which at this stage of the study is not feasible given its complexity, limited 
resources and time constraints. The constructs used as measurements in each of the 
contexts are discussed next. 
Individual context 
Personal characteristics influence one’s technology acceptance decisions (Chau 
& Hu, 2002b). As regards personal characteristics, many aspects have been 
previously studied under different circumstances. But, computer self-efficacy, 
computer anxiety and computer attitude are the most common and prominent 
constructs used in many technology acceptance studies (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). To 
be specific to the nature and domain of this study, we introduce “EHR” as an 
augmentation to the general meaning of “Computer” in this context, which is 
reflected in our hypotheses. 
Computer Self-Efficacy is defined as the judgement of one’s capability to use 
ICT (Compeau & Higgins, 1995). It can be applied, measured and described at a 
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general level or as pertaining to a specific application (Downey & McMurtrey, 2007; 
Marakas, Mun, & Johnson, 1998). Because this research model focuses on specific 
characteristics of a system, computer self-efficacy in used as a measure of the 
computer self-efficacy of a specific application.  
Contrasting to other research (Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Compeau, et al., 
1999; Hsu & Chiu, 2004; Igbaria & Iivari, 1995), the UTAUT model considered 
computer self-efficacy not to have a direct relationship to behavioural intention but 
to have an indirect effect being mediated by effort expectancy (Venkatesh, et al., 
2003). Hence, we make the following hypotheses for our research model. 
Hypothesis 1:  Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy will have a direct positive effect on 
effort expectancy 
Hypothesis 2: Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy will not have a direct effect on 
behavioural intention 
Computer Anxiety is defined as an affective response of apprehension, or 
fear, when faced with the possibility of using ICT (Simonson, Maurer, Montag-
Torardi, & Whitaker, 1987). Furthermore, according to Heinssen et al. (1987), 
computer anxiety involves a more effective response, such that resistance to and 
avoidance of computer technology are a function of fear and apprehension, 
intimidation, hostility, and worries that one will be embarrassed, look stupid or even 
damage the equipment. Factors such as erroneous beliefs of one’s ability to use 
computers may be contributors to computer anxiety. Computer anxiety is said to 
have an effect on motivation and performance (Heinssen Jr, et al., 1987). 
In the development of the UTAUT model, computer anxiety was modelled not 
to have a direct effect on behavioural intention but to have a direct effect on effort 
expectancy and thereby have an indirect effect on behavioural intention mediated by 
effort expectancy (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). Hence we formulate the following 
hypotheses relating to computer anxiety in our research model. 
Hypothesis 3: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct negative effect on effort 
expectancy 
Hypothesis 4: Computer/EHR Anxiety will not have a direct effect on behavioural 
intention 
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Computer Attitude is an individual’s overall affective reaction to using ICT 
(Venkatesh, et al., 2003). IT involves an individual’s interest in and feelings of the 
enjoyment and pleasure that they feel with using ICT. Similar to computer anxiety, 
computer attitude is said to have an effect on motivation and performance of an 
individual when using ICT (Heinssen Jr, et al., 1987). In their study however, 
Venkatesh et al. (2003) found that computer attitude did not have a direct 
relationship towards behavioural intention, which was mediated by performance 
expectancy and effort expectancy. But in healthcare technology acceptance studies it 
was shown that computer attitude does in fact have a direct relationship with 
behavioural intention or technology acceptance (Chau & Hu, 2002b; Schaper & 
Pervan, 2007). Therefore we formulate the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Computer/EHR Attitude will have a direct positive effect on 
behavioural intention 
Technological context 
The perceptions of an individual’s evaluation of technology has been found to 
have relevance in technology acceptance decision making in healthcare (Schaper & 
Pervan, 2007). In the technological context of this research model the focus is give to 
two constructs; performance expectancy and effort expectancy, which are theorised 
to have direct relationships to behavioural intention. 
In the UTAUT model, Performance Expectancy is defined as the degree to 
which an individual believes that using the system will help him or her to attain gains 
in job performance (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). Being a very relevant construct in any 
technology domain, it has been established that performance expectancy is a 
significant aspect in the healthcare domain which has a direct effect in a health 
professionals’ behavioural intention and an indirect effect to behavioural intention 
mediated by computer attitude (Chau & Hu, 2002b; Schaper & Pervan, 2007). 
Hence, we make the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 6: Performance Expectancy will have a direct positive effect on 
behavioural intention 
Hypothesis 7: Performance Expectancy will have a direct positive effect on 
computer attitude 
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Effort Expectancy as the degree of ease associated with the use of the system 
(Venkatesh, et al., 2003). In most technology acceptance literature, effort expectancy 
(mostly captured through perceived ease of use by Davis et al. (1989)) was found to 
have a direct relationship with behavioural intention. In contrast in the healthcare 
sector, studies have shown that effort expectancy does not have a significant 
influence on behavioural intention (Chau & Hu, 2002b; Chismar & Wiley-Patton, 
2003; Jayasuriya, 1998). However, the study by Schaper et al. (2007) that utilised the 
UTAUT model, did establish that there is in fact a direct relationship of effort 
expectancy on behavioural intention (Schaper, 2009; Schaper & Pervan, 2007). The 
contrasting results may have been due to the specialised nature (Australian 
Occupational Therapists) of the participants in their study. 
Given that this study is mostly based on the UTAUT model and that effort 
expectancy acts as a mediator for other constructs as theorised above, we will make 
the following hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 8: Effort Expectancy will have a direct positive effect on behavioural 
intention 
Information context 
The information context has been introduced to the research model to capture 
the characteristics of the IAF and to measure the influence of those characteristics on 
acceptance of the proposed system. It consists of three main determinants; 
information control, information governance and information accountability. Each of 
these characterises the nature of the eHealth system that the user would use in a 
healthcare setting. Since the influence of these aspects has not been tested in prior 
research, we theorise that they may have an influence on all aspects of the research 
model that are logically sound. The IAF constructs may influence performance 
expectancy and effort expectancy. We also test their direct influence on behavioural 
intention. We assume that the new IAF capabilities will not have a negative effect on 
the acceptance of technology by healthcare professionals such that the introduction 
of those capabilities would not affect the overall acceptance of the EHR system. 
We believe that the information context introduced here will play a significant 
role in the acceptance of technology in the healthcare domain. Because healthcare 
professionals have an expectation of timely availability and good quality information 
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and the facts that healthcare is driven by information, a significant focus should be 
given to how information is manipulated in the EHR system. 
Information Governance is defined in this context as the enforcement of 
usage rules on how health professionals use a patients’ healthcare information. These 
usage rules are captured by predefined purposes set by the health authority, which 
are discussed in detail in chapter five. The items in the information governance 
construct were designed to measure the attitudes of the participants towards the 
presence of information usage rules on how they can use patient information for 
healthcare purposes. The significance of this construct to the technological aspects is 
that it measures how this characteristic is perceived by the stakeholders. The 
influence of this aspect of the IAF is important given that misuse of information is 
initially detected using a knowledge base present in the IAF containing the purposes 
assigned for each data type in the EHR. Chapters five and six discuss these aspects in 
more detail. 
We make the following hypotheses in regards to the information governance 
construct. 
Hypothesis 9: Information Governance will not have a direct negative effect 
on Effort expectancy 
Hypothesis 10: Information Governance will not have a direct negative effect 
on Performance expectancy 
Hypothesis 11: Information Governance will have a direct negative effect on 
Computer/EHR Anxiety 
Hypothesis 12: Information Governance will have a direct negative effect on 
Computer/EHR Attitude 
Hypothesis 13: Information Governance will not have a direct negative effect 
on behavioural intention 
The second construct in the information context is information control. It 
related to the characteristic of the IAF which gives patients the control of their 
healthcare information which is in accordance with eHealth requirements 6 and 7 
given in section 1.2.6. Information Control is defined as the ability for the owner or 
subject of the information to control their healthcare information. Patient control of 
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healthcare information is a measure used to increase confidence in eHealth systems 
(Haas, et al., 2011). Allowing patients to set their own privacy rules to govern how 
healthcare professionals use their health information, although increases patient 
confidence and trust in the system, is not always beneficial to the patients. As 
discussed in chapter two, a patient is not always capable of deciding what data 
elements are required by a healthcare professional to make an informed decision. 
Although the IAF facilitate this capability, the process is overlooked by a healthcare 
authority to ensure that the healthcare process is unhindered by patient privacy 
policies. The perceptions the respondents have on information control thus directly 
relates to identifying how appropriate the related technological aspects given in 
chapters five and six would be if implemented in an eHealth system. 
In our research model, we test the influence of this aspect of the IAF in the 
eyes of future healthcare professionals. We make the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 14: Information Control will not have a direct negative effect on 
Effort Expectancy 
Hypothesis 15: Information Control will not have a direct negative effect on 
Performance Expectancy 
Hypothesis 16: Information Control will have a direct negative effect on 
Computer/EHR Anxiety 
Hypothesis 17: Information Control will have a direct negative effect on 
Computer/EHR Attitude 
Hypothesis 18: Information Control will not have a direct negative effect on 
Behavioural Intention 
The final construct of the information context is Information Accountability. 
We measure the attitudes of future healthcare professionals towards holding 
healthcare professionals accountable and patients having the capability to inquire 
about possible misuse of information by a healthcare professional. This is directly 
related to eHealth requirement 8 in section 1.2.6. It also related to the characteristic 
of AeH systems which states that inappropriate use of information is followed by 
accountability (see section 2.8.1 in chapter two). 
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Similar to the previous constructs in the information context, we make the 
following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 19: Information Accountability will not have a direct negative 
effect on Effort Expectancy 
Hypothesis 20: Information Accountability will not have a direct negative 
effect on Performance Expectancy 
Hypothesis 21: Information Accountability will have a direct negative effect on 
Computer/EHR Anxiety 
Hypothesis 22: Information Accountability will have a direct negative effect on 
Computer/EHR Attitude 
Hypothesis 23: Information Accountability will not have a direct negative 
effect on Behavioural Intention 
Behavioural intention 
Behavioural intention was first introduced in the theory of reasoned action 
(TRA) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). It is defined as the measure of the strength of one’s 
intention to perform a specific behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). In technology 
acceptance research, behavioural intention was successfully used as a conclusive 
measure of the actual use of ICT by Davis (1989) in the Technology Acceptance 
Model (TAM). Since then, the relationship between behavioural intention and the 
actual use of ICT has been successfully established in technology acceptance 
research (Ajzen, 1991; Venkatesh & Davis, 2000; Venkatesh, et al., 2003).  It is also 
the case in the healthcare context (Chau & Hu, 2002b; Chismar & Wiley-Patton, 
2003). Therefore, considering the acceptance of the IAF as the actual use of ICT in 
our research model, we hypothesise that; 
Hypothesis 24: Behavioural Intention will have a direct positive effect on the 
acceptance of the IAF 
The survey hypotheses are summarised in Table 3.1. 
Moderators 
Moderating variables play a significant role in technology acceptance research 
(Schepers & Wetzels, 2007; H. Sun & Zhang, 2006). The main function of 
moderating variables is to explain the inconsistencies of the relationships between 
 68 Chapter 3: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: A Survey of Future Healthcare Professionals 
constructs by identifying the situational differences (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 
2003). In technology acceptance models, the exploratory power is higher with the 
inclusion of moderating factors (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). In the UTAUT model, four 
moderating variables have been identified; age, gender, experience and 
voluntariness. Moderators such as computer literacy has been previously used in 
technology acceptance research in the healthcare domain together with others that are 
relevant to the application domain (Schaper & Pervan, 2007). 
In our study, focusing on the nature of the participants, we consider six 
moderating variables; age, gender, computer literacy, academic year, level of study 
and discipline. Age and gender have been established in technology acceptance 
literature as to have effective moderating effects (H. Sun & Zhang, 2006; Venkatesh, 
et al., 2003). Although experience is a moderator of most technology acceptance 
studies (H. Sun & Zhang, 2006), in our research model, we theorise that the level of 
study, academic year and discipline to have a similar effect to experience.  
Removal of constructs from UTAUT model 
In the UTAUT model, social influence and facilitating conditions are also 
theorised and proved to have a significant contribution to behavioural intention and 
use behaviour respectively (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). Given the nature of the 
participants, those constructs were removed from this study. A student cohort is 
unlikely to be influenced by social factors and is not expected to have sufficient 
experience to be influenced by organisational facilitating conditions. We leave the 
utilisation of these two constructs to a future study involving healthcare professionals 
who will be able to work with a system implemented with the proposed IAF.
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Table 3.1 Research hypotheses 
Construct Abbreviation Hypothesis 
Individual Context 
Computer self-efficacy CSE 
H1: CSE will have a direct effect on effort expectancy 
H2: CSE will not have a significant effect on behavioural intention 
Computer (EHR) anxiety ANX 
H3: ANX will have a direct negative effect on effort expectancy 
H4: ANX will not have a direct negative effect on behavioural intention 
Computer (EHR) attitude ATT H5: ATT will have a direct positive effect on behavioural intention 
Technological Context 
Performance expectancy PE 
H6: PE will have a direct effect on behavioural intention 
H7: PE will have a direct effect on computer attitude 
Effort expectancy EE H8: EE will have a direct effect on behavioural intention 
Information Context 
Information governance IG 
H9: IG will not have a direct negative effect on Effort expectancy 
H10: IG will not have a direct negative effect on Performance Expectancy 
H11: IG will have a direct negative effect on Computer/EHR Anxiety 
H12: IG will have a direct negative effect on Computer/EHR Attitude 
H13: IG will not have a direct negative effect on behavioural intention 
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Information control IC 
H14: IC will not have a direct negative effect on Effort Expectancy 
H15: IC will not have a direct negative effect on Performance Expectancy 
H16: IC will have a direct negative effect on Computer/EHR Anxiety 
H17: IC will have a direct negative effect on Computer/EHR Attitude 
H18: IC will not have a direct negative effect on Behavioural Intention 
Information accountability IA 
H19: IA will not have a direct negative effect on Effort Expectancy 
H20: IA will not have a direct negative effect on Performance Expectancy 
H21: IA will have a direct negative effect on Computer/EHR Anxiety 
H22: IA will have a direct negative effect on Computer/EHR Attitude 
H23: IA will not have a direct negative effect on Behavioural Intention 
Acceptance of the IAF 
Behavioural Intention BI H24: BI will have a direct positive effect on the acceptance of the IAF 
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3.2.5 Survey items and constructs 
The questionnaire items for each construct were either directly adopted from 
existing models (after adjusting to fit the cohort and application domain) or were 
designed specifically for the purpose of measuring the acceptance of the IAF by 
future healthcare professionals. The developed questionnaire items were verified by 
the rest of the research team and a qualified clinician and university lecturer involved 
with undergraduate teaching. Table 3.2 shows the questionnaire items for each of the 
constructs. 
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Table 3.2 Constructs and questionnaire items 
Construct Related hypothesis Questionnaire item Origin 
Individual Context 
Computer self-
efficacy (CSE) 
H1 
H2 
CSE1….I would be able to complete different tasks without 
anyone around to tell me what to do 
CSE2….I would be able to complete tasks if I could call someone 
for help if I got stuck 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Computer/EHR 
anxiety (ANX) 
H3 
H4 
ANX1….I feel apprehensive about using this EHR system 
ANX2….I would hesitate to use this EHR system for fear of 
making a mistake I cannot correct 
ANX3….I would be concerned about losing a lot of information 
by hitting the wrong key 
ANX4….I would find this EHR system intimidating 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Computer (EHR) 
attitude (ATT) 
H5 
ATT1….I believe that paper records can be better utilised to keep 
health information more secure than in EHRs 
ATT2….Using EHR systems is a good idea 
ATT3….I think EHRs are easy to work with than paper records 
Developed to capture 
eHR attitude 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Developed to capture 
eHR attitude 
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ATT4….I think I would enjoy working with this EHR system 
ATT5….I think that EHR systems are expensive to implement 
and maintain. The expense could be better utilised to 
improve other healthcare facilities 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Developed to capture 
eHR attitude 
Technological Context 
Performance 
expectancy 
H6 
H7 
PE1….I believe that this EHR system would be useful in my 
professional activities 
PE2….I believe that this EHR would help improve my patient 
care delivery 
PE3….I think that this EHR system would improve my job 
performance 
PE4….I feel that this EHR system can make health information 
sharing easier and more effective 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Developed to capture 
eHR attitude 
Effort expectancy 
H8 
EE1….I think that learning to work with this EHR system would 
be easy  
EE2….I would find this EHR system easy to work with 
EE3….I believe I have or will develop the skills necessary to use 
this EHR system 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Information Context 
Information H9 To H13 IG1….I believe that when health information is manipulated 
electronically (using computers), proper rules should be set 
Developed to capture 
 74 Chapter 3: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: A Survey of Future Healthcare Professionals 
Governance on the use of health information 
IG2….I believe that when health information is manipulated 
electronically (using computers), a comprehensive 
knowledge base should govern information usage 
IG3….I believe that when health information is manipulated 
electronically (using computers), health professionals 
should be bound by predefined rules when using and 
accessing patient health information 
IG4….I believe that a health authority such as Queensland Health 
can formulate a comprehensive set of usage rules which 
indicate what health data is required for a given episode of 
care 
attitudes towards having 
usage rules and a 
computerised 
knowledgebase 
Information 
control 
H14 To H18 
IC1….I believe that patient participation (participatory medicine) 
in healthcare decision making is an important element in 
healthcare 
IC2….I believe that patients have the right to set their own 
privacy settings in an electronic health record system such 
as most social media websites 
IC3….I believe that patients have the right to decide which health 
professional can access his/her EHR 
Developed to capture 
attitudes towards patients 
participation and control 
of health information 
Information 
accountability 
H19 to H23 
IA1….I believe that if usage rules set by a health authority such as 
Queensland Health are broken intentionally, the offenders 
should be held accountable 
Developed to capture the 
attitudes towards 
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IA2….I think that patients have the right to inquire about possible 
misuse of their health information 
IA3….I think that health professionals should be required to 
justify why they have accessed/use information which they 
did not require for a given episode of care 
IA4….I feel that health professionals should be held accountable 
if found to have misused patient health information 
accountability measures 
Intention to Use 
Behavioural 
Intention H24 
BI1….I would use this EHR system in my professional activities 
for a few months 
BI2….I would use this EHR system throughout my professional 
career 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
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3.3 PARTICIPANTS 
3.3.1 Selection criteria 
Participants were selected such that a wide range of potential healthcare 
professionals are involved in the study so that the results are more generalisable. The 
selection of the participants purely depended on the availability of the resources and 
the willingness of the participating institutions.  
Quantitative data as well as qualitative data in the form of comments to 
specific questions from university students of three universities were collected using 
an online survey tool. The selection of the universities and the student cohort 
depended purely on their availability and the willingness of the institutions to 
participate in the survey. The participants ranged from medical students to health 
sciences students. The distribution of participants across each institute is shown in 
Figure 3.2. 
 
Figure 3.2 Distribution of participants across participating institutes 
The number of respondents from institute B and C are low compared to 
institute A due to the fact that only medical students from those institutes were 
invited to participate. Institute A did not have a medical school; therefore, all health 
related students were invited to participate. 
3.3.2 Participants from institution A 
The participants from institute A comprised on undergraduate and post 
graduate students studying health sciences including nursing, optometry, 
pharmacology etc. The participant attributes are listed in Table 3.3. 
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Table 3.3 Respondents from Institute A 
  
Nursing (n) Other (n) 
 
  
Male Female Male Female Total 
Bachelors 
1st year 3 24 15 47 
206 
2nd year 1 13 2 28 
3nd Year 3 15 7 23 
4th year 0 4 1 19 
Graduated 0 0 0 1 
Masters 
1st year 1 4 3 5 
32 
2nd year 0 2 2 7 
3nd Year 0 1 1 1 
4th year 0 0 0 0 
Graduated 0 0 0 5 
PhD 
1st year 0 1 1 1 
9 
2nd year 0 0 0 1 
3nd Year 0 0 0 1 
4th year 0 1 0 2 
Graduated 0 0 0 1 
Other 
1st year 1 3 2 9 
37 
2nd year 1 2 0 1 
3nd Year 0 2 0 1 
4th year 0 0 2 4 
Graduated 1 3 0 5 
Notes: Study level categorised as other include diploma, certificate, graduate 
certificate and graduate diploma. 284 
 
The age of the respondents ranged from 17 years to a maximum of 58 with 
mean 27 (SD = 10.55). The age distribution of the participants is shown in Table 5.4. 
Table 3.4 Age range of respondents 
Age Range (years) Number of respondents 
17-20 103 
21-30 89 
31-40 40 
41-60 49 
3.3.3 Participants from institution B 
The participants from institution B comprised of undergraduate medical 
students. The participant attributes are listed in Table 3.5. The age of the respondents 
ranged from 20 years to 43 years with a mean of 25.67(SD = 4.59). 
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Table 3.5 Respondents from Institution B 
 
Male Female 
1st year 4 3 
2nd year 1 4 
3nd Year 1 3 
4th year 4 7 
Total 10 17 
 
3.3.4 Participants from institution C 
The participants from institution C comprised of postgraduate students 
studying medicine, nursing and other health related courses. The participant 
attributes are listed in Table 3.6. 
Table 3.6 Respondents from Institution C 
  
Medicine Nursing Other 
 
  
Male Female Male Female Male Female Total 
MSc 
1st year 0 1 0 0 0 1 
15 
2nd year 0 0 0 1 1 2 
3nd Year 1 1 0 0 0 0 
4th year 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Graduated 2 2 0 0 0 1 
PhD 
1st year 0 0 0 0 3 0 
8 
2nd year 0 2 0 0 0 0 
3nd Year 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4th year 0 0 0 1 0 0 
Graduated 0 1 0 0 0 0 
Note: Participants categorised as “Other” include pharmacology, radiation therapy, sports 
health, human services, nutrition and dietetics, biomedical science, psychology, social 
work, medical science, paramedics, public health optometry and psychiatry  
 
The age of respondents ranged from a minimum of 22 years to a maximum of 
51 years with a mean age of 32.78 (SD = 7.49). 
3.4 THE SURVEY 
3.4.1 Instrument 
The survey questions were included in an online survey tool and were 
formatted such that the readability and presentation of the survey was appropriate. 
Questions were distributed in such a way that the ceiling and floor effects were 
minimal. The survey was distributed via email invitation to all prospective 
participants (see Appendix B for email invitation). Because all university students 
were already familiar with email and Internet technologies, there were no hindrances 
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expected from the use of an online survey tool in terms of usability. The online 
survey distribution and response collection was also expected to maximise the 
response rate. 
3.4.2 Survey Administration 
A detailed description was given to the participants outlining the specific 
characteristics of the EHR system, similar to Angst and Agrawal’s (2009) approach. 
Rather than testing the participants’ knowledge about EHRs, as done by Angst and 
Agrawal (2009), given the participants’ education background related to healthcare, 
we assumed they had a basic understanding of EHRs. The survey questions were 
designed to further outline the characteristics specific to the IAF such as policy 
setting by patients and inquiries and justifications. The survey specifically noted that 
the questions were related to EHRs and the newly introduced information 
accountability measures. The questions focused on the attitudes the respondents had 
on an EHR system designed using the IA principles. A screen capture of the first 
page of the survey tool can be found in Appendix C. 
After the participating institutions agreed for the survey to be launched within 
specific areas of the institutions, email invitations were sent to the expected 
participants by the respective authorities. The survey was also included in an internal 
newsletter at institution C. After four weeks time of the launch of the survey, a 
reminder email was sent to all participants at institution A. Data collection was 
terminated after a total of 6 weeks. 
3.4.3 Ethics and Limitations 
Ethical clearance was obtained from the authors’ education institution to 
conduct the research study, which did not include any health and safety issues. From 
the other two participating institutions, one institution required ethical clearance, 
which was obtained before the study commenced. There were no ethical issues or 
incidents arising from this study. The ethical clearance certificates can be found in 
Appendix A. 
As previously stated, the study was limited to a student population from the 
three different educational institutions. Professional institutions and societies within 
the healthcare domain were initially contacted to include participants for the research 
but the requests were denied due to their resource limitations and busy time 
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schedules of healthcare professionals. A decision was made afterwards to include a 
suitable student cohort that would deliver a limited but similar result to what could 
have been expected from current healthcare professionals. This was done so that the 
research study could be completed within the available time frame. 
3.5 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
In order to present the overall acceptability of the IAF by the survey 
participants, a descriptive analysis of the results was performed and is presented in 
this section. A descriptive analysis of the results is also required to establish the 
practical significance of the research questions. It is a means of multivariate analysis 
of the results based on their substantive findings rather than statistical significance 
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1998).  The analysis software used for the 
descriptive analysis was IBM SPSS Version 19 (SPSS Inc, 2012). 
3.5.1 Response 
A total of 334 valid responses were received as a result of an initial email 
request and reminder emails broadcasted over the respective faculties and schools in 
the participating institutions. The responses also include qualitative data acquired 
through unrestricted comments. 
3.5.2 Analysis 
The questions asked from the participants are categorised in to 9 variables 
which are also used to test the measurement model, structural model and hypotheses. 
A total of 31 items were used to measure the variables. An additional six questions 
were also asked from the participants regarding the EHR system in question. The 
model variables, the individual items and the mean and standard deviation of each 
item and variable are shown in Table 3.7. The percentage response of each item is 
also given. 
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Table 3.7 Descriptive data of questionnaire items relating to the measurement model 
 
Strongly Disagree                 %                 Strongly Agree   
1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD 
Computer/EHR self efficacy 3.81 .79 
CSE1 0.9 8.4 35.0 41.9 13.8 3.59 .86 
CSE2 0.9 2.7 10.8 63.2 22.5 4.04 .72 
Computer/EHR anxiety 2.42 1.03 
ANX1 15.0 47.0 16.2 19.5 2.4 2.47 1.04 
ANX2 16.2 47.0 12.3 20.7 3.9 2.49 1.11 
ANX3 14.7 43.1 10.5 26.3 5.4 2.65 1.17 
ANX4 21.6 58.1 12.6 7.5 0.3 2.07 .81 
Computer/EHR attitude 3.69 .94 
ATT1* 3.3 22.2 15.9 45.8 12.9 3.43 1.07 
ATT2 1.2 2.4 18.0 49.7 28.7 4.02 .82 
ATT3 1.2 7.8 14.4 45.2 31.4 3.98 0.94 
ATT4 0.6 5.1 24.3 48.2 21.9 3.86 .84 
ATT5* 6.9 17.4 35.6 32.6 7.5 3.16 1.03 
Performance expectancy 3.96 0.84 
PE1 0.6 4.8 13.2 47.9 33.5 4.09 0.84 
PE2 0.6 6.6 19.8 44.3 28.7 3.94 0.89 
PE3 1.2 7.8 29.9 43.4 17.7 3.69 .89 
PE4 0.6 1.8 12.6 56.3 28.7 4.11 .73 
Effort expectancy 3.96 .76 
EE1 0.9 6.0 25.7 50.6 16.8 3.76 .83 
EE2 0.9 3.9 28.7 48.2 18.3 3.79 0.81 
EE3 0.0 0.6 6.9 53.0 39.5 4.31 .63 
Information governance 4.21 .76 
IG1 0.0 0.0 5.4 35.0 59.6 4.54 .59 
IG2 0.0 1.2 14.4 49.4 35.0 4.18 .71 
IG3 0.0 1.2 6.9 40.1 51.8 4.43 .68 
IG4 4.2 10.2 21.9 40.4 23.4 3.69 1.07 
Information control 3.75 1.02 
IC1 0.0 3.0 6.3 47.6 43.1 4.31 .72 
IC2 6.9 24.0 19.2 30.5 19.5 3.32 1.23 
IC3 5.7 16.8 14.7 35.9 26.9 3.62 1.21 
Information accountability 4.36 .74 
IA1 0.0 1.5 10.8 41.3 46.4 4.33 .73 
IA2 0.3 1.2 3.0 39.5 56.0 4.50 .65 
IA3 2.1 5.1 8.1 48.5 36.2 4.12 .91 
IA4 0.6 0.3 6.0 36.5 56.6 4.48 .68 
Behavioural intension 3.50 .91 
BI1 1.2 8.4 34.7 43.1 12.6 3.84 .79 
BI2 0.0 3.0 31.4 43.7 21.9 3.16 1.03 
Notes * reverse coded item 
 
Computer/EHR self-efficacy 
The item means of all items used to measure CSE was greater than the 
midpoint of the scale, the overall mean score being 3.81 (0.79). This indicates that 
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the respondents believed they were able to use the proposed EHR system 
confidently. But this indication was not very strong but significantly favourable 
towards the proposed system. 
Computer/EHR anxiety 
The level of anxiety the respondents showed was low in the sense that the 
means of all items used to measure ANX was lower than the midpoint of the scale. 
But, with an overall mean score of 2.42 (1.03), the respondents’ computer anxiety 
was not very low. 
Computer/EHR attitude 
 All the items used to measure ATT showed individual means greater than the 
midpoint of the scale and ATT showed an overall mean score of 3.69 (0.94). 
Although the respondents’ attitude towards the EHR system is favourable it is not 
very high. 
Performance expectancy 
PE had an overall means score of 3.96 (0.84) with the means of all individual 
measurement items being higher than the midpoint of the scale. This indicates that 
the participants believed that by using this EHR system, their professional 
performance will be enhanced. The indication is at a significantly good level.  
Effort expectancy 
Similar to PE, EE had an overall means score of 3.96 (0.76) with all indicator 
mean scores higher than the midpoint of the scale. This indicates that the participants 
believed that a high degree of ease is associated with using the EHR system. This is a 
favourable indication of positive acceptance of the IAF. 
Information governance 
The overall mean score for IG was 4.21 (0.76). This is a very strong indicator 
that the respondents believed that usage rules are an important factor in the EHR 
system. Although above the midpoint of the scale, IG4 had the lowest mean score of 
3.69 indicating that the respondents’ confidence in the capability of a central 
authority to formulate usage rules was not as high as the other indicators. This may 
be because the question mentioned the name of the local healthcare authority and at 
the time of data collection there were a number of issues raised against it. 
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Information control 
IC showed an overall mean score of 3.75 (1.02). All indicators showed a mean 
score of above the midpoint of the scale. Respondents believed that patient 
participation in the healthcare proves and making decisions about their health 
information is important. As expected, over 50% of respondents felt very strongly 
that patient consent is critical before using health information, but they were least 
confident about patient setting their own privacy rules with only 19.5% of them 
choosing the highest scale item. 
Information accountability 
IA showed a very high overall mean score of 4.36 (0.74). Every item used to 
measure the accountability aspect had a mean score significantly above 4.0. The 
respondents strongly believe that accountability measures are needed in EHR 
systems. This is a strong indicator of the significance of the IAF in healthcare. 
Behavioural intension 
The respondents indicated that they desire to use this EHR system is high with 
an overall mean score of 3.50 (0.91). Both of the items used to measure BI had a 
mean score over 3.0. The higher of the two was for BI1 indicating that they would 
use the system for a few months of their professional activities. In terms of the 
intention to use a future EHR system, a score of 3.50 can be considered to be strong. 
Overall response 
The overall response to the questionnaire items indicates that the respondents’ 
felt favourably towards the characteristics of the designed EHR system. Therefore 
the overall acceptance of the proposed EHR system with the technological aspects 
presented in chapters five and six is favourable. 
Apart from the measurement model construct reported above, additional 
questions were asked from the participants regarding the EHR system. 
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Table 3.8 Additional questionnaire items 
Theme Strongly Disagree             %             Strongly Agree  
Information availability 1 2 3 4 5 Mean (SD) 
I would prefer to have 
access to information 
that is only related to the 
current episode of care. 
19.2 50.3 12.9 14.4 3.3 2.32 (1.04) 
I would require complete 
access to a patients’ 
health record without any 
access restrictions. 
4.8 26.9 20.1 32.6 15.6 3.27 (1.16) 
Information sharing 1 2 3 4 5 Mean (SD) 
I believe that care givers 
should be allowed to 
share patient information 
with other professionals. 
4.5 14.1 19.5 51.5 10.5 3.49 (1.01) 
Privacy concerns 1 2 3 4 5 Mean (SD) 
I believe that storing and 
managing health 
information 
electronically (using 
computers) in this EHR 
system will hinder 
patient privacy. 
8.7 41.9 21.9 22.2 5.4 2.74 (1.07) 
I feel that patient 
information, even with 
personal identifiable 
information removed, 
should not be accessed 
by any outside entity or 
authority for any reason 
other than the 
caregiver(s) for the 
purpose of providing 
healthcare. 
5.1 25.7 11.4 29.6 28.1 3.50 (1.28) 
 
The respondents are more favourable towards having unrestricted access to 
health information than being limited to a specific set of information. But the 
indication is not very strong. The respondents’ attitudes are favourable towards 
information sharing and believe that sharing should be allowed. The respondents 
believe that this EHR system poses no threat to information privacy issues and 
believe that information should only be used for the purpose of healthcare. But, 
secondary use of healthcare information is important in some cases to enhance the 
delivery of care such as in research.  
3.5.3 Qualitative data analysis 
At the end of the survey the participants were asked to comment on the 
proposed EHR system and its accountability features. A total of 70 written responses 
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were received. Following are some of the comments and interpretations categorised 
under themes relevant to the study. Table D.1 in Appendix D summarises the 
comments received from the respondents regarding different aspects of the EHR 
system. The comments given by respondents have been assessed and categorised in 
to 6 themes, Data access/availability, Accountability measures/Information misuse, 
Patients control, Attitudes on overall system, Attitudes towards EHR/eHealth and 
other.  
The respondents have a strong belief that healthcare professionals should have 
access to as much information about a patients’ medical status as possible in order to 
make a well informed decision towards the wellbeing of the patient. They feel 
apprehensive about patients being able to set their own privacy rules but believe that 
patient privacy is paramount. Some believe that EHR all together could hinder 
confidentiality. In their perspective, the patient-physician relationship should be built 
around trust. 
  The majority of the respondents feel that they and their patients would benefit 
from EHR systems in general. But some claim that paper records would still 
dominate over electronic health records. The main negative concerns of the 
respondents around EHR systems are mainly based on unauthorised access to the 
systems resulting from poor security measures. Computer literacy has also been 
stated as a barrier for EHR system adoption. Some negative bias to EHR systems 
from some respondents can be observed resulting from previous experience with the 
local healthcare authority.  
 The respondents strongly believe that information misuse should be followed 
by appropriate penalties for the relevant users to enforce accountability. One 
respondent stated that,  
“…overall I am for the idea, just don't like the idea that patients will restrict 
the type of information I can access. How is a patient to know if past medical history 
is relevant or not? I feel like I would like to know everything possible about the 
patient in order to give them the best possible care - however if patients are able to 
see which information I access, I would be hesitant to do so, in case it attracts 
litigation.” 
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The aim of accountable-eHealth systems as discussed in chapter two is to deter 
users from misusing information, which this comment highlights. With the assurance 
that legitimate use of information would not result in legal action and since the 
respondent is in favour of the system she has a high tendency to adopt the system.  
The respondents feel that information should only be used for the purposes for 
which they have been collected. This strong belief is a positive aspect towards the 
future acceptability of an IAF in the eHealth domain. Further support to the proposed 
EHR system can be observed from the respondents’ comments. But, issues such as 
usability are mentioned in the comments indicating that they are concerned about 
how the system would be delivered to the end users. Overall the qualitative data 
indicates a favourable attitude from the respondents towards the proposed EHR 
system with the IA characteristics discussed in chapter two. 
3.6 ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING 
The assessment of the research model was conducted using the partial least 
square (PLS) method of structural equation modelling (SEM). PLS was developed to 
maximise prediction rather than fit; to maximise the proportion of the variance of the 
dependent construct that is explained by the predictor constructs. PLS is particularly 
suitable for data analysis during the early stages of theory development where the 
theoretical model and its measures are not well formed (Tsang, 2002). The PLS 
analysis follow a two-step method involving the evaluation of the results of the 
measurement model and the assessment of the structural model. 
3.6.1 Assessment of the measurement model 
The reliability and validity of the model constructs and the items used to 
measure the constructs were evaluated by the assessment of the measurement model. 
The properties of the measurement model were assessed using construct reliability 
and discriminant and convergent validity techniques in PLS. 
Construct reliability 
The construct reliability is a measure of the construct to determine to what 
extent an individual can answer the same question the same manner each time 
(Detmar Straub, 1989). Construct reliability in PLS is determined by using individual 
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item reliability, internal consistency and the average variance extracted (AVE) 
(Barclay, Higgins, & Thompson, 1995). 
Individual item reliability 
PLS was used to test the internal consistency by producing individual item 
loading for each construct. Hair et al. (1998), as cited by Igbaria et al. (1997), state 
that individual item reliability is considered significant if the loading is greater than 
0.3 (Igbaria, et al., 1997) and that the significance increases thereafter. Only one item 
out of the 31 items used to measure the constructs has a loading less than 0.3. An 
item used to measure information control, IC1, had a loading of (-0.089). This item 
was removed from further analyses. The resulting item loadings are shown in Table 
3.9. 
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Table 3.9 individual item loadings 
Construct Indicators Loading 
Computer/EHR self-efficacy (CSE) CSE1 0.8975 
 
CSE2 0.6632 
Computer/EHR anxiety (ANX) ANX1 0.8003 
 
ANX2 0.8064 
 
ANX3 0.6822 
 
ANX4 0.778 
Computer/EHR attitude (ATT) ATT1 0.8511 
 
ATT2 0.6907 
 
ATT3 0.7032 
 
ATT4 0.636 
 
ATT5 0.8521 
Performance expectancy (PE) PE1 0.8445 
 
PE2 0.848 
 
PE3 0.7001 
 
PE4 0.802 
Effort expectancy (EE) EE1 0.7385 
 
EE2 0.8424 
 
EE3 0.8532 
Information governance (IG) IG1 0.7643 
 
IG2 0.7827 
 
IG3 0.7358 
 
IG4 0.6402 
Information control (IC) IC2 0.6025 
 
IC3 0.6473 
Information accountability (IA) IA1 0.8244 
 
IA2 0.6534 
 
IA3 0.463 
 
IA4 0.7773 
Behavioural intention (BI) BI1 0.6685 
 
BI2 0.9244 
 
Internal consistency and average variance extracted (AVE) 
Using the same PLS results which produced the previous results, internal 
composite reliabilities were produced as a determinant of the internal consistency. 
All internal composite reliabilities were greater than 0.707, which is the threshold for 
acceptable reliability (Igbaria, et al., 1997).  
Finally the average variance extracted (AVE) was measured to determine the 
amount of variance a construct captures from its indicators relative to the amount due 
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to measurement error (Chin, 1998). All constructs showed an AVE of greater than 
the 0.5 threshold. Results are shown in Table 3.10. 
Table 3.10 Internal composite reliabilities and average variance extracted 
Construct AVE Composite Reliability 
Computer/EHR self-efficacy (CSE) 0.6227 0.7635 
Computer/EHR anxiety (ANX) 0.5904 0.8516 
Computer/EHR attitude (ATT) 0.5653 0.8651 
Performance expectancy (PE) 0.6414 0.8767 
Effort expectancy (EE) 0.6610 0.8535 
Information governance (IG) 0.5371 0.8219 
Information control (IC) 0.5424 0.7742 
Information accountability (IA) 0.5030 0.7808 
Behavioural intention (BI) 0.6507 0.7841 
 
Discriminant and Convergent Validity 
Discriminant and convergent validity are measures of construct validity. 
Discriminant validity is used to measure the difference of a construct to other 
constructs used in the model (Schaper, 2009). Convergent validity is used to 
determine the convergence of the items used to measure a construct. It shows how 
they associate with each other to reflect the construct they are designed to measure 
(Datmar Straub, M. C. Boudreau, & Gefen, 2004). In PLS, correlations of the 
constructs and cross loading of constructs are used to determine the discriminant and 
convergence validity. 
Correlation of constructs 
In the measurement of correlation of constructs, the square root of AVE must 
be greater than the correlation with other constructs (Datmar Straub, et al., 2004). 
Table 3.11 shows the correlation of constructs with the square root of AVE (shown 
in bold). 
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Table 3.11 Correlation of constructs and square root of AVE 
 CSE ANX ATT PE EE IG IC IA BI 
CSE 0.789 
        ANX -0.326 0.768 
       ATT 0.372 -0.569 0.751 
      PE 0.335 -0.480 0.792 0.801 
     EE 0.410 -0.564 0.557 0.498 0.813 
    IG 0.310 -0.224 0.306 0.333 0.280 0.732 
   IC 0.003 0.106 -0.072 -0.04 -0.059 0.222 0.736 
  IA 0.163 -0.199 0.169 0.167 0.133 0.520 0.288 0.709 
 BI 0.310 -0.415 0.610 0.666 0.388 0.259 -0.092 0.126 0.806 
 
Only one item (PE) was found to have a slightly higher value than the square 
root of AVE of ATT. The correlation of performance expectancy and computer/EHR 
attitude can be expected because the model exhibits a causal relationship amongst 
them. Overall, discriminant and convergent validity is acceptable. 
Cross loadings of constructs 
Cross loadings of constructs reveal the fit of individual items load on the latent 
variable compared to their loadings on other variables (Schaper, 2009). Table 3.12 
presents the cross loadings of the constructs, which revealed that the loadings for 
each of the indicators are significantly higher than those of the other constructs. We 
come to the conclusion that the discriminant validity of the model indicators is 
acceptable because the indicators used reflect the constructs they are designed to 
reflect than other constructs. 
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Table 3.12 Cross loading of constructs 
Indicators CSE ANX ATT PE EE IG IC IA BI 
CSE1 0.897 -0.319 0.306 0.267 0.392 0.276 0.016 0.091 0.230 
CSE2 0.663 -0.170 0.2956 0.28 0.231 0.2087 -0.021 0.2009 0.2876 
ANX1 -0.321 0.800 -0.616 -0.594 -0.504 -0.322 -0.006 -0.273 -0.449 
ANX2 -0.260 0.806 -0.412 -0.338 -0.383 -0.122 0.0959 -0.100 -0.329 
ANX3 -0.134 0.682 -0.284 -0.165 -0.331 -0.074 0.1436 -0.071 -0.190 
ANX4 -0.240 0.778 -0.352 -0.261 -0.475 -0.099 0.1409 -0.11 -0.242 
ATT1 0.1773 -0.400 0.6360 0.3743 0.2955 0.1401 -0.095 0.0745 0.3559 
ATT2 0.2913 -0.422 0.8521 0.7816 0.4677 0.2914 -0.045 0.1677 0.5758 
ATT3 0.3095 -0.366 0.7032 0.5000 0.4558 0.1629 -0.047 0.1189 0.4119 
ATT4 0.3574 -0.494 0.8511 0.7019 0.5743 0.3068 -0.003 0.1499 0.4938 
ATT5 0.2442 -0.478 0.6907 0.5145 0.2511 0.2021 -0.114 0.1002 0.4145 
PE1 0.2702 -0.383 0.6513 0.8445 0.4078 0.2478 -0.021 0.1215 0.556 
PE2 0.2135 -0.352 0.614 0.8480 0.3825 0.2395 -0.017 0.1181 0.5347 
PE3 0.2913 -0.388 0.6763 0.8020 0.4355 0.2331 0.0002 0.0817 0.5662 
PE4 0.2966 -0.412 0.5899 0.7001 0.3634 0.3515 -0.112 0.2198 0.4695 
EE1 0.3276 -0.439 0.4340 0.3908 0.8424 0.2092 -0.041 0.0654 0.2396 
EE2 0.356 -0.418 0.4691 0.4306 0.8532 0.2165 0.006 0.0844 0.3259 
EE3 0.3121 -0.504 0.4479 0.3866 0.7385 0.2506 -0.101 0.163 0.364 
IG1 0.2516 -0.180 0.1884 0.1962 0.2069 0.7643 0.1685 0.4264 0.2122 
IG2 0.235 -0.191 0.2343 0.289 0.1935 0.7827 0.1494 0.3864 0.1912 
IG3 0.1508 -0.175 0.0987 0.1168 0.1206 0.7358 0.2486 0.5281 0.1161 
IG4 0.2335 -0.118 0.3022 0.3008 0.2533 0.6402 0.1231 0.2558 0.204 
IC2 0.0400 0.0698 0.0156 0.0223 -0.024 0.1107 0.6025 0.1973 0.0012 
IC3 0.0422 0.0451 -0.030 -0.011 0.0338 0.0905 0.6473 0.2144 -0.068 
IA1 0.164 -0.175 0.1749 0.1414 0.132 0.4985 0.1868 0.8244 0.1267 
IA2 0.0856 -0.100 0.0829 0.1264 0.0674 0.2907 0.3124 0.6534 0.0523 
IA3 -0.017 -0.011 -0.009 0.0310 -0.026 0.2861 0.3599 0.4630 -0.021 
IA4 0.1087 -0.166 0.1109 0.1156 0.0934 0.352 0.1887 0.7773 0.0948 
BI1 0.2631 -0.160 0.3014 0.3463 0.2166 0.2012 -0.075 0.1157 0.6685 
BI2 0.2581 -0.444 0.6187 0.6667 0.3809 0.2259 -0.078 0.1004 0.9244 
 
3.6.2 Assessment of the structural model 
Assessment of the structural model reveals the significance of the hypotheses 
in the model. The process involves testing the predictive power of the model and the 
significance of the relationships between the models’ constructs (Schaper, 2009). 
Predictive properties of the model 
The predictive power of the model was established by performing PLS 
analysis. R2 values of the entire model were produced and for each of the dependent 
variables. The results are show in Table 3.13. 
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Table 3.13 Predictive properties of the model 
Construct R2 Value 
Computer/EHR attitude (ATT) 0.630 
Computer/EHR anxiety (ANX) 0.069 
Effort expectancy (EE) 0.378 
Performance Expectancy (PE) 0.069 
Behavioural intention (BI) 0.473 
 
The results revealed that the model was capable of predicting 47.3% of the 
behavioural intention of the participants towards the acceptance of the IAF. The 
predictive power of the model is a highly satisfactory level in technology acceptance 
research. The model was also able to predict 63.0% of variance in computer/EHR 
attitude, 6.9% of variance of computer/EHR anxiety, 37.8% of variance in effort 
expectancy, and 6.9% of that in performance expectancy.  
Relationship between model constructs 
To establish the relationship of the model constructs, the path coefficients and 
t-values for each of the structural model paths were calculated. Seventeen of the 18 
hypotheses are tested here. From the available technology acceptance literature we 
assume a direct relationship between BI and actual use behaviour contributing to the 
acceptance of the IAF. 
A bootstrapping resampling technique was used to calculate the values using 
smartPLS. The analysis used 100 randomly selected samples from the 334 cases. The 
corresponding p-values were determined using an F-distribution table and the values 
are given in Table 3.14. 
Table 3.14 t-value and corresponding p-value 
t-value p-value 
t > 1.96 p < 0.05 
t > 2.57 p < 0.001 
t > 3.29 p < 0.0001 
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The results of the bootstrapping and PLS analysis are summarised in Figure 5.3 
and Table 3.15. 
 
Figure 3.3 Results of the structural model 
The relationships shown in dotted lines in Figure 3.3 are relationships initially 
hypothesised to be non-significant. 
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Table 3.15 Individual path significance 
Path t-Statistics Path Coefficients Hypothesis 
CSE → EE 4.9404** 0.2474 H1 
CSE  BI 1.4122 0.0735 H2 
ANX → EE 8.558*** -0.4853 H3 
ANX  BI 1.243 -0.0681 H4 
ATT → BI 2.0758* 0.1624 H5 
PE → ATT 30.3758*** 0.7691 H6 
PE → BI 7.828*** 0.4739 H7 
EE → BI 0.341 -0.0203 H8 
IG  EE 2.145* 0.070 H9 
IG  PE 5.755** 0.232 H10 
IG → ANX 2.665** -0.153 H11 
IG → ATT 0.006 -0.000 H12 
IG  BI 0.6823 0.038 H13 
IC  EE 0.736 0.041 H14 
IC  PE 0.562 -0.035 H15 
IC → ANX 1.541 0.105 H16 
IC → ATT 0.751 -0.028 H17 
IC  BI 1.179 -0.049 H18 
IA  EE 0.969 -0.051 H19 
IA  PE 0.823 0.057 H20 
IA → ANX 2.279* -0.146 H21 
IA → ATT 0.997 0.046 H22 
IA  BI 0.0507 -0.041 H23 
Notes 
*p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001 
 
The PLS analysis revealed that seven hypotheses were not supported (H8, H9, 
H10, H12, H16, H17 and H22). Effort expectancy, as discussed earlier, is associated 
with the degree of ease of using a system. By not having a significant effect on 
behavioural intention, it supports previous technology acceptance research in the 
healthcare domain (Chau & Hu, 2002b; Chismar & Wiley-Patton, 2003; Jayasuriya, 
1998).  
IG and IA showed significant negative effects on ANX, thus supporting 
hypotheses H11 and H21 respectively. This negative relationship indicates that if a 
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respondent feels that either accountability measures or computerised information 
governance are suitable, their anxiety level about the system reduces and vice versa. 
From the descriptive analysis of the results in section 3.5, we observed a favourable 
attitude towards these constructs from the respondents indicating that the 
respondents’ anxiety levels are not heightened by the presence of these measures. 
However, despite the fact that IA and IG negatively affect ANX, since there is no 
significant effect from ANX on BI, their effect on BI is not significant. IG had 
significant positive effects on PE and EE. This indicates that if a respondent believes 
that the presence of a computerised knowledgebase that governs usage is suitable, it 
would improve their perceived job performance and perceived ease of use. Since we 
saw from the descriptive analysis in section 3.5 that respondents are favourable 
towards the IG aspects, the designed EHR system characteristic in regards to IG, 
which is technologically feasible through the purpose definitions discussed in chapter 
five, is suitable for implementation. Our hypotheses H13, H18 and H23 were also 
supported from the results, which indicate that the presence of usage rules on health 
information use, accountability measures and the fact that patients have control of 
their information does not negatively affect BI. We believe that this is a favourable 
outcome towards the implementation of AeH systems and the technological aspects 
presented in chapters five and six. 
Two of the three hypothesised direct effects on behavioural intention were 
found to be statistically significant (PE and ATT) while performance expectancy had 
the highest direct effect (with path coefficient = 0.4739***). In general, technology 
acceptance research finds that attitude does not have a significant effect on 
behavioural intention (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). But in the healthcare sector, 
computer attitude has been seen to have a significant effect on behavioural intention 
(Chau & Hu, 2002b), supporting our findings. 
The indirect effects may also contribute to the total effect on behavioural 
intention. We calculate the indirect effects of each on the constructs on behavioural 
intention. The total effect of a construct to behavioural intention is the sum of the 
direct and indirect effects. The indirect effect of a construct to behavioural intention 
can be calculated by multiplying the relevant structural coefficients along the path 
(Igbaria, et al., 1997). 
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Table 3.16 Total effects on behavioural intention 
Construct Total effect 
Computer/EHR self efficacy 0.0706 
Computer/EHR anxiety -0.0605 
Computer/EHR attitude 0.1685* 
Performance expectancy 0.6064*** 
Effort expectancy -0.0162 
Information governance 0.1858*** 
Information control -0.0814 
Information accountability 0.0379 
 
As presented in Table 3.16, the strongest direct effect on behavioural intention 
was from performance expectancy followed by information governance and 
computer/EHR attitude. The model showed that none of the information context 
constructs had a negative effect on the attitudes of the participants in adopting the 
proposed EHR system in their professional activities, which is a positive outcome for 
the IAF, especially in terms of information governance. 
3.6.3 Influence of moderating variables on the structural model 
Moderating factors have a significant role in technology acceptance research 
(H. Sun & Zhang, 2006). Six factors were theorised to have moderating effects on 
the research model by considering the characteristics of the participants. Age, 
gender, computer literacy, study discipline, academic year and study level (e.g. 
undergraduate level, master’s level, PhD level, etc.) were selected as moderating 
factors. Age and gender are key factors in the UTAUT model whilst year of study 
and study level were used to replace experience. 
Due to the presence of the new constructs in the research model, which are 
previously untested, and with the available data set, it is not possible to test specific 
hypotheses for the moderating variables. However, the theorised moderating factors 
were tested to examine their impact on the relationships between the model 
constructs and also the exploratory power of the model. With the knowledge of 
gained from this study, a future study involving active healthcare professionals can 
be done to further test the impact of the moderating variables with specific 
hypotheses. 
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In order to perform the statistical analysis for each of the moderating variables, 
separate data sets were created for each category of each moderating variable using 
SPSS Version 19. Table 3.17 summarises the distribution of the data set in to each 
category. The following series of tables summarise the PLS and bootstrapping 
calculations performed on each of the new datasets. 
 Table 3.17 Moderating variable categories 
Moderating variable Category Number of cases 
Gender Male 64 
Female 270 
Age (years)* 17 - 20 104 
21 - 30 125 
31-60 102 
Computer literacy Excellent 167 
Good 134 
Moderate 33 
Study Discipline** Medicine 43 
Nursing 85 
Other 196 
Year of Study*** First year 96 
Second year 49 
Third year 52 
Forth year or 
graduated 
36 
Study Level Undergraduate 231 
Postgraduate 103 
Note: * Age had three missing values; *** Study Discipline had 10 missing values; 
** Only the year of study of the undergraduate students was considered 
 
Gender 
The following table shows the path coefficients of the moderating variable 
Gender. The ratio of male to female respondents is 1:4 as shown in table 3.17. 
Therefore we expect the influence of the female respondents on the research model 
to be more significant. 
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Table 3.18 Path coefficients of moderating variable Gender 
 Gender  
 Male Female  
ATT - R2 0.5824 0.6491  
EE - R2 0.4838 0.3919  
ANX - R2 0.0895 0.0846  
PE - R2 0.0876 0.1339  
BI - R2 0.5103 0.4764  
Path coefficients with significance Hypothesis 
CSE → EE 0.2015* 0.2274*** H1 
CSE  BI 0.0863 0.0644 H2 
ANX → EE -0.6105*** -0.4497*** H3 
ANX  BI 0.1574 -0.1181 H4 
ATT → BI 0.236 0.1712* H5 
PE → ATT 0.6848*** 0.7991*** H6 
PE → BI 0.467*** 0.4684*** H7 
EE → BI 0.1495 -0.0538 H8 
IG  EE -0.16 0.2046** H9 
IG  PE 0.1183 0.3576*** H10 
IG → ANX -0.209 -0.152* H11 
IG → ATT -0.045 0.048 H12 
IG  BI 0.128 0.027 H13 
IC  EE 0.1229 0.0448 H14 
IC  PE -0.084 -0.0167 H15 
IC → ANX -0.052 0.137* H16 
IC → ATT -0.090 -0.015 H17 
IC  BI -0.0191 -0.0272 H18 
IA  EE 0.137 -0.1247** H19 
IA  PE 0.2146 0.0191 H20 
IA → ANX -0.0130 -0.181** H21 
IA → ATT 0.195 0.011 H22 
IA  BI -0.084 -0.0215 H23 
Notes:  
1. *p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0001 
2. The hypotheses shown in red are unsupported hypotheses from the entire sample 
 
The results of the PLS analysis of the separate data sets for gender are shown 
in Table 3.18. In the male sample of 64 respondents, only hypotheses H5, H10 and 
H21 were found to be contradicting to the original findings. In the female sample of 
270 respondents, hypotheses H16 and H19 were contradictory to the original 
findings. The female sample exhibit more sensitiveness to the newly introduced 
information context constructs relating to the IAF characteristics but does not have a 
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significant effect on the behavioural intention. Although these results are 
satisfactory, a balanced overall sample can be used to measure to reach a more 
conclusive decision on the moderating effects of gender.  
Age 
Table 3.19 shows the path coefficients of the moderating variable Age. 
Table 3.19 Path coefficients of moderating variable Age 
 
Age  
17-20 21-30 31 - 60  
ATT - R2 0.6051 0.6618 0.5866  
EE - R2 0.4959 0.3815 0.3918  
ANX - R2 0.0802 0.0741 0.0469  
PE - R2 0.1245 0.193 0.0658  
BI - R2 0.5902 0.4761 0.467  
Path coefficients with significance Hypotheses 
CSE → EE 0.279*** 0.2147* 0.1725 H1 
CSE  BI 0.2267** 0.0585 -0.0632 H2 
ANX → EE -0.5166*** -0.4657*** -0.5094*** H3 
ANX  BI -0.0935* -0.1164 -0.0748 H4 
ATT → BI 0.324 0.0226 0.2254* H5 
PE → ATT 0.7471*** 0.8215*** 0.7206*** H6 
PE → BI 0.3341** 0.5498*** 0.4779*** H7 
EE → BI -0.0942 -0.0014 -0.0457 H8 
IG  EE 0.271** 0.1654 0.0687 H9 
IG  PE 0.1139 0.4449*** 0.2203 H10 
IG → ANX -0.930 -0.187* -0.137 H11 
IG → ATT -0.148* 0.073 0.118 H12 
IG  BI 0.0314 0.0044 0.1024 H13 
IC  EE 0.1237 0.1014 -0.0186 H14 
IC  PE -0.1122 0.1095 -0.1299 H15 
IC → ANX 0.187 0.065 0.080 H16 
IC → ATT -0.018 -0.023 -0.010 H17 
IC  BI -0.1129 -0.1159 0.1074 H18 
IA  EE -0.1812 -0.1683 0.0813 H19 
IA  PE 0.2649 -0.0633 0.0361 H20 
IA → ANX -0.158 -0.136 -0.117 H21 
IA→ ATT 0.158 -0.058 0.053 H22 
IA  BI -0.0659 0.1226 -0.0246 H23 
Notes:  
1. *p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0001 
2. The hypotheses shown in red are unsupported hypotheses from the entire 
sample 
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The results of the PLS analysis of the data sets for the separate age categories 
are shown in Table 3.19. Respondents were categorised in to three groups depending 
on their age; 17 to 20 (n = 104), 21 to 30 (n = 125), 31 to 60 (n = 102). The intervals 
were chosen in such a way so that their sample size were over 60 for the PLS 
analysis. In terms of the original hypotheses results, the first age group contradicts 
the findings for H2, H4, H4, H9, H10, H11 and H21; the second age group 
contradicts the findings for H5 and H21 and the third group contradicts the results for 
H1, H11 and H21. The results converge to the original findings when age increases. 
The significance of CSE on EE and BI reduced with age where older respondents 
showing no significance. Whilst younger respondents showed no significance of 
ATT to BI, respondents aged between 31 and 60 showed a significance relationship 
with ATT and BI. We conclude that age has a significant moderating effect on the 
attitudes of respondents towards the IAF. 
Computer literacy 
The following table shows the path coefficients of moderating variable 
computer literacy. The respondents were asked to rate their computer skill on a 5-
point scale (Excellent, Good, Moderate, Poor and Very Poor). None of the 
respondents indicated that their computer literacy was either poor or very poor. This 
can be expected from a student population. Therefore, those levels were discarded. 
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Table 3.20 Path coefficients of moderating variable Computer Literacy 
 Computer Literacy  
 Excellent Good Moderate  
ATT - R2 0.6585 0.6146 0.5242  
EE - R2 0.3393 0.3279 0.4199  
ANX - R2 0.0826 0.045 0.1261  
PE - R2 0.1111 0.07 0.2242  
BI - R2 0.5569 0.3683 0.6605  
Path coefficients with significance Hypotheses 
CSE → EE 0.2385** 0.1819 0.1226 H1 
CSE  BI 0.1368 -0.057 0.0871 H2 
ANX → EE -0.389*** -0.5115*** -0.5048*** H3 
ANX  BI -0.0671 -0.112 0.0175 H4 
ATT → BI 0.0653 0.2331 0.1667 H5 
PE → ATT 0.8053*** 0.7773*** 0.7374*** H6 
PE → BI 0.5823*** 0.3691** 0.4413 H7 
EE → BI -0.0203 -0.0403 0.0642 H8 
IG  EE 0.1811* 0.1278 0.0369 H9 
IG  PE 0.3065** 0.2843* 0.3492 H10 
IG → ANX -0.165 -0.018 -0.100 H11 
IG → ATT 0.067 -0.030 0.0178 H12 
IG  BI 0.0833 -0.1091 0.4331** H13 
IC  EE 0.0976 -0.014 0.2717 H14 
IC  PE -0.0439 -0.0158 0.2106 H15 
IC → ANX 0.044 0.130 0.052 H16 
IC → ATT 0.014 -0.028 -0.104 H17 
IC  BI -0.0329 -0.0717 -0.2167 H18 
IA  EE -0.1172 -0.1102 0.0024 H19 
IA  PE 0.0512 -0.0368 0.056 H20 
IA → ANX -0.170 -0.193 -0.310 H21 
IA → ATT -0.007 -0.061 -0.017 H22 
IA  BI -0.0965 0.1249 -0.2704 H23 
Notes:  
1. *p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0001 
2. The hypotheses shown in red are unsupported hypotheses from the entire sample 
 
The subsamples of computer literacy were categorised in to Excellent (n = 
167), Good (n = 134) and Moderate (n = 33). All three categories supported the 
original findings relating to all hypotheses except for H1, H5, H11 and H21. But the 
results from the “Moderate” group are not conclusive given that the number of 
respondents was less than the required minimum of 60. We also note that because the 
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distribution was severely skewed towards computer literacy levels being high 
(because the majority of the participants can be considered digital natives), the 
results are not entirely generalisable. But there was no significant negative effect on 
the intention to adopt the system from the IAF characteristics. Given that the range of 
computer literacy was not adequate, a final conclusion cannot be reached regarding 
the moderating effects of computer literacy from the results from the current data set. 
Discipline 
Table 3.21 shows the path coefficients of moderating variable Discipline. The 
main disciplines were Medicine (n = 43) and Nursing (n = 85).  
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Table 3.21 Path coefficients of moderating variable Discipline 
 Discipline 
 
 Medicine Nursing Other 
 
ATT - R2 0.7441 0.6723 0.6069  
EE - R2 0.5429 0.4885 0.3619  
ANX - R2 0.2772 0.2424 0.0367  
PE - R2 0.1563 0.3172 0.0693  
BI - R2 0.5934 0.5667 0.4663  
Path coefficients with significance Hypotheses 
CSE → EE 0.177 0.1701 0.2364** H1 
CSE  BI 0.3775 -0.1826 0.1142 H2 
ANX → EE -0.564*** -0.4813*** -0.4755*** H3 
ANX  BI -0.0575 -0.0653 -0.1152 H4 
ATT → BI 0.1422 0.3854* 0.0978 H5 
PE → ATT 0.8516*** 0.8009*** 0.7604*** H6 
PE → BI 0.3505 0.4163** 0.4861*** H7 
EE → BI 0.1209 -0.0488 -0.036 H8 
IG  EE -0.1112 0.2793* 0.0962 H9 
IG  PE 0.1804 0.6207*** 0.2186** H10 
IG → ANX -0.524 -0.320** -0.083 H11 
IG → ATT 0.050 0.112 0.023 H12 
IG  BI -0.133 0.0736 0.0244 H13 
IC  EE 0.2714* 0.1601 0.0198 H14 
IC  PE 0.1876 0.0073 -0.0895 H15 
IC → ANX -0.116 0.298** 0.023 H16 
IC → ATT 0.029 -0.127 -0.078 H17 
IC  BI -0.3035 0.1316 -0.0966 H18 
IA  EE -0.0575 -0.0243 -0.0924 H19 
IA  PE 0.1068 -0.112 0.0662 H20 
IA → ANX 0.103 -0.072 -0.141 H21 
IA → ATT -0.035 -0.038 0.047 H22 
IA  BI 0.1258 0.0053 0.0177 H23 
Notes:  
1. *p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0001 
2. The hypotheses shown in red are unsupported hypotheses from the entire sample 
 
The third category (n = 196) categorised as “Other” consists of respondents 
from Optometry, Pharmacology, Psychiatry, and several other health science 
disciplines. The moderating effect of these categories was not measured individually 
because of their low individual sample sizes (n < 60). The results revealed that the all 
three groups support the original results relating to all hypotheses except for H1, H5, 
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H7, H9, H10, H11, H16 and H21. Medical students seem to be less influenced by the 
information context than nursing students who show sensitiveness to IG. But, there is 
no evidence, in all three categories, indicating negative effects by the IAF 
characteristics towards behavioural intension. Note that the number of medical 
students was less than 60, indicating that the respective results are not entirely 
conclusive. 
Level of study 
Table 3.22 shows the path coefficients of moderating variable Level of Study. 
The data set was divided in to two categories depending on the level of study; 
undergraduate level (n = 231) and postgraduate level (n = 103). Postgraduate level 
respondents include Master’s level, PhD level, graduate diploma and graduate 
certificate level students. 
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Table 3.22 Path coefficients of moderating variable Level of Study 
 Level of Study  
 Undergraduate Postgraduate  
ATT - R2 0.6577 0.5942  
EE - R2 0.4226 0.3892  
ANX - R2 0.0963 0.0802  
PE - R2 0.1145 0.1298  
BI - R2 0.5385 0.4097  
Path coefficients with significance Hypotheses 
CSE → EE 0.2747*** 0.0962 H1 
CSE  BI 0.0739 0.0809 H2 
ANX → EE -0.4753*** -0.5391*** H3 
ANX  BI -0.0936 0.0293 H4 
ATT → BI 0.2241* 0.061 H5 
PE → ATT 0.8056*** 0.7007*** H6 
PE → BI 0.4251*** 0.5835*** H7 
EE → BI -0.0216 0.0121 H8 
IG  EE 0.1782* 0.0597 H9 
IG  PE 0.2846** 0.3643** H10 
IG → ANX -0.103 0.223 H11 
IG → ATT -0.010 0.133 H12 
IG  BI 0.0386 -0.0328 H13 
IC  EE 0.0874 -0.0288 H14 
IC  PE -0.064 -0.008 H15 
IC → ANX 0.162** 0.005 H16 
IC → ATT -0.051 0.034 H17 
IC  BI -0.1017 0.052 H18 
IA  EE -0.1379* 0.0833 H19 
IA  PE 0.0913 -0.0058 H20 
IA → ANX -0.238** -0.093 H21 
IA → ATT 0.018 0.164 H22 
IA  BI 0.0414 -0.0354 H23 
Notes:  
1. *p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0001 
2. The hypotheses shown in red are unsupported hypotheses from the entire 
sample 
 
Results from the two subsamples supported most of the original results relating 
to the hypotheses. Postgraduate students did not exhibit a significant effect on EE 
from CSE whilst with undergraduate students it was very significant. Similarly, ATT 
had a significant effect on BI with undergraduate students but not with postgraduate 
students. The effect of the IAF characteristics (H9 and H15) was higher in 
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undergraduate students than with postgraduate students who showed no significant 
effect on their intention to use the system. Overall, there was no significant negative 
effect on the intention to use the proposed system by either group. But there is a clear 
moderating effect on the model from level of study. 
Academic year 
Table 3.23 shows the path coefficients of moderating variable Academic year. 
Due to the fact that postgraduate students who responded to the survey may have had 
prior industry exposure of some nature, the academic year of only the Undergraduate 
level respondents was considered as a moderating factor.  
 Chapter 3: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: A Survey of Future Healthcare Professionals 107 
Table 3.23 Path coefficient of moderating variable Academic Year 
 Academic Year 
 
 First Second Third Fourth 
 
ATT - R2 0.6542 0.6702 0.6863 0.7057  
EE - R2 0.4363 0.4023 0.4664 0.5154  
ANX - R2 0.1693 0.2022 0.2375 0.2636  
PE - R2 0.2229 0.2066 0.1296 0.2098  
BI - R2 0.5199 0.7119 0.4885 0.678  
Path coefficients with significance Hypotheses 
CSE → EE 0.3012*** 0.3064* 0.2364 0.2029 H1 
CSE  BI 0.0216 0.2571* 0.1081 0.0611 H2 
ANX → EE -0.4859*** -0.401** -0.47** -0.5478 H3 
ANX  BI -0.1321 -0.017 -0.1299 -0.1435 H4 
ATT → BI 0.2224 0.4333* 0.1493 0.0552 H5 
PE → ATT 0.8*** 0.8181*** 0.7646*** 0.8036*** H6 
PE → BI 0.4851*** 0.1201 0.4378 0.6992** H7 
EE → BI -0.0467 0.0247 0.0589 -0.1369 H8 
IG  EE 0.2561* 0.1731 0.1753 -0.1373 H9 
IG  PE 0.3552** 0.3352** 0.2268 -0.4494 H10 
IG → ANX -0.092 -0.165 -0.284 0.452 H11 
IG → ATT -0.017 0.002 0.015 -0.151 H12 
IG  BI -0.0119 0.2025 -0.1609 -0.0411 H13 
IC  EE 0.1083 -0.0418 0.0118 -0.065 H14 
IC  PE 0.1146 -0.1395 -0.1779 -0.1353 H15 
IC → ANX 0.112 0.024 0.330* 0.239 H16 
IC → ATT -0.081 0.007 -0.140 -0.006 H17 
IC  BI -0.0664 -0.196* 0.0611 -0.1508 H18 
IA  EE -0.2749** -0.0519 -0.0826 0.2622 H19 
IA  PE 0.1117 0.1125 0.1812 0.0614 H20 
IA → ANX -0.375* -0.338 -0.191 -0.052 H21 
IA → ATT 0.078 0.009 0.132 0.082 H22 
IA  BI -0.0082 0.0143 0.0538 0.1223 H23 
Notes:  
1. *p<0.05; **p<0.001; ***p<0.0001 
2. The hypotheses shown in red are unsupported hypotheses from the entire sample 
 
The subsamples were populated such that 96 first year students, 49 second year 
students, 52 third year student and 36 fourth year students were present in each 
category. Note that three of the categories have respondents less than the required 
sample size of 60. The results may not be entirely conclusive. 
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The results mostly support the original findings from the entire data set. The 
effects of the IAF characteristics although significant in some cases (H9, H10, H18, 
H19 and H21) with first and second year students become insignificant factors with 
the third and fourth year students. Overall there were no negative effects from the 
IAF characteristics towards the intention to use the proposed system, supporting the 
original results. The academic year exhibited a noticeable moderating effect on the 
model. 
Measuring the effects of the moderating factors allows for a further 
clarification of the original results by identifying the situational differences (Chin, et 
al., 2003). In this study, we have seen that the moderating factors indeed affect the 
model paths. Although a considerable effect on R2 by every moderator was observed, 
its effects are said to be modest (Chin, et al., 2003). Important to this research, we 
have established that with the results from the moderating factor analysis that there 
are no negative effects from the introduced IAF characteristics towards the 
participants’ intention to adopt and use the proposed EHR system, which is a 
favourable outcome for the rest of the study. 
3.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter we have surveyed a medical and health science student cohort 
and measured their attitudes towards an EHR system augmented with information 
accountability principles for better information management as presented in chapter 
two to investigate how such a system would be accepted by future healthcare 
professionals. We have also developed, tested and validated a new empirical research 
model that is suitable to measure the perceived intention to use AeH systems by 
using previously accepted technology acceptance theories. 
The initial step of the investigation was a descriptive analysis of the survey 
results. The results from the descriptive analysis of the quantitative and qualitative 
data suggest that such a system would be favourably accepted by future healthcare 
professionals. As we saw in section 3.5, the respondents’ attitudes towards the 
system were high and their anxiety levels were low. We have seen from chapter two 
that information accountability in the healthcare domain is important and relevant for 
appropriate information privacy management. Although a strong attitude towards 
patient privacy is present, the respondents are mainly concerned about the timely and 
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comprehensive access to healthcare information, which was identified through 
eHealth requirement 2 in section 1.2.6. The respondents attitudes towards specific 
systems characteristics such as patients having control of their healthcare 
information, being bound by predefined rules for information usage and the 
possibility of being held accountable for misuse of information were also favourable, 
which are technologically feasible through what is discussed in chapters five and six.  
The next step of the investigation was to identify how different aspects, be it 
technical or psychological, influence the intention to adopt the proposed system. We 
conceptualised a research model from existent technology acceptance theories that 
can be empirically tested from the survey results. To test the research model, we 
measured 9 constructs of which 6 were adopted from previously accepted technology 
acceptance models and three were newly introduced to capture the characteristics of 
the IAF in eHealth, which are directly related to the technological presented in 
chapters five and six. Twenty four relationships were hypothesised between the 
constructs and 23 were tested using the survey data. The final hypothesis was 
theorised to be significant from previous research.  
The assessment of the measurement model and structured model was done 
using the partial least square (PLS) approach of structural equation modelling 
(SEM). Construct reliability measurements showed that one item user to measure the 
information control construct had unacceptable reliability. This item was removed 
from further analysis. The model exhibited acceptable internal consistency (> 0.7) for 
each construct indicating that the model was both valid and reliable. 
The PLS results revealed that the model was capable of predicting 47.3% of the 
variance of behavioural intention towards acceptance of the IAF. A PLS analysis 
with bootstrapping was performed to test the 23 hypotheses. Seven out of the 23 
hypotheses tested were not supported. In technology acceptance research, effort 
expectancy was shown to have a significant positive effect on behavioural intention. 
Contrastingly though in the healthcare domain, this was disproven in several studies, 
as was the case in this study. Information governance was hypothesised not to have a 
negative effect on effort expectancy and performance expectancy. But unexpectedly 
in this study, it showed a significant positive effect on both. 
As indicated earlier, the information context constructs are designed to capture 
AeH system characteristics and a direct association can be made with the case 
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scenario given in section 2.6 in chapter two. Information control relates to Patient 
X’s capability to nominate the healthcare professionals he/she want to be able to 
have access to his/her EHR and the fact that custom access policies (reflecting 
information privacy requirements) can be set for them by Patient X. Information 
governance relates to StateHealth defining healthcare access policies that govern the 
access to healthcare information and the definition of intended purposes for data 
access. As stated in the case scenario, certain relationships are present between data 
types and they are maintained by StateHealth, which adds to the intended purposes. 
Information accountability is related to the fact that healthcare professionals can be 
held accountable for inappropriate use of information. In our scenario, if Dr. B had 
accessed Patient X’s mental health details he would have been asked to justify why 
the action occurred. Dr. B’s justification may or may not be valid depending on the 
circumstances. Our survey respondents felt strongly that this characteristic is 
important to EHR systems, which is clear from that descriptive analysis of the 
quantitative and qualitative data presented in section 3.5. More detailed descriptions 
of the AeH system characteristics that were measured from the information context 
constructs are given in chapters five and six. 
The effects of moderating factors on the model constructs were also tested. We 
found that age, gender, study discipline, study year and the level of study had 
moderating effects on the research model. Because the moderating variable computer 
literacy was severely skewed, generalisable conclusions could not be made. We 
believe that further studies are required to test the extent to which each moderating 
factor effect the model.  
The only contributing factor found to have an effect on system acceptance was 
computer/EHR attitude and performance expectancy. Although the information 
context constructs had no significant positive direct effects (except IG on EE and PE) 
there were no negative effects on any of the other constructs. However, we did 
observe a significant positive total effect of IG on BI. This means that the additional 
accountability characteristics do not negatively affect EHR adoption. Overall we 
conclude that, when accountable-eHealth (AeH) systems are implemented, they will 
be favourably accepted by the future healthcare professionals. 
Having established the above conclusion from the results obtained, we point 
out that the representativeness of the data set is not entirely general to all healthcare 
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professionals.  For example, only a limited number of medical students were 
surveyed. We propose a future study involving healthcare professionals with varied 
levels of experience with EHR systems to further validate the findings of this study. 
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Chapter 4: Views on Information 
Accountability in eHealth: The 
Consumers’ Perspective 
 
In this chapter, we present the results of a survey conducted to measure the 
attitudes of the general consumers towards information accountability in eHealth. A 
research model and descriptive analysis of survey data are presented. The 
quantitative and qualitative data utilised in this chapter originated from 187 
completed survey responses from university student studying non-health related 
courses at the Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. The survey 
investigates how the concepts behind the information accountability framework 
(IAF) designed for eHealth systems would be accepted by future eHealth consumers. 
The results from the survey analysis support the applicability IA principles in the 
eHealth domain. The findings indicate that there is support from the consumers’ 
perspective for the technological aspects of the IAF reported in chapters five and six. 
Research objective 4(b) is addressed in this chapter. 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The lack of consumer adoption is one of the main impediments to eHealth. 
This related to both healthcare professionals as well as the general consumers, i.e. 
patients or individuals who own an EHR. Low consumer adoption of technology can 
be seen as a critical issue in many eHealth initiatives around the world. This was 
recently evident in Australia relating to the PCEHR system (Barlass, 2012). The 
main concern for consumers is privacy and security of their health information. 
Although there is ample evidence and concerns pertaining to the technology 
perspective relating to security and privacy in eHealth (Petkovic & Ibraimi, 2011),  
there are only a few studies conducted in that regards (Or & Karsh, 2009; Wilkowska 
& Ziefle, 2011). Most of the studies conducted in relation to patients attitudes are 
focused on consumer health information technologies, i.e. computer-based systems 
that are designed to facilitate information access and exchange, enhance decision 
making, provide social and emotional support, and help behaviour changes that 
promote health and well-being (Gustafson et al., 2002; Or & Karsh, 2009). The 
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attitudes of the consumers towards EHR systems that enable them to manage their 
own healthcare information have not been extensively researched. But in recent 
eHealth developments, a significant degree of these types of systems are being 
developed. It is therefore important to measure the attitudes of the consumers 
towards eHealth systems and system attributes which directly affects system 
acceptance once implemented. 
Consumers may see an increased opportunity to use EHR systems because they 
empower consumers to participate in information sharing and decision making, 
which enables them to be more in control and contribute to quality healthcare (Or & 
Karsh, 2009). But their acceptance of these technologies is hindered by several 
reasons. Poor availability, lack of training, lack of computer skills and low self-
efficacy can be seen as several major reasons. Relevant to EHR system, which 
manage sensitive health information, information privacy, security and trust issues 
also contribute to the low adoption rate. There is evidence to suggest that the lack of 
adoption of eHealth technologies by the consumers has led to the failure of a number 
of eHealth projects (Jimison et al., 2008; A. Rogers & Mead, 2004; Stoop, van’t Riet, 
& Berg, 2004; P. Williams, Nicholas, & Huntington, 2003). 
The focus of this chapter is given to the consumers’ perspective on a newly 
designed measure (the IAF) to address information privacy. It is stated that the 
understanding of factors that influence technology acceptance is essential for its 
successful adoption (E. M. Rogers, 1995). The influence of technology acceptance 
has been extensively studied, most commonly, in the business arena. Although 
technology acceptance research has been done in the healthcare domain as reported 
in chapter three, very little work is done pertaining to the patients’ perspective 
(Korzaan & Boswell, 2008; Wilkowska & Ziefle, 2011). But, the knowledge about 
the attitudes of patients towards eHealth systems is needed to ensure that the design 
of future systems will be acceptable to patients (Whiddett, Hunter, Engelbrecht, & 
Handy, 2006b). 
The term “acceptance” has been previously defined in several ways in the 
prominent technology acceptance literature (Or & Karsh, 2009). The main four ways 
it has been defined are: the satisfaction with the technology; use or adoption of the 
technology; efficient or effective use of the technology; and the intention or 
willingness to use the technology (Chau & Hu, 2002a, 2002b; Davis, 1989; Karsh, 
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2004; Venkatesh, et al., 2003; Whitten & Richardson, 2002). The last definition of 
acceptance is the focus of this study. 
This chapter presents the results of a survey and a conceptual research model 
developed by considering facts presented in chapter two to measure the acceptance 
of the IAF in eHealth by eHealth consumers. A descriptive analysis of the survey 
data is presented as a measure of the perceived attitudes towards the IAF. Similar to 
what was done in chapter three the research model is based on well established 
technology acceptance model constructs and their relationships together with 
constructs and relationships hypothesised to be significant in the study domain. 
Many of the same constructs used in chapter three are utilised in this chapter. 
However, since the study is measuring the consumers’ perspective as opposed to the 
professionals’ perspective, the perception for the same construct may be different, 
i.e. opposite to what was observed in chapter three. Therefore the hypotheses in this 
chapter are made accordingly. 
The survey utilised in this study aims to measure the perceived intention to 
adopt the proposed EHR system with IA measures for information management by 
potential consumers of the system, i.e. patients. This scope is significant given that 
the implementation and operation of such a system will require a significant amount 
of time, resources and require extensive legislative support, which are only recently 
being initiated, for instance, in Australia (refer to chapter seven for more details 
about the legal aspects related to IA in healthcare). 
The analysis of the results from the survey followed the methods used in 
chapter three. Firstly, a descriptive analysis was performed on the quantitative and 
qualitative data using IBM SPSS Version 19 (SPSS Inc, 2012). From the descriptive 
analysis, an assessment was made about the attitudes of the respondents towards the 
IAF characteristics. Secondly, the measurement model and the structural model were 
tested focusing on the relationships of the model constructs and hypotheses 
respectively using partial least square (PLS) analysis. The PLS analysis tool used 
was smartPLS 2.0 (Ringle, et al., 2005). 
4.2 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
The research model design in this chapter follows the same method used in 
chapter three. The research model used to test the attitudes of the general public was 
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designed based on published technology acceptance research and research relating to 
people’s attitudes towards eHealth technologies. In the design of the relationships 
between specific aspects (constructs), consideration is also given to the findings from 
chapter three. Previously untested constructs are introduced to the research model to 
capture the IAF characteristics similar to what was done in chapter three. 
4.2.1 Methodology 
The method of research was a quantitative and qualitative questionnaire 
survey. The results resented in this chapter is the final part of the two part survey 
which was designed and carried out to capture patients’ attitudes towards the 
designed EHR system with IA characteristics. The questions included in the 
questionnaire were either adopted from previous technology acceptance research or 
have been developed specifically for this study. The primary goals of this chapter 
are; firstly, to measure how the designed EHR system would be accepted in the 
future by the members of the general public and secondly, to validate the research 
model used in the study using the survey data. 
4.2.2 Research model design 
Chapter three established three main contexts which influence the behavioural 
intention to use technology that relates to the acceptance of the IAF in eHealth. In 
this section of the study, two of the three contexts are brought forward and an 
additional context is introduced to the research model. The individual context, the 
information context, and the privacy context are theorised to have influence on the 
behavioural intention of patients towards accepting the designed IAF. Figure 4.1 
shows the designed research model. 
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Figure 4.1 Hypothesised research model 
The main hypotheses made here relate to the relationships between the model 
constructs within the information context and privacy context to determine their role 
in the perceived attitude of the respondents towards accepting the IAF. 
4.2.3 Research Hypothesis 
The hypotheses for this research study were based on technology acceptance 
research in general and in the healthcare domain focusing on the consumers’ 
acceptance of technology. The hypotheses are related to the structural relationships 
amongst the model constructs. Each of the three contexts and their related hypotheses 
are discussed in this section. 
Individual context 
Similar to what was discussed in chapter three, for the individual context we 
consider three constructs; computer self-efficacy (CSE), computer anxiety (ANX) 
and computer attitude (ATT). These constructs are drawn from the unified theory of 
acceptance and use of technology (UTAUT) (Venkatesh, et al., 2003). 
Previous studies that tested consumer acceptance of health ICT acceptance, the 
usability characteristics of a technology, a person’s feelings, perceptions, or beliefs 
about a technology can affect their perceived acceptance of that technology (Holden 
& Karsh, 2009). Therefore, the aforementioned constructs are used to capture 
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different aspects in relation to the above. Formal definitions or meanings of each of 
the constructs can be found in chapter five. 
Results from chapter five and the UTAUT model (Venkatesh, et al., 2003) 
showed that Computer Self-Efficacy does not have a direct relationship with 
behavioural intention. But, other research on consumer acceptance of technology in 
the healthcare domain has shown that CSE is in fact a predictor of acceptance 
(Compeau & Higgins, 1995; Hsu & Chiu, 2004; Hu, Chau, Sheng, & Tam, 1999). In 
this study, CSE can also be theorised to have a direct effect on information control, a 
capability given to the consumers for self control of their healthcare information by 
the IAF. The considerations resulted in the following hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1:  Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy will have a direct positive effect on the 
consumers’ perception on information control 
Hypothesis 2: Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy will have a direct effect on the 
consumers’ perceived acceptance of the technology 
Although Computer Anxiety was found to be only indirectly related to 
behavioural intention in technology acceptance research involving professionals 
(Schaper & Pervan, 2007; Venkatesh, et al., 2003), consumer related studies in the 
healthcare domain has found a direct relationship between ANX and behavioural 
intention (Finkelstein, Khare, & Ansell, 2003; Lai, Larson, Rockoff, & Bakken, 
2008; Lober et al., 2006), which directly related to acceptance. Computer anxiety has 
also been theorised to have a direct negative effect on privacy concerns (Korzaan & 
Boswell, 2008). In this context that may be resulting from the fear of having an 
electronic health record of one’s medical history. In our research context we also 
theorise that that Computer Anxiety to have a direct negative effect on the perceived 
attitude towards information control. As a result of these evidence and considerations 
the following hypotheses were formulated regarding Computer Anxiety represented 
in this context as Computer/EHR Anxiety. 
Hypothesis 3: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct positive effect on the 
consumers’ perceived privacy concerns 
Hypothesis 4: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct negative effect on 
perceived acceptance of the technology 
 Chapter 4: Views on Information Accountability in eHealth: The Consumers’ Perspective 119 
Hypothesis 5: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct negative effect on 
information control 
Similar to what has been seen in technology acceptance research in general, 
Computer Attitude is considered to have a significant effect on acceptance (Or & 
Karsh, 2009). Similar to anxiety, computer attitude can also influence privacy 
concerns with consumers. A similar hypothesis is also made in relation to 
information control. The following hypotheses are formulated regarding Computer 
Attitude represented in this context as Computer/EHR Attitude. 
Hypothesis 6: Computer/EHR Attitude will have a direct negative effect on 
consumers’ perceived privacy concerns 
Hypothesis 7: Computer/EHR Attitude will have a direct positive effect on 
consumers’ perceived acceptance of the technology 
Hypothesis 8: Computer/EHR Attitude will have a direct positive effect on 
information control 
Information privacy context 
Information privacy related technology acceptance studies are mostly based on 
the big five personality traits (Graeff & Harmon, 2002; Korzaan & Boswell, 2008; 
Smith, Milberg, & Burke, 1996). But these studies were primarily focused on 
domains such as corporate use of personal information (Angst & Agarwal, 2009). 
Information privacy research in the healthcare domain, however, focuses on issues 
such as information sharing, information access and use, information control (Angst 
& Agarwal, 2009; Perera, Holbrook, Thabane, Foster, & Willison, 2011). Therefore 
in this study we adopt similar construct items to measure privacy concerns of 
individuals. This construct is important to the overall study of the thesis given our 
primary objective of addressing information privacy. 
Privacy concerns are related to the consumer concern about information 
privacy arising from health information being stored and manipulated electronically 
(in the EHR system), information sharing by healthcare professionals and access and 
use of information by the said parties. As mentioned earlier, sharing and information 
access and use, have been directly associated with privacy concerns. Specific to this 
study, it was theorised that the privacy concerns would positively affect the 
consumers’ perceived need of information accountability, the primary focus of this 
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thesis. Privacy concerns are also theorised here to have direct effects on the other two 
information context constructs because they are also directly related to IAF 
characteristics, which are addressed in chapters five and six. A direct negative effect 
on the perceived acceptance of the technology is also theorised. The resulting 
hypotheses are as follows. 
Hypothesis 9: Privacy concerns will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ 
perception of information governance 
Hypothesis 10: Privacy concerns will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ 
perception of information control 
Hypothesis 11: Privacy concerns will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ 
perception of information accountability 
Hypothesis 12: Privacy concerns will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ 
perceived acceptance of the technology 
Trust, in this study, is related to the trust level of a consumer on a third party 
(Whiddett, et al., 2006b). Trust can affect both privacy concerns and the acceptance 
of technology. This construct related to the technological aspect, as discussed in 
chapter five, involving the health authority setting access policies for healthcare 
information. The characteristic was also identified as an eHealth requirement in 
section 1.2.6. It is important to understand how consumers perceive this 
characteristic of the IAF. It was also theorised that trust would have direct effect on 
all three information context constructs. Therefore the following hypotheses were 
made. 
Hypothesis 13: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perceived 
privacy concerns 
Hypothesis 14: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perception on 
information governance 
Hypothesis 15: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perception on 
information control 
Hypothesis 16: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perception on 
information accountability 
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Hypothesis 17: Trust will have a direct effect on consumers’ perceived acceptance 
of the technology 
Information context 
The constructs of the information context are information control, information 
governance, and information accountability as discussed in chapter three, which 
directly relate to the characteristics of AeH systems and the technological aspects 
presented in chapters five and six. The results from chapter three showed that none of 
the three constructs had a direct relationship with behavioural intention. Rather than 
assuming the same here related to the consumers’ perspective, because they have not 
been tested before elsewhere, it was theorised that all three constructs would have a 
positive direct effect on the acceptance of the technology. This is because consumers 
may perceive the three accountability measures could improve their information 
privacy as opposed to HCPs perceiving them as hindrances. The following three 
hypotheses were made to reflect these effects. 
Hypothesis 18: Information governance will have a direct positive effect on 
consumers’ perceived acceptance of the technology 
Hypothesis 19: Information control will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ 
perceived acceptance of the technology 
Hypothesis 20: Information accountability will have a direct positive effect on 
consumers’ perceived acceptance of the technology 
Perceived acceptance 
Perceive acceptance covers the same aspects as behavioural intention, which 
was discussed in chapter three. Therefore, it is theorised that the perceived 
acceptance of the technology will have a direct effect on the actual acceptance by the 
consumers. The actual acceptance of the designed EHR system cannot be tested as 
part of this research study. As mentioned in chapter three, the implementation of 
such a system is too complex for a single research study. However, once 
implemented, a longitudinal study may be carried out to test the actual acceptance of 
the system by both eHealth consumers and healthcare professionals. The following 
hypothesis was made in relation to the actual acceptance of the system by healthcare 
consumers. 
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Hypothesis 21: Perceived acceptance will have a direct positive effect on the actual 
acceptance of the IAF 
The hypotheses are summarised in Table 4.1. 
Moderators 
In prior research relating to how consumers accept healthcare information 
technology, there is a lack of consideration of the effects of moderating variable 
towards acceptance (Or & Karsh, 2009). Therefore in this study, four moderating 
factors were considered; gender, age, computer literacy and the awareness of the 
PCEHR. The effects of these factors are discussed later in the chapter.
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Table 4.1 Research hypotheses 
Construct Abbreviation Hypothesis 
Individual Context 
Computer self-efficacy CSE H1:  Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy will have a direct positive effect on the consumers’ 
perception on information control 
H2: Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy will have a direct effect on the consumers’ perceived 
acceptance of the technology 
Computer (EHR) 
anxiety 
ANX H3: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct positive effect on the consumers’ 
perceived privacy concerns 
H4: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct negative effect on perceived acceptance of 
the technology 
H5: Computer/EHR Anxiety will have a direct negative effect on information control 
Computer (EHR) 
attitude 
ATT H6: Computer/EHR Attitude will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perceived 
privacy concerns 
H7: Computer/EHR Attitude will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ perceived 
acceptance of the technology 
H8: Computer/EHR attitude will have a direct positive effect on information control 
Information Privacy Context 
Privacy Concerns PC H9: Privacy concerns will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ perception of 
information governance 
H10: Privacy concerns will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ perception of 
information control 
H11: Privacy concerns will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ perception of 
information accountability 
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H12: Privacy concerns will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perceived 
acceptance of the technology 
Third party trust TPT H13: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perceived privacy concerns 
H14: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perception on information 
governance 
H15: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perception on information 
control 
H16: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perception on information 
accountability 
H17: Trust will have a direct negative effect on consumers’ perceived acceptance of the 
technology 
Information Context 
Information 
governance 
IG H18: Information governance will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ perceived 
acceptance of the technology 
Information control IC H19: Information control will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ perceived 
acceptance of the technology 
Information 
accountability 
IA H20: Information accountability will have a direct positive effect on consumers’ 
perceived acceptance of the technology 
Acceptance of the IAF 
Perceived acceptance ACC H21: Perceived acceptance will have a direct positive effect on the actual acceptance of 
the IAF 
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4.2.4 Survey items and constructs 
The individual items used for measuring each of the constructs are given in 
Table 4.2. Although some items were adopted from previous research in technology 
acceptance, most of the items were specifically designed for this study. The reason 
for the low adoption from prior research was due to the nature of the respondents and 
the introduction of a new information manipulation protocol to EHRs. 
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Table 4.2 Constructs and questionnaire items 
Construct Related hypothesis Questionnaire item Origin 
Individual Context 
Computer self-
efficacy (CSE) 
H1 
H2 
CSE1…. I would be able to complete different tasks without 
anyone around to tell me what to do 
CSE2…. I would be able to complete tasks if I could call someone 
for help if I got stuck 
CSE2…. I would like to have the guidance of a health authority in 
managing my health information electronically 
 
 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
 
Developed for this 
research study 
Computer/EHR 
anxiety (ANX) H3 – H5 
ANX1….I feel apprehensive about using this EHR systems 
ANX2….I would hesitate to use this EHR systems for fear of 
making a mistake I cannot correct 
ANX3….I would be concerned about losing a lot of information 
by hitting the wrong key 
ANX4….I would find this EHR systems intimidating 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Computer/EHR 
attitude (ATT) H6 – H8 
ATT1….I believe that paper records can be better utilised to keep 
health information more secure than in EHRs 
ATT2…. I think that using an EHR to manage my health 
information is a good idea 
ATT3….I think that EHR systems are expensive to implement 
and maintain. The expense could be better utilised to 
improve other healthcare facilities 
Developed to capture 
eHR attitude 
Venkatesh et al., 2003 
Developed to capture 
eHR attitude 
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Information privacy context 
Privacy concerns 
(PC) H9 – H12 
PC1…. I believe that storing and managing health information 
electronically (using computers) will threaten my privacy 
PC2….I feel that patient information, even with personal 
identifiable information removed, should not be accessed 
by any outside entity or authority (including the 
government) for any reason (including research) other than 
the caregiver(s) for the purpose of providing healthcare 
PC3…. I would prefer if health professionals who treat me had 
access to information that is only related to the current 
episode of care knowing that it would not hinder the 
healthcare process 
PC4…. I feel that caregivers should not be allowed to share 
patient information with other healthcare professionals 
PC5…  I think that patient consent is critical before using patient 
information 
Developed for this 
research study 
Third party trust 
(TPT) H13 – H17 
TPT1…. I would trust a health authority to properly manage my 
health information so that my privacy requirements are 
satisfied 
TPT2…. I would trust a health professional such as my GP to 
properly manage my health information so that my 
privacy requirements are satisfied 
TPT3…. I believe that a health authority can formulate a 
comprehensive set of usage rules which would indicate 
what health data is required for treating a given medical 
condition 
Developed for this 
research study 
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Information Context 
Information 
governance (IG) H18 
IG1…. I believe that when health information is manipulated 
electronically (using computers), health professionals 
should be bound by predefined rules for  accessing and 
using patient health information 
IG2…. I believe that when health information is manipulated 
electronically (using computers), a comprehensive medical 
knowledge base should govern information usage 
IG3…. I believe that when health information is manipulated 
electronically (using computers), proper rules should be 
set on the use of health information 
IG4…. I would prefer to impose usage rules on health 
professionals who would access my health information for 
the purpose of providing healthcare knowing that those 
rules would not hinder the healthcare process 
Developed to capture 
attitudes towards having 
usage rules and a 
computerised 
knowledgebase 
Information 
control (IC) H19 
IC1….I believe that patients have the right to set their own 
privacy settings in an electronic health record system 
similar to that of most social media websites (e.g. 
Facebook) 
IC2…. I believe that patients have the right to decide which health 
professional can access his/her eHR 
IC3…. I would like to have control of my health information 
rather than trusting a health authority or a health 
professional with my data 
Developed to capture 
attitudes towards patients 
participation and control 
of health information 
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Information 
accountability (IA) H20 
IA1…. I believe that if usage rules set by a health authority are 
broken intentionally, the offenders (e.g. doctors, nurses, 
etc) should be held accountable 
IA2…. I think that patients have the right to inquire about possible 
misuse of their health information 
IA3…. I think that health professionals should be required to 
justify why they have accessed/used information which 
they did not require for a given episode of care 
IA4…. I feel that health professionals should be held accountable 
if they fail to provide a valid justification for a patients’ 
inquiry 
IA4…. I feel that health professionals should be held accountable 
if found to have misused patient health information. 
(Misuse in this context is using information for tasks other 
than the purpose of patient care which would have a 
negative impact on the patient’s social life, professional 
career, etc) 
Developed to capture the 
attitudes towards 
accountability measures 
Acceptance of the technology 
Perceived 
acceptance H21 
ACC1…. I would use this type of EHR system to manage my 
health information in the future 
ACC2…. I am confident that my privacy will be secure in this type of 
EHR system 
ACC3…. I feel that using this type of EHR system would hinder 
my well-being 
Developed for this 
research study 
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4.3 PARTICIPANTS 
4.3.1 Selection criteria 
The participants were selected from the Science and Engineering Faculty at the 
Queensland University of Technology, Brisbane, Australia. All participants were 
students studying in non-health related undergraduate and postgraduate courses. This 
was to eliminate the influence of possible bias towards the questionnaire items 
affecting from the healthcare knowledge and the study environment of those 
students. Since the students from the health related courses participated in the study 
reported in chapter three, they were not engaged in this study. Apart from the reasons 
mentioned above, the selection of this specific population also depended on the 
willingness of the institution to broadcast the survey invitation emails within the 
institution. 
4.3.2 Participants 
The participants comprised of undergraduate and postgraduate students 
studying non-health related courses at the institute. The distribution is shown in 
Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3 Distribution of respondents 
 Undergraduate Postgraduate  
 Male (%) Female (%) Male (%) Female (%) Total 
1st Year 28 (32.6) 18 (36.7) 13 (52.0) 12 (46.2) 71 
2nd Year 26 (30.2) 10 (20.4) 5 (20.0) 5 (19.2) 46 
3rd Year 16 (18.6) 14 (28.6) 5 (20.0) 2 (7.7) 37 
4thYear 15 (17.4) 6 (12.2) 1 (4.0) 2 (7.7) 24 
Graduated 1 (1.2) 1 (2.0) 1 (4.0) 5 (19.2) 8 
 86 49 25 26 186 
 135 51 
 
The age of the respondents ranged from a minimum of 17 to a maximum of 65 
with a mean of 27 (SD = 10.1.). Table 6.4 shows the age distribution. 
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Table 4.4 Age range of respondents 
Age Range Number of Respondents 
17 - 20 58 
21 - 30 77 
31 - 40 26 
41 - 65 23 
Total 184 
Note: Age had two missing values 
 
4.4 THE SURVEY 
4.4.1 Instrument 
Similar to the questionnaire used in chapter three, the questions were included 
in an online survey tool and were formatted such that the readability and presentation 
of the survey was appropriate. Questions were distributed in such a way that the 
ceiling and floor effects were minimal. The survey was distributed via email 
invitation to all prospective participants (see Appendix B the for email invitation). 
Because all university students were already familiar with email and Internet 
technologies, there were no hindrances expected from the use of an online survey 
tool in terms of usability. The online survey distribution and response collection was 
also expected to maximise the response rate. 
4.4.2 Survey Administration 
A detailed description was given to the participants outlining the specific 
characteristics of the EHR system. Similar to chapter three, the survey questions 
were designed to further outline the characteristics specific to the IAF such as policy 
setting by patients and inquiries and justifications. The questions focused on the 
attitudes the respondents had on an EHR system designed using the IA principles. A 
screen shot of the first page of phase 1 survey can be found in Appendix C, which is 
similar to phase two. After six weeks time from the launch of the survey, data 
collection was terminated. 
4.4.3 Ethics and Limitations 
Ethical clearance was obtained from Queensland University of Technology to 
conduct the research study as a variation of the ethics clearance obtained for the 
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study presented in the previous chapter, which also did not include any health and 
safety issues. The ethical clearance certificates can be found in Appendix A. 
As previously stated, the study was limited to a student population. Initial 
attempts were made to involve members of the general public in the survey and were 
unsuccessful. The decision was made afterwards to include a suitable student cohort 
that would deliver a limited but similar result to what could have been expected from 
current healthcare professionals. This was done so that the research study could be 
completed within the available time frame. 
4.5 DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE RESULTS 
The descriptive analysis presented in this section aim to find the overall 
attitude towards the designed IAF for eHealth systems. The results from the 
descriptive analysis also aids to establish the practical significance of the research 
questions (Hair, et al., 1998). 
4.5.1 Response 
A total of 259 responses were received. But due to incomplete submissions, 73 
were removed from the analysis. The descriptive results reported here are from the 
resulting 186 responses. Limited amount of quantitative data were also collected in 
the form of unrestricted comments. 
4.5.2 Analysis 
A total of 33 items were used to measure the 9 model variables, which are used 
to assess the measurement model, structural model and hypotheses. An additional 7 
questions were also included in the questionnaire relating to the EHR system. The 
response for the model variables is summarised in Table 4.5. 
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Table 4.5 Descriptive data of questionnaire items related to the measurement model 
 Strongly Disagree % Strongly Agree   
 1 2 3 4 5 Mean SD 
Computer/EHR Self-Efficacy 3.96 .850 
CSE1 .5 6.5 14.5 46.2 32.3 4.03 .882 
CSE2 1.6 3.2 12.4 51.1 31.7 4.08 .844 
CSE3 1.6 5.4 23.1 55.4 14.5 3.76 .826 
Computer/EHR Anxiety 2.40 1.121 
ANX1 14.5 38.2 21.0 22.0 4.3 2.63 1.108 
ANX2 17.7 43.5 12.4 21.5 4.8 2.52 1.154 
ANX3 25.3 43.5 12.9 14.0 4.3 2.28 1.120 
ANX4 30.1 41.4 12.9 11.8 3.8 2.18 1.103 
Computer/EHR Attitude 3.52 1.124 
ATT1* 7.5 14.5 22 31.7 24.2 3.51 1.218 
ATT2 2.7 5.4 22.6 41.9 27.4 3.86 0.971 
ATT3* 12.9 12.4 25.8 38.7 10.2 3.21 1.183 
Privacy concerns 3.3 1.208 
PC1 11.8 32.8 21.0 25.3 9.1 2.87 1.188 
PC2 9.7 25.3 11.8 24.2 29.0 3.38 1.383 
PC3 13.4 23.7 15.1 37.1 10.8 3.08 1.256 
PC4* 8.6 24.7 22.6 34.4 9.7 3.12 1.147 
PC5 1.6 13.4 3.8 40.3 40.9 4.05 1.064 
Third Part Trust 3.78 .978 
TPT1 3.8 10.8 12.9 53.2 19.4 3.74 1.014 
TPT2 1.6 9.7 14.0 51.1 23.7 3.85 .945 
TPT3 2.2 11.8 15.1 51.6 19.4 3.74 .974 
Information Governance 4.20 .820 
IG1 1.1 1.1 5.9 40.9 51.1 4.40 .745 
IG2 1.1 5.4 18.8 46.2 28.5 3.96 .887 
IG3 .0 1.1 3.8 40.3 54.8 4.49 .626 
IG4 2.2 10.2 10.8 43.5 33.3 3.96 1.023 
Information Control 3.65 1.130 
IC1 4.8 15.6 12.4 36.6 30.6 3.73 1.192 
IC2 1.6 13.4 9.7 43.0 32.3 3.91 1.049 
IC3 2.7 28.0 22.6 28.0 18.8 3.32 1.150 
Information accountability 4.46 .720 
IA1 .5 2.7 4.3 33.3 59.1 4.48 .751 
IA2 .0 .0 2.7 33.9 63.4 4.61 .542 
IA3 2.7 2.2 5.9 38.7 50.5 4.32 .890 
IA4 0 3.8 7.5 37.6 51.1 4.36 .781 
IA5 .0 .5 5.9 33.3 60.2 4.53 .634 
Perceived acceptance 3.67 .931 
ACC1 1.6 5.4 30.1 40.9 22.0 3.76 .911 
ACC2  5.9 12.9 33.3 38.2 9.7 3.33 1.016 
ACC3* 1.1 4.3 22.0 46.2 26.3 3.92 .867 
Note: * reverse coded item 
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Computer/EHR self-efficacy 
An overall mean of 3.96 (0.850) was achieved for CSE. All items used to as 
measures exhibited means significantly greater than the midpoint of the scale. This 
indicates that the respondents were confident about their ability to use the EHR 
system and their computer skills are high. This was expected since the respondent 
cohort was from a technology oriented faculty at the Queensland University of 
Technology. 
Computer/EHR anxiety 
The overall mean for ANX was 2.40 (1.121) with all items used as measures 
having means less than the midpoint of the scale. The respondents exhibited a low 
level of anxiety in using the EHR system to manage their health information but the 
level was not very low. This significant level of anxiety may contribute to increase of 
privacy concerns and may negatively affect acceptance, which will be tested later in 
the study. 
Computer/EHR attitude 
The respondents’ computer/EHR attitude is high with the means of all 
measurement items above the midpoint and an overall mean of 3.52 (1.124). But the 
level is not very high. 
Privacy concerns 
The overall mean of the measurement items for PC was 3.3 (1.208). This 
indicates that the respondents did have considerable privacy concerns but it was not 
strong. This may be due to the age group of the participants, who have not had 
extensive exposure to a medical system and had to manage their sensitive health 
information. 
Third party trust 
The respondents exhibit a relatively high level of trust on health authorities and 
their caring physicians towards the management of their health information. The 
overall mean for TPT was 3.78 (0.978). 
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Information governance 
The respondents strongly believe that information governance measure such as 
usage rules and computerised medical knowledge bases are required in the system. 
The overall mean for IG was a significantly high 4.20 (0.820). This high indication is 
a favourable sign for the application of information accountability in eHealth. 
Information control 
The respondents believe that general consumers must be allowed to control 
their own information. The overall mean of IC was a moderately high 3.65 (1.130). 
Since information control is a key characteristic of AeH system, it was expected that 
this level would be higher than exhibited. IC3 has had a significant contribution to 
the mean level. This reflects the high third party trust level exhibited by the 
respondents. 
Information accountability 
The overall mean score for IA was a very high 4.46 (0.720). This indicates that 
the respondents very strongly believe that information misuse must be followed by 
appropriate accountability measures. The respondents’ attitudes towards the inquiry 
and justification process are very favourable. This indicated that the respondents are 
very keen on this capability, a favourable sign for AeH systems. 
Perceived acceptance 
The overall mean score for ACC was 3.67 (0.931). The mean scores for all 
items used to measure the construct was above the midpoint of the scale. But the 
levels are not very high as exhibited for some of the other constructs. Nevertheless, 
the current perceived acceptance levels are favourable. 
Overall response 
The mean score for each model variable were higher than the midpoint of the 
scale except for Computer/EHR Anxiety. This indicates the strength of the 
respondents’ agreements with the items used to measure each of the constructs. The 
mode of each of the items used to measure the constructs, except Computer/EHR 
Anxiety, was 4. This is an indicator that the majority if the respondents were not 
neutral in their response but were in agreement with the items.  
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4.5.3 Qualitative Analysis 
The qualitative data was obtained from the questionnaire through unrestricted 
comments. The respondents commented on their attitudes towards managing their 
health information on the designed EHR system and the importance of the 
accountability features presented. A total of 56 respondents commented on the EHR 
system. The comments are categorised in to themes and presented in Table E.1 of 
Appendix E. 
There is a strong bias towards consumers’ right to control their healthcare 
information as a means of privacy management. As one respondent said; 
“The term 'Sufficient reasoning' should be up to the end user, through privacy 
settings NOT Government Legislators” 
This indicates that patients should have the right to inquire about any potential 
misuse of their information and that it is their right to do so. It was also seen 
important to clearly identify the type of use that might occur outside of the set rules. 
“If they are misused in some insidious plot to cause harm or I dunno spread 
my info across the Internet yeah sure. But if their intent is too better treat a patient 
or use the data in some reasonable medical way(such as research), only they happen 
to break some small rule in information usage, meant only to ensure a patients 
impression of privacy while limiting practical use of data, then no, they shouldn’t be 
punished, instead the rules should be adapted to the needs of  the health 
professionals.” 
“If they are found to have misused the information then that should be the 
same as breaking patient confidentiality. If they have used it for researching patients 
with conditions similar to one of their own, or to help the patient then I do not think 
it is a bad thing.” 
The validation of the justifications must consider the circumstances which the 
usage occurred. The patients’ health must come first. 
As one respondent commented saying, “Misuse should be made a criminal 
offence to discourage it”, a strong statement but this indicates that accountability 
measures can deliver the deterrence required to prevent users from misusing 
information. Other similar comments were present that exhibited the need and the 
effectiveness of accountability measures in the EHR system.  
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There were negative comments directed towards both EHRs in general, where 
one respondent commented saying; “Don't waste money on eHR”, and the designed 
EHR system with IA. However, the majority of the comments from the respondents 
towards the designed EHR system were positive; one respondent saying that it was a 
“Great idea”. 
General consensus was that the idea was appropriate for the management of 
healthcare information electronically. Although the response was favourable to the 
proposed EHR, more extensive work need to be done, especially with a broader age 
range and a more general cohort, to further validate the consumers’ attitudes towards 
information accountability in eHealth. 
4.6 ASSESSMENT OF THE RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESIS 
TESTING 
For the assessment of the research model and hypothesis testing, the same 
methods used in the previous chapter are used here. The partial least square (PLS) 
method is used to assess the research model. As mentioned before, this involves the 
assessment of the measurement model and the assessment of the structural model 
(hypothesis testing).  
4.6.1 Assessment of the measurement model 
Construct reliability and discriminant and convergent validity of PLS analysis 
were used to measure the reliability and validity of the measurement model 
respectively. 
Construct reliability 
Construct reliability of the measurement model was determined by the 
individual item loadings, internal consistency and the average of variance extracted 
(AVE). Tables E.2 and E.3 in Appendix E present the results in the order above. The 
PLS results indicated that all construct measurements were reliable since the 
individual item loadings were greater than the 0.3 threshold (Igbaria, et al., 1997). 
Therefore, all items were used for the proceeding analysis. The composite reliability 
of the constructs revealed that all reliabilities were greater than the 0.707 threshold 
required (Igbaria, et al., 1997). The average variance extracted (AVE) for each 
construct showed that they were greater than the required 0.5. 
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Discriminant and convergent validity 
The construct validity was determined by measuring the discriminant and 
convergent validity. Discriminant validity is used to measure the difference of a 
construct to other constructs used in the model (Schaper, 2009). Convergent validity 
is used to determine the convergence of the items used to measure a construct. It 
shows how they associate with each other to reflect the construct they are designed to 
measure (Datmar Straub, et al., 2004). In PLS, correlations of the constructs and 
cross loading of constructs are used to determine the discriminant and convergence 
validity. 
Correlation of constructs 
In the measurement of correlation of constructs, the square root of AVE must 
be greater than the correlation with other constructs (Datmar Straub, et al., 2004). 
Table E.4 in Appendix E shows the correlation of constructs with the square root of 
AVE (shown in bold). None of the items had a higher value than the square root of 
the corresponding AVE. Overall, discriminant and convergent validity is acceptable. 
Cross loadings of constructs 
Cross loadings of constructs reveal the fit of individual items load on the latent 
variable compared to their loadings on other variables (Schaper, 2009). The cross 
loadings are shown in Table F.5. The cross loadings of the constructs revealed that 
the loadings for each of the indicators are significantly higher than those of the other 
constructs. We come to the conclusion that the discriminant validity of the model 
indicators is acceptable because the indicators used reflect the constructs they are 
supposed to than other constructs. 
4.6.2 Assessment of the structural model 
Assessment of the structural model reveals the significance of the hypotheses 
in the model. The process involves testing the predictive power of the model and the 
significance of the relationships between the models’ constructs (Schaper, 2009). 
Predictive properties of the model 
The predictive power of the model was established by performing PLS 
analysis. R2 values of the entire model were produced and for each of the dependent 
variables. The results are shown in Table 4.6. 
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Table 4.6 Predictive properties of the model 
Construct R2 Value 
Privacy Concerns (PC) 0.361 
Information Governance (IG) 0.194 
Information Control (IC) 0.386 
Information accountability (IA) 0.089 
Perceived acceptance (ACC) 0.698 
 
The results revealed that the model was capable to explain 69.8% of the 
perceived acceptance of the participants of the IAF. This predictive power of the 
model is a highly satisfactory level in technology acceptance research. The model 
was also able to predict 36.1% of variance in privacy concerns, 38.6% of variance of 
information control, 19.4% of variance of information governance and 8.9% of 
variance of information accountability.  
Relationship between model constructs 
To establish the relationship of the model constructs, the path coefficients and 
t-values for each of the structural model paths were calculated. Seventeen of the 18 
hypotheses are tested here. From the available technology acceptance literature we 
assume a direct relationship between BI and actual use behaviour contributing to the 
acceptance of the IAF. 
A bootstrapping resampling technique was used to calculate the values using 
smartPLS. The analysis used 100 randomly selected samples from the 186 cases. The 
corresponding p-values were determined using an F-distribution table and the values 
used were given in Table 3.14. The results of the bootstrapping and PLS analysis are 
summarised in Figure 4.2 and Table 4.7. 
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Figure 4.2 Results of the structural model 
The research model revealed that only the individual context constructs has a 
significant effect on the perceived acceptance of the technology.  
Table 4.7 Individual path significance 
Path t-Statistics Path Coefficient Hypothesis 
CSE → IC 3.299** 0.229** H1 
CSE →ACC 2.268* 0.125* H2 
ANX →PC 2.601** 0.176** H3 
ANX →ACC 3.339** -0.228** H4 
ANX →IC 1.149 0.092 H5 
ATT → PC 4.919*** -0.361*** H6 
ATT →ACC 9.595*** 0.544*** H7 
ATT →IC 3.421** 0.298** H8 
PC →IG 4.566*** 0.476*** H9 
PC →IC 4.959*** 0.393*** H10 
PC →IA 3.863** 0.302** H11 
PC →ACC 1.972* -0.131* H12 
TPT →PC 4.189*** -0.276*** H13 
TPT →IG 1.065 0.150 H14 
TPT →IC 4.133*** -0.288*** H15 
TPT →IA 0.076 0.007 H16 
TPT →ACC 2.299* 0.111* H17 
IG →ACC 0.532 0.023 H18 
IC →ACC 2.020* 0.108* H19 
IA →ACC 1.305 -0.061 H20 
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The results of the hypothesis testing revealed that five (H5, H14, H16, H18 and 
H20) of the twenty tested hypotheses were not supported by the results. Privacy 
concerns (PC) exhibited a significant negative effect of the perceived acceptance. 
This indicates that if an eHealth consumer felt concerned about their privacy in the 
systems, they are less likely to adopt the system, thus confirming our thesis that 
information privacy concerns of consumers are a significant aspect for eHealth 
systems. The results revealed that there was no positive or negative effect from the 
information context towards the perceived acceptance except IC, which had a 
positive significant effect. Privacy concerns had significant positive effects on IG, IC 
and IA, supporting our hypotheses H9 – H11. This indicates that if an eHealth 
consumer is concerned about privacy, they believe that the measures put in place by 
the IAF are required, thus required aspects for an EHR system, which is favourable 
to the rest of the study. Trust also plays a significant role in the research model 
presented. The level of trust the respondents had on third parties had a significant 
negative effect on PC and IC, thus supporting our hypotheses H13 and H15 
respectively. This indicates that privacy concerns are high when the trust levels are 
low and that the respondents believed that they should have the control of their own 
health information. Therefore, by providing the consumers the control of their 
information, the IAF caters for a need that would improve system acceptance, which 
is supported by the evidence relating to H19 where IC shows a significant 
contribution to system acceptance. By not providing evidence for H18 and H20, IG 
and IA showed no significant effects on overall system acceptance. However, as 
discussed above, given their significant relationships with PC, the information 
context constructs, the information accountability characteristics are significant EHR 
system requirements for better privacy management. We believe that when 
consumers are exposed to an EHR system that is similar to the one proposed, IA and 
IG may show positively contributing effects to overall system acceptance. 
The constructs measured in relation to the individual context also show 
significant effects on PC, IC and ACC. Computer/EHR anxiety shows a significant 
positive relationship with PC and a significant negative relationship with ACC, 
which is indicated by the supporting evidence for H3 and H4 respectively. Therefore, 
if an eHealth consumer’s anxiety levels are high their privacy concerns will be high 
and they are less likely to accept the EHR system. Because our descriptive analysis 
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in section 4.5 showed a low anxiety level, we can assume that the proposed EHR 
system with the IAF is likely to be adopted by future eHealth consumers. However, 
we note that the anxiety level was not as low as expected, a results we believe is due 
to the fact that the concept of information accountability is new to the respondents. 
Given the necessary exposure however, we believe that the anxiety levels would 
decrease to a more favourable level. Similar arguments can be made in relation to 
Computer/EHR attitude, reflected through H6 and H7. Although by not supporting 
H5, ANX did not have a significant effect on IC. But ATT showed a significant 
positive effect on IC, supporting H8. As indicated from a supported H1, 
computer/EHR self-efficacy also positively affects IC. 
Total effects on perceived acceptance 
As argued in chapter three, the total effect of each of the constructs on (in this 
case) the perceived acceptance of the respondents is another deciding factor that 
reveals the indirect effects. Using the same method as before, the total effects of each 
construct on perceived acceptance can be calculated. Table 4.8 show the results of 
the calculations. 
Table 4.8 Total effects on perceived acceptance 
Construct Total effect 
Computer self efficacy 0.1443** 
Computer/EHR anxiety -0.2332** 
Computer/EHR attitude 0.6049*** 
Privacy Concerns -0.089 
Third Party Trust 0.1043* 
Information governance 0.0233 
Information control 0.1081* 
Information Accountability -0.0602 
 
Computer/EHR Attitude has the largest total effect on perceived acceptance. 
Computer/EHR Anxiety also has a high negative effect on perceived acceptance. 
Privacy concerns have very low effect on perceived acceptance and the effect is not 
significant. Third party trust has a significant positive effect on perceived acceptance. 
Only information control from the information context constructs have a significant 
effect on respondents’ perceived acceptance of the EHR system, which is positive. 
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4.6.3 Influence of the moderating variables 
As previously stated, there is a lack of consideration of the effects of 
moderating variable towards acceptance in prior research relating to how consumers 
accept healthcare information technology (Or & Karsh, 2009). To test the effects of 
moderating variables, age, gender and computer literacy and the awareness of the 
PCEHR system have been considered here in this study. Table 4.9 shows the 
distribution of the data set in the moderating categories. 
Table 4.9 Moderating variable categories 
Moderating variable Category Number of cases (%) 
Gender Male 111 (59.7) 
Female 75 (40.3) 
Age (years)* 17 – 21 71 (38.6) 
22 – 31 70 (38.0) 
32 – 65 43 (23.4) 
Computer literacy Excellent 137 (73.7) 
Good 43 (23.1) 
Moderate 6 (3.2) 
Knowledge of the PCEHR Aware 136 (73.2) 
Not aware 50 (26.8) 
Note: * Age had two missing values 
 
Separate data sets for the different groups were created using SPSS Version 19. 
The following tables summarise the results of the PLS and bootstrapping analysis 
performed on each category. The results for each moderating variable and their 
categories are shown in Tables 6.15 to 6.18. The hypotheses shown in red in each 
table are the unsupported hypotheses from the original results. 
Gender 
A total of 111 male respondents and 75 female respondents were present in the 
186 responses. The PLS and bootstrapping results for male and female respondents 
are shown in Table E.6 of Appendix E. Although none of the rejected hypotheses 
were supported by either of the groups, the difference in male and female responses 
is significant. Notably, privacy concerns and computer-self efficacy did not exhibit 
significant relationships to acceptance in either group. Females were not sensitive to 
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most of the hypothesised relationships as males. Therefore, gender can be seen as a 
moderating variable in this study. 
Age 
The data set was divided into three main age groups: 17 – 21 (n = 71), 22 – 31 
(n = 70) and 32- 65 (n = 43). The analysis results for each of the groups are shown in 
Table E.7 of Appendix E. The deviation from the original results increased with age. 
The originally unsupported hypotheses remained unsupported with all three groups. 
Privacy concerns did not exhibit a significant relationship to the acceptance in any of 
the groups and neither did computer self efficacy, third party trust and information 
control as was seen in the original results. 
Computer Literacy 
Computer literacy was categorised into two main groups due to the fact that 
only 6 respondents indicate a moderate computer literacy and none of the 
respondents indicated otherwise. Those six responses were removed from the 
analysis. The two groups were populated such that 137 respondents were included to 
the Excellent group and 43 respondents to the Good group. The results of the analysis 
are shown in Table E.8 of Appendix E. The results deviated from the original results 
in the group with Good computer literacy (note that the number of respondents were 
less than the required 60 for reliable PLS analysis). Privacy concerns, computer self-
efficacy and information control did not exhibit a significant relationship with 
acceptance in either group as seen from the original results.  Similar to chapter three, 
general conclusions cannot be drawn as regards to the moderating effects of 
computer literacy. 
Awareness of the PCEHR 
The awareness of the PCEHR was categorised into two groups: Aware (n = 
136) and Not Aware (n = 50). The PLS and bootstrapping results are show in Table 
E.9 of Appendix E. The results of the group of respondents who did not know about 
the PCEHR exhibited no significant relationships. But the number of respondents 
were less than the required 60 for reliable PLS analysis. Notably, the respondents 
who were aware of the PCEHR exhibit a significant relationship between 
information accountability and acceptance.  
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From the results presented above, it is seen that all moderating variables do 
affect the research model. However, the interactions amongst the moderating 
variables were not tested in this study. But such a study is encouraged to understand 
the full effect of the moderating factors on the models’ relationships. 
4.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have presented the results of a survey conducted to measure 
the attitudes of general EHR consumers towards an EHR system with information 
accountability measures for information privacy management. We presented a 
descriptive analysis of the results and validated an empirical research model that can 
be used to measure the effects of each of the characteristics of the model towards the 
consumers’ perceived acceptance. 
The results of the descriptive analysis of the quantitative and qualitative results 
showed that such a system would be favourably received by general consumers. The 
respondents indicated that they favour the newly introduced information 
accountability measures (conclusions drawn from the results relating to the 
information context constructs). Previously well established survey items from 
related research studies performed as documented elsewhere indicating that the 
survey cohort behaved similar to more general populations although they were 
students. A limitation of selecting university students is a possible presence of bias 
from well educated respondents. All eHealth consumers are not so. 
Although the information context constructs did not have significant positive 
effect on perceived acceptance, other constructs like privacy concerns had 
significantly high effects on them. This indicates that the need for those measures is 
high in the minds of the consumers and the relationships indicate that with high 
privacy concerns, the need for those measures increase. Only information control 
positively affects system acceptance. Information Governance and Information 
Accountability did not exhibit a significant positive or negative effect. This is a 
acceptable outcome for the rest of the study. 
From the results obtained, we can also conclude that personal beliefs relating to 
one’s ability to use and attitudes about computing has the most effect on the 
acceptance of technology. 
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Previous research has shown that, patients who have experience with EHR 
through their caring doctor (e.g. GP) exhibit significant relationships between their 
privacy concerns and their acceptance of medical technology (Jessica S. Ancker, 
Edwards, Miller, & Kaushal, 2012).  But more recently, studies have found that 
experience with physicians using EHRs was not associated with privacy (Jessica S 
Ancker, Silver, Miller, & Kaushal, 2012; Whiddett, et al., 2006b). Therefore, further 
analysis is required to determine the effect of privacy concerns towards the 
acceptance of EHR systems adoption by consumers in general, which will not be 
addressed in this thesis. 
The effects of several moderating variables were also tested. The originally 
rejected hypotheses remained invalid with all moderating variable results except for 
the awareness of the PCEHR, which indicated a significant negative relationship of 
information accountability and acceptance with the respondents who were aware of 
the PCEHR. This negative effect could be due to indirect effects of privacy concerns 
on the information accountability construct. Further work is required to find 
conclusive evidence for this effect. 
The results showed that there is a negative relationship between trust and 
privacy concerns. Therefore, if trust levels are low, the privacy concerns will be high 
and vice versa. Trust also had a negative relationship with information control, which 
indicates that low levels of trust will result in a high need for personal control of 
information. 
To improve clarity and connectivity of the thesis, the outcomes of this chapter 
can be related to the case scenario similar to what was discussed in chapter three. 
However, the perceptions towards each construct in this chapter are different from 
what was observed in chapter three given that they measured the consumers’ 
perspective as opposed to the professionals’ perspectives in chapter three. In our case 
scenario, the survey results focus on Patient X’s perspectives on the EHR system in 
question. Patient X is capable of selecting the HCPs he/she prefers to have access to 
his/her EHR and define custom access policies for them. This fact is captured 
through the construct IC. From the survey results, we saw that IC is positively related 
to ACC, thus supporting our hypothesis H19. If Patient X believes that his 
computer/EHR self-efficacy is high and his attitude towards EHRs is positive, he 
would strongly believe that having control of his EHR information is appropriate. 
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These facts are supported by hypotheses H1 and H8 respectively. Patient X’s 
information privacy concerns also play a significant role in relation to the 
information context constructs, which are directly related to the IAF characteristics. 
If Patient X’s privacy concerns are high, he strongly believes that the three IAF 
characteristics IG, IC and IA are suitable for implementation in EHR systems. As 
discussed earlier, this fact is indicated from the strong evidence for H9, H10 and 
H11.  
We conclude that information accountability measures are important to the 
management of information privacy in eHealth systems that utilise EHRs. EHR 
consumers are favourable towards the introduction of these measures in to eHealth 
systems and will adopt such systems if they are implemented in the near future. 
Further studies that test the effects of information accountability measures can be 
performed and is encouraged with the use of the presented research model. 
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Chapter 5: Access Control Requirements 
for Accountable-eHealth 
Systems 
 
In this chapter, we present access control requirement for AeH systems. We 
present and validate an access control model towards the design of a technical 
architecture of AeH systems. The model is designed by capturing distinctive features 
of well established access control models. The purpose, therefore, of this new access 
control model is to capture the requirements of eHealth stakeholders into one module 
that can be adopted in a working EHR system that facilitate accountability principles 
as presented in chapter two. Research objective 3(a) is addressed in this chapter. 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
Information security encompasses three main characteristics; confidentiality, 
integrity and availability (Bishop, 2004; Gollman, 2009). Confidentiality deals with 
limiting access to information to only the authorised entities whilst integrity and 
availability deals with the prevention of unauthorised modification of information 
and the prevention of unauthorised withholding of information respectively. 
Security measures of electronic health records (EHR) are a critical aspect of 
eHealth solutions, which use EHRs as the health information repository. Various 
solutions have been proposed and developed over the years but the questions still 
remains as to whether the data in EHRs are secure enough. Securing the storage and 
transmission of data alone is insufficient for the confidentiality of EHRs to be 
protected. 
Access control is a fundamental security measure to assure that the information 
is accessed by the appropriate users. Therefore, access control deals with data access 
of authenticated users. Authentication is the initial stage of validation of the users to 
determine whether they are who they claim they are (Sandhu, Coyne, Feinstein, & 
Youman, 1996). Once authenticated, the users can enter an information system but 
access to information will still be governed by an access control policy that is 
contextual to the application domain. Access control models hence assume that users 
are authenticated to access the information system thus aims to control the data 
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access of such users (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994) and is one of the main safeguards 
against improper data access. The access control mechanism will determine what 
information each user is authorised or not authorised to access. 
Many different access control models have been proposed. Amongst them, 
discretionary access control (DAC) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994), mandatory access 
control (MAC) (Ferraiolo, Kuhn, & Chandramouli, 2003; Lindqvist, 2006; Osborn, 
1997) and role based access control (RBAC) (Sandhu, et al., 1996) can be seen as 
well established models. The access control model presented here draws from the 
principles of these models and contextualises the principles to fulfil and balance the 
requirements of each type of consumers of an eHealth system. Focus is also given to 
purpose based access control (PBAC) (J. W. Byun, E. Bertino, & N. Li, 2005; 
Naikuo, Howard, & Ning, 2007) to fulfil the need to capture the purposes for data 
access by users. 
Access control is a vital part of eHealth systems and proper access control 
policies are a necessity for any eHealth systems’ operation (Motta & Furuie, 2003; 
National E-Health Transition Authority, 2011a). The nature of the domain makes its 
data access requirements different from other domains. Healthcare providers have 
information access requirements to fulfil their professional responsibilities and 
patients have information privacy requirements, which is a right they can exercise to 
not have their private information unnecessarily exposed resulting from the lack of 
confidentiality measures within a system. These requirements may in some instances, 
contradict each other and fulfilling every such requirement is a complex yet 
necessary task in order to implement apposite eHealth systems and also to gain the 
confidence and trust of the end users towards such systems. 
5.2 RELATED WORK 
In this section we will discuss the aforementioned access control models and 
access control approaches in eHealth. The access control models reviewed in this 
section have gone through many alterations and extensions within computer science 
research. However, the fundamental principles behind each model still remain core 
within most applications. 
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5.2.1 Access control in healthcare 
Healthcare information systems contain sensitive information that is vital for 
healthcare providers to make crucial decisions regarding a patients’ health. 
Information cannot always be denied to the treating healthcare professional due to 
underlying access policies. This means that traditional access control models are not 
suitable for a domain such as healthcare. To this end, many specialised access control 
models have been designed to address specific healthcare needs. It has been observed 
that access control research in the healthcare domain reflects the pace of generic 
access control research (Ferreira, Cruz-Correia, Antunes, & Chadwick, 2007), but 
they have their own limitations (Røstad, 2008). 
The main focus on security threats of EHRs are related to data breaches to 
external entities (Burdon, Lane, & von Nessen, 2010; Demuynck & De Decker, 
2005; Kierkegaard, 2012). Techniques such as cryptography address issues in 
relation to data security relating to external entities but internal data security issues 
such as who has access to what information cannot be addressed using such 
technologies. In fact, data breaches in relation to EHRs are also related to internal 
breaches (Kierkegaard, 2012). To this end, access control techniques are applied to 
EHRs, which can control the internal activities in relation to data access. 
Different access control strategies for eHealth systems have also been 
developed in the past (Alhaqbani & Fidge, 2008; Motta & Furuie, 2003). Alhaqbani 
et al. (2008) showed that neither MAC, DAC nor RBAC could satisfy specific 
healthcare requirements they have previously identified but a careful combination of 
the models can address them successfully. In their model, patients can set sensitivity 
labels on data items and so can the caring medical practitioner to hide certain 
information from the patient in special circumstances. The patients’ policy will act as 
a rigid access control for healthcare professionals unless the episode of care is 
declared as an emergency. But in a specialised domain such as healthcare, this rigid 
access control set by the patient is not suitable given that the patient is not always 
aware of complex medical relationships present between healthcare data types. 
Therefore, access policy formulation process must be overlooked by a healthcare 
authority that would make sure that the required information is always available to 
the relevant healthcare professional. 
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The most common access control model used in healthcare information 
systems is RBAC (Ferreira, et al., 2007; Røstad, 2008). The reason for this 
preference is due to its easier administration and flexibility to be adapted to the 
workflows and hierarchical needs of an organisation (Ferreira, et al., 2007).  
One of the main aspects of privacy preservation in relation to information 
manipulation is the intended purpose of data collection (J. W. Byun, et al., 2005; Jin, 
Ahn, Covington, & Zhang, 2008; Jin, Ahn, Hu, Covington, & Zhang, 2009). It is 
widely regarded that data must be used for the purpose for which they have been 
collected. In this regards, purpose based access control (PBAC) models have been 
proposed for use in the healthcare domain (L. Sun, Wang, Soar, & Rong, 2012; 
Yang, Barringer, & Zhang, 2007). More general models using the PBAC approach 
are also presented that can be utilised in healthcare (J.-W. Byun, E. Bertino, & N. Li, 
2005). An access control model in an EHR system therefore must be capable of 
identifying the intended purposes of a data element and also the access purpose of a 
user. It also follows that the data elements must be individually identifiable as seen in 
the eHealth requirements in section 1.2.6. Thus, a purpose based access control 
component must be integrated into the access control model. The definition of the 
purposes must be handled with care to avoid wrongful denial of information to 
healthcare professionals for legitimate access requests. 
5.2.2 Prominent access control models 
Discretionary access control 
Discretionary Access Control uses access restrictions set by the owner of the 
data object to restrict access to the objects. The users are bound by the authorisations 
which specify the operations each user can perform on specified objects such as read 
(R), write (W) and execute (EXE) (Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). The DAC model uses 
an access control matrix to assign access rights to users. A simple access control 
matrix is shown in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1 Access control matrix 
User Object 1 Object 2 Object 3 Object 4 
Dr. P R,W, EXE R,W - R,W, EXE 
Dr. S R,W - R,W, EXE - 
Dr. B - R,W, EXE R, W - 
Dr. M - - - R,W, EXE 
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Implementing this matrix in large systems is a tedious and error-prone task and 
representing it as a matrix will consume a considerable amount of resources. To 
represent it in a practical system the most common approach is by means of an 
Access Control List (ACL) and a Capability List (CL). An ACL is used to associate 
each object, e.g. EHR data element, with the users who can access it. This 
association also contains the type of access (R, W, and EXE) to the object. This is a 
column wise representation of the access matrix. Figure 5.1 shows an ACL.  
 
Figure 5.1 Access Control List 
A Capability List is used to associate each user with the access permissions to 
the objects. This is a row wise representation of the access matrix. 
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Figure 5.2 Capability List 
DAC models have some inherent drawbacks. A significant issue is the fact that 
a user who is allowed to access an object by the owner of the object has the 
capability to pass on the access right to other users without the involvement of the 
owner of the object. This will create inevitable privacy issues if the DAC policy is 
used in an eHR system. Another factor we have to consider is the ownership of the 
data. In healthcare we cannot clearly identify a single entity as the owner of health 
data. An initial argument would be that the patients are the owners of their own 
health data. But patients are not always health professionals and it is likely that the 
involvement of, for example, a healthcare authority is necessary. Due to these 
reasons it is difficult to use only a DAC policy and fulfil access and privacy 
requirements of all healthcare stakeholders. 
Mandatory Access Control 
Mandatory access control systems do not consider the requirements of the 
owners of the data objects (Ferraiolo, et al., 2003). The access to data objects is 
controlled by assigning a security level to each object and comparing that security 
level to the user’s security clearance and need-to-know. In order to access an object, 
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the user must possess a clearance that is greater than or equal to the objects 
classification. In the MAC policy the flow of information from a higher security 
level to a lower security level is prevented by the “Read Down” and “Write Up” rules 
(Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). Similarly the integrity of the data objects can be 
protected by using the “Read Up” and “Write Down” Rules. 
However, in a healthcare environment, assigning security levels to objects for 
the purpose of restricting access is not suitable. The same data type may have 
different sensitivity levels for different consumers or patients. Thus, a more flexible 
method of defining sensitivity levels must be incorporated to an access control model 
used for EHRs. 
Role Based Access Control 
Role base access control (Sandhu, et al., 1996) models use permissions and 
rights that are assigned to roles in an organisation to control access to data objects. It 
does not consider the access rights of an individual. Roles are assigned to all 
individual users in the systems. The users inherit the access permissions assigned to 
each role. This allows the system administrators to assign users to roles rather than 
go through the tedious task of assigning access rights to each and every user. 
Roles are assigned to users depending on their capabilities and the job 
requirements within an organisation. Each user must be given the least privilege 
depending on their job functions. RBAC policy uses the need-to-know principle to 
assign permissions to roles and to fulfil the least privilege condition. 
Purpose Based Access Control 
According to the OECD guidelines, “the purposes for which personal data are 
collected should be specified not later than at the time of data collection and the 
subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those purposes or such others as are not 
incompatible with those purposes and as are specified on each occasion of change of 
purpose” (OECD, 1980). Purpose-based access control (PBAC) is based on the 
notion of relating data objects with purposes (J. W. Byun, et al., 2005). These 
purposes can determine for what reason data is collected and what they can be used 
for. Much research has been done in this area and most have identified that greater 
privacy preservation is possible by assigning objects with purposes (J.-W. Byun, et 
al., 2005; Naikuo, et al., 2007; Ni et al., 2010). However, according to Al-Fedaghi 
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(2007), purpose management introduces a great deal of complexity at the access 
control level. Despite the complexity issues with PBAC, it can help capture the 
reasons for data collection as well as the intentions of the users, which is a vital 
factor in healthcare information systems where privacy preservation is a must. 
5.3 BUILDING BLOCKS OF THE PROPOSED ACCESS CONTROL 
MODEL 
In order to present the protocols that have been developed we first lay the 
foundations in the form of the following assumptions. 
As stated in section 1.1, we assume the existence of a system with 
comprehensive EHRs of patients. This EHR system acts as a central system which 
patients and healthcare providers can access through an Internet connection and is 
maintained by a central healthcare authority. We eliminate the need for localised 
EMR systems. The basic architecture of the access control model is illustrated in 
Figure 5.3. 
 
Figure 5.3 Access control model architecture 
We have used the terminology used in the XACML standard, policy 
enforcement point (PEP) and policy decision point (PDP) to have the same 
meanings. We identify three systems actors; the patient, the preferred healthcare 
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providers and the health authority. The patients and the health authority formulate the 
policies associated with each healthcare professional. These policies encompass the 
requirements of the patients in terms of privacy and the health authority in terms of 
information requirements. 
5.3.1 EHR Data Types and Purposes 
The data in the EHR is divided into specific data types and subtypes (Table 
5.2) to distinguish between them so that the access and usage policies assigned to 
them can be directly related to the individual data types with finer granularity. This 
approach addressed eHealth requirement 5 in section 1.2.6. 
Table 5.2 Data types and purposes 
Data type Subtype Intended Purpose(s) 
Identity Data 
ID1 p1 
ID2 p1 
ID3 p1, p2 
General Health 
GH1 p1, p2  
GH2 p3, p4 
GH3 p5, p6 
Sexual Health 
SH1 p5,  p6, p7 
SH2 p7, p8, p9 
SH3 p8, p9, p10 
Mental Health 
MH1 p11, p12 
MH2 p11, p13 
 
Each data type in the EHR is mapped with a purpose(s) for which the data can 
be used. These purposes relate to healthcare activities that can be performed using 
the related EHR data element(s). These are called the intended purposes for which 
data is collected. Similar to Figure 2.3, intended purposes can be, for example, 
patient visit, referrals, diagnosis purposes, inpatient care, prescribing purposes, 
sharing, billing, and research. We make the assumption that the intended purposes 
are comprehensive and current. The central health authority is responsible for the 
maintenance and update of these purposes. As mentioned in chapter two, the 
mapping between the EHR data types and the intended purposes will be done with 
the appropriate domain knowledge. Defining the purposed achieve two things. First, 
it allows the consumer to know why information was accessed by an HCP at a given 
time later through audit logs. And helps identify possible misuse of data. Second, it 
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will prevent HCPs from accessing data without a legitimate purpose, thus acting as a 
deterrent against misuse. 
Definition of purposes and the relevant mapping to EHR data types, without a 
doubt, is a complex task that requires much care. This process itself has to explore 
medical knowledge from medical professionals who can identify the significance of a 
single data element in the care giving process. The data types contain data elements 
related to them.  In a more fine grained level, purposes are related to data elements. 
For example, Identity Data of a patient can be divided into Name, Date of Birth, Age, 
Residential Address, etc. The Address can be further divided into street address, 
Town, State, Country and post code. The more detached the data field gets, the more 
fine grained it becomes. 
There will be a default set of purposes for every data type and elements of that 
data type. The health authority can define, add and remove purposes related to data 
types and elements. This will ensure that up to date purposes are maintained in the 
systems such that the access requirements of care providers are not wrongfully 
denied. It is understood that the proper definition of intended purposes is a key factor 
in this model. For the system to reach an optimum performance level it will 
undoubtedly take time in which initial purpose definitions would be altered and new 
purposes defined. 
5.3.2 EHR data structure 
The MAC model grants access to data depending on the sensitivity level of the 
data elements and the clearance level of the users. But defining the sensitivity level 
of health information is a complex issue. The sensitivity labelling we use in our 
approach is different from the classical hierarchical security levels found in MAC 
(Sandhu & Samarati, 1994). It is difficult to define a clear hierarchical structure for 
the sensitivity of health data elements that is general to all consumers. For example, 
sexual health and mental health information may have the same sensitivity for some 
patients and may not be so for others. If a hierarchical structure is defined, it would 
be difficult to fulfil certain privacy requirements of patients. We propose sensitivity 
labelling of EHR data using a tree structure (Figure 5.4) that has the EHR itself as the 
root element, the data types as children and data elements as grandchildren. 
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Figure 5.4 Object sensitivity tree 
We use a similar technique introduced for purpose representation in Byun et al 
(Byun & Li, 2008) to represent a sensitivity label of data elements. We refer to this 
representation as the Sensitivity Tree (ST). A sensitivity label is not assigned to the 
objects themselves rather we relate the access level of a particular user in terms of 
the sensitivity label. 
Definition 5.1:  A sensitivity label (SL) is a tuple <ASL, PSL>, where ASL = [asl1, 
asl2…asln] is a set of allowed sensitivity labels and PSL = [psl1, psl2…pslm] is a set 
of prohibited sensitivity labels. 
ASL = [asli]; i = 1…n is denoted as all of the descendants of asli including asli 
PSL = [pslj]; j = 1…m is denoted as all of the descendants of pslj including pslj 
The definition follows that PSL precedes the corresponding ASL in any 
specified SL. Therefore, <ASLX, PSLX> denotes an SLY defined by user “X” for user 
“Y” with access to all data types included in ASLX with the exception of data types 
included in PSLX. Revisiting the case scenario in section 2.6, we can contextualise 
the definition of an SL. 
Example 5.1: Dr. M can access Patient X’s mental health details but cannot access 
his Sexual or Dermatology details. The access level for Dr. M can be represented in 
terms of sensitivity labels as follows. 
SLDr. M = < [EHR], [Sexual Health, Dermatology Health] > 
Here we use the Denial-Takes-Precedence (Bertino, 1998) principle. Access is 
granted to the entire EHR and then access is denied to specific field by the PSL. This 
helps isolate the most sensitive information in the EHR that needs to be hidden from 
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certain users. The access level for a particular user can also be represented as 
follows. 
SLDr. M = < [Identity Data, General Health, Mental Health], [NULL] > 
Specifying the data elements that Dr. M can access can be a more tedious task 
than specifying the data elements he cannot access. We will use this representation to 
represent the minimum access levels defined by the health authority. The health 
authority is only concerned with allowing access to particular data fields for the 
relevant health practitioners. This representation can also be used in purposes such as 
research where access is required only to a particular data type. 
Example: Data of a survey of people who have suffered from some form of a STD 
during the last 10 years. For this purpose access is required only for the sexual health 
data type. Under no foreseeable circumstance would there be a requirement for 
accessing other fields of the EHR. The access level can be represented as follows. 
SLResearcher = < [Sexual Health], [NULL]> 
Using this method of representing the access levels enables more fine grained 
control over the data accessed by users that is governed by the SLs assigned for each 
user. Unlike common access control models, in our approach the permissions and 
prohibitions are not assigned to the data assets, as mentioned earlier. Our approach 
eliminates the need for a hierarchical structure for the sensitivity of the data types. 
Since the data types can be distinguished through the ST, in accordance with eHealth 
requirement 5, the SLs for each HCP can be defined by both patients and the health 
authority with high expressive power.  
5.4 THE ACCESS CONTROL PROTOCOLS 
In this section we shall present the protocols defined to set policies and access 
data in the EHR. Throughout this section we will use the Specification Description 
Language (SDL) and Message Sequence Charts (MSC) to graphically present the 
protocols used in the model. First we will give an overview of SDL and MSC. 
5.4.1 Overview of SDL and MSC 
The Specification and Description Language (SDL) is a formal language 
defined by the International Telecommunications Union (ITU-T). It can be used to 
describe unambiguous specifications and descriptions of the behaviour of real time 
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systems. A specification of a system is the description of its required behaviour and a 
description of a system is the description of its actual behaviour. SDL, together with 
Message Sequence Charts (MSC), can be used to provide a clear description of the 
behaviour of a system in terms of the behaviour of each individual agent in the 
system and their communications with each other. Figure 5.5 introduces the SDL 
notation used in this thesis. 
Symbol Name Description 
 
State 
This symbol represents a state 
of the system. The state symbol 
indicates that the system is 
waiting to an input. 
 
Procedure 
This symbol represents a 
Procedure. A procedure contains 
a description of a system 
activity. 
 
Message from 
User 
This symbol represents a 
message from the user. The 
messages are considered as 
inputs to the system. 
 
Message to User 
This symbol represents a 
message to the user. The 
messages are considered as 
outputs from the system. 
 
Decision 1 
This symbol represents a 
decision by the system. The 
decisions have specific outputs 
that trigger events in the system. 
 
Decision 2 
This symbol represents a 
decision by the system. The 
decisions have specific outputs 
that trigger events in the system. 
 
Off page 
reference 
This symbol represents a 
reference outside the current 
page (current SDL diagram). 
 
Return 
This symbol represents a return 
state. The return state means 
that the procedure has 
terminated and returns to the 
start state. 
Figure 5.5 Basic SDL notation 
5.4.2 Motivating case scenario revisited 
A brief description of the motivating case scenario in section 2.6 is given 
below that is used to illustrate the access control protocols. 
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Figure 5.6 Case scenario 
Patient X’s GP is Dr. P. As his GP, Patient X has allowed Dr. P complete 
access to the data in his eHR. Patient X has also been treated by Dr. S a 
dermatologist, Dr. B a sexual health specialist and Dr. M a mental health specialist in 
the recent past. As a result Patient X allows Dr. B to access his sexual health details, 
Dr. M to access his mental health details and Dr. S to access his dermatology health 
details. He does not want Dr. B or Dr. S accessing his mental health details and Dr. 
M or Dr. S accessing his sexual health details. Patient X suffers from a severe skin 
disease and does not want either Dr. B or Dr. M accessing his dermatology details 
due to embarrassment. He is aware that his care providers may need to share his 
information with other specialists but does not want them sharing the details without 
his consent. Dr. S believes Patient X’s skin condition may be related to a known STD 
and wants access to Patient X’s sexual health details. 
5.4.3 Setting Access Policies 
In section 1.2.6, we identified two types of requirements that need to be 
fulfilled. In this section we will show how the policies are set by the actors in our 
model. An abstract view of the data within the components is given in Figure 5.7. 
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Figure 5.7 A data representation of the access control model components 
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Fulfilling the Healthcare Providers Requirements 
The healthcare authority will define a role structure of the health organisation 
and assign the minimum access level for each role in the organisation, thus fulfilling 
eHealth requirement 1 in section 1.2.6. In this role definition each role will be given 
a default sensitivity level for data access which will be discussed later. Even though 
the patients’ privacy requirements have to be considered before data access is 
granted, there is no input from the patient for the default access policy. This phase is 
purely dedicated to fulfilling the organisational access and policy requirements. In a 
normal RBAC model, the role of the user has to change when the permissions for the 
user changes. For this reason only the initial user-role assignment is done using the 
RBAC method to simplify the tasks of the responsible authority. 
Fulfilling the Patients Privacy Requirements 
A DAC and MAC type approach is used by the patient to specify who can 
access his EHR, hence fulfilling eHealth requirement 6. The patient will also define 
what each HCP can access in his EHR, which fulfils eHealth requirement 7. He will 
populate an Access Control List (ACL) with the healthcare practitioners who he 
prefers to be able to access his eHR. The patient also has the capability to specify the 
access level of each of the users in terms of a sensitivity label in the ACL which is 
done using the MAC based process. Although eHealth requirement 9 states that the 
administrative process must be easy to understand, the usability aspects are not 
addressed here. 
Table 5.3 Access control list 
Healthcare 
Practitioner Patient’s Settings 
Minimum Access Level Set by Health 
Authority 
Dr. P <[EHR], [NULL]> <[General Health],[NULL]> 
Dr. S <[EHR],[Sexual Health, Mental Health]> <[Dermatology, Sexual Health],[NULL]> 
Dr. B <[EHR],[Mental Health, Dermatology]> <[General Health, Sexual Health],[NULL]> 
Dr. M <[EHR],[Sexual Health, Dermatology Health]> <[General Health, Mental Health],[NULL]> 
 
The table above shows an abstract ACL. Patient X has granted 4 health care 
practitioners access to his EHR. But the access is bound by the patient’s privacy 
settings and the settings by the health authority. The settings by the health authority 
are set during the role assignment as seen in the previous section. 
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5.4.4 Internal Protocols 
The sensitivity level defined by the health authority is different to what is 
defined by the patients. PSLs set by the health authority will always be NULL. As 
mentioned above, this is because the health authority is concerned with allowing 
access to the health professionals. The ASLs set by the health authority does not 
allow the HCP to access other data types. Explicit prohibitions are defined by the 
patients. Allowed sensitivity level set by the patients always precedes that which is 
set by the health authority if there is no conflict between the patients prohibited 
sensitivity label and the allowed sensitivity label set by the health authority. The 
allowed sensitivity level set by the health authority always precedes the prohibited 
sensitivity label set by the patients if there is a conflict. This characteristic fulfils 
eHealth requirement 4 in section 1.2.6. This will ensure that the relevant information 
is always available to the right person in terms of providing better healthcare and 
fulfil the “need-to-know” principle associated with EHRs. A formal definition for 
this notion is given below. 
Definition 5.2:  
IF (ASLPatient ≥ ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority = ∅) THEN 
SLHealthProfessional = < [ASLPatient], [PSLPatient] > 
IF (ASLPatient < ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority = ∅) THEN 
SLHealthProfessional = < [ASLPatient ∪ ASLHealthAuthority], [PSLPatient] > 
IF (ASLPatient ≥ ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority ≠ ∅) THEN 
SLHealthProfessional = < [ASLPatient], [PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority`] > 
IF (ASLPatient < ASLHealthAuthority AND PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority ≠ ∅) THEN 
SLHealthProfessional = < [ASLPatient ∪ ASLHealthAuthority], [PSLPatient ∩ ASLHealthAuthority`] > 
Note: Please note that “ ` ” indicates complement. 
When these conditions are satisfied, the sensitivity levels are updated so that 
the users can access the relevant data types/elements. E.g. Dr. S (Table 5.3) will be 
assigned a sensitivity level SLDr. S = < [EHR], [Mental Health]>. Algorithm 1 shows 
how sensitivity levels are set for the users. The symbols other than the ones used 
previously denote as follows.PSL and HASL denote sensitivity levels set by the Patient 
(P) and the Health Authority (HA) for a healthcare professional respectively.  
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Algorithm 1: Policy Aggregation 
1:  Input: 1. User ID: UID 
2:  2. Health Authority Policy: HASL_UID ← <ASLHA_UID, PSLHA_UID>  
3:  3. Patient Policy: PSL_UID ← <ASLP_UID, PSLP_UID>  
4:  Output: User Sensitivity Label SLUID 
5:  Method: 
6: if (ASLP_UID ≥ ASLHA_UID AND PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID = ∅) then 
7:     SLUID ← < [ASLP_UID], [PSLP_UID] > 
8: else if (ASLP_UID < ASLHA_UID AND PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID = ∅) then 
9:     SLUID ← < [ASLP_UID ∪ ASLHA_UID], [PSLP_UID] > 
10: else if (ASLP_UID ≥ ASLHA_UID AND PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID ≠ ∅) then 
11:     SLUID ← < [ASLP_UID], [PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID `] > 
12: else if (ASLP_UID < ASLHA_UID AND PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID ≠ ∅) then 
    SLUID ← < [ASLP_UID ∪ ASLHA_UID] , [PSLP_UID ∩ ASLHA_UID `] > 
13: end if 
14: return SLUID 
Note: Please note that “ ` ” indicates complement. 
We will now look at how the sensitivity level for Dr. S, from our case scenario 
in section 2.6, is set in our model. The steps taken to set the sensitivity label for a 
dermatology health professional are as follows. 
1. A representative from StateHealth creates a dermatologist role 
definition. 
a. StateHealth initiates the request with the access policy service 
b. The access policy service requests the default sensitivity label 
for the dermatologists role 
c. StateHealth sends the default sensitivity level 
d. A new dermatology role is created by the access policy service 
and is stored in its roles database 
e. StateHealth is notified of the process completion 
2. StateHealth assigns the role of dermatologist to Dr. S 
a. StateHealth initiates the request with the access policy service 
b. Access policy service requests health professionals credentials 
c. The access policy service requests Dr. S’s credentials 
d. StateHealth sends Dr. S’s credentials 
 Chapter 5: Access Control Requirements for Accountable-eHealth Systems 169 
e. The access policy service assigns a dermatologist role to Dr. S 
f. The role assignments data base is updated 
g. StateHealth is notified of the process completion 
3. Patient X adds Dr. S to his ACL 
a. Patient X logs into the EHR system as a patient 
b. Patient X initiates a request to add Dr. S to the ACL 
c. The privacy policy service request the sensitivity label for Dr. S 
d. Patient X sends the sensitivity label for Dr. S to the privacy 
policy service 
e. The privacy policy service sends the privacy policy to the policy 
aggregator 
f. The policy aggregator request Dr. S’s default sensitivity label 
from the access policy service 
g. The access policy service sends Dr. S’s default sensitivity label 
from its roles database to the policy aggregator 
h. The policy aggregator formulates the final policy for Dr. S 
i. The policy aggregator sends the final policy to the privacy 
policy service 
j. The privacy policy service sends the final policy to Patient X 
and ask for his acknowledgement 
If a negative acknowledgement is received; 
i. the policy aggregator is notified and the policy 
aggregator discards the policy 
ii. PPS notifies the patient 
k. Patient X send a positive acknowledgement to the privacy 
policy service 
l. The privacy policy service sends approval to the policy 
aggregator 
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m. The policy aggregator sends the final policy to the policy store 
n. The policy store stores Dr. S’s sensitivity label as an access 
policy 
o. The PPS sends notification of final policy service to Patient X 
The SDL diagrams that correspond to this process are show in the figures 
below. 
 
Figure 5.8 SDL for Health Authority 
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Figure 5.9 SDL for Access Policy Function (APS) 
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Figure 5.10 SDL for the Patient 
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Figure 5.11 SDL for the Privacy Policy Function (PPF) 
 
Figure 5.12 SDL for the Policy Aggregation Function 
A sequence diagram for this policy setting process is shown in Figure 5.13. 
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Figure 5.13 Final policy for Dr. S 
5.4.5 Accessing Data in the EHR 
The health authority defines intended purposes for each data type and element 
in an EHR. Access requests of authorised users are also handled in a purpose based 
manner. When a user requires access to data in an EHR they define an access request 
consisting the reason(s) or purpose(s). This definition will be compared with the 
purposes in Table 5.2, which were assigned to the data elements by the healthcare 
authority. If satisfied access is granted. The granular level access to data is granted 
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depending on the SL of each user. The access purposes are captured for the purpose 
of identifying the reason for accessing data, which is used for accountability 
purposes as will discussed in chapter six. 
Table 5.4 represents typical access requests by authorised health practitioners. 
An access request may not particularly be for a single task. Each data type requested 
may not always be associated with a single purpose. The users must have the 
capability to specify multiple purposes in a single access request to enhance the ease 
of use. If access is granted we have to make the assumption that each data element 
can only be used for the specified access purpose(s). The health information systems 
which would use this access control model should have the capability to provide the 
functionality where data misuse can be captured. 
Algorithm 2: Access Request 
1:    Input:  1. User ID: UID 
2:     2. Sensitivity Level: SLUID 
3:     3. Access Purposes List: AccPurList[dAP, pAP] 
4:     4. Intended Purposes List: IntPurList [dIP, pIP] 
5:    Output: Access_State [] 
6:    Method: 
7:     Num_Requests ← Size (AccPurList) 
8:     Num_Pur← Size (AccPurList) 
9:     Access_State [Num_Requests] ← False 
10:   Permit_Data [Num_Requests] ← False 
11:   Check_Purpose [Num_Requests, Num_Pur] ← False 
12: for i = 1 to Num_Requests do 
13:  if IntPurList(i) ∈ PSL(SLUID ) then 
14:   Permit_Data[i] ← False 
15:  else 
16:   Permit_Data[i] ← True 
17:   end if 
18: for j = 1 to Size(AccPurList(i)) do 
19:  if AccPurList[i, j] ⊆ IntPurList then 
20:   Check_Purpose [i, j] ← True 
21:  else 
22:   Check_Purpose [i, j] ← False 
23:  if [(Permit_Data [i] = True) AND (Check_Purpose [i, j] = True ) = True] 
24:                     then 
25:   Access_State [i] ← True 
26:  else 
27:   Access_State [i] ← False 
28:  end if 
29: end for 
30: end for 
31: return Access_State [] 
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Algorithm 2 processes the access requests by health professionals. A tuple with 
data type and purpose is denoted as <d, p>. Permit_Data [] contains the status 
(allowed or disallowed) of the data types requested by the user. Check_Purpose 
[Num_Requests, Num_Pur] is a 2D array containing the status of the purposes for 
each the data type requested. The algorithm returns and array Access_State [] with 
the state of each purpose in the access request. IntPurList [dIP, pIP] is a 2D array with 
data types with their intended purposes (set by the health authority). AccPurList [dIP, 
pIP] is a 2D array with the data types and their access purposes (requested by a user). 
Table 5.4 Access requests by authorised users 
User Sensitivity level Data Type (d) 
Access Purpose 
(p) 
Dr. P <[EHR],[NULL]> 
Identity Data p1,p2 
General 
Health p3 
Mental 
Health p7, p4 
Sexual 
Health p5 
Dr. S <[EHR],[Mental Health]> 
Dermatology p8 
Sexual 
Health p5 
 
It is important to note that the nature of the healthcare industry forces us to 
adopt the break the glass emergency mechanisms where the patient’s health prevails 
over privacy requirements. Also, usability is a vital part of every healthcare 
information system. No matter what the underlying principles are, the users, both 
patients and the healthcare providers must be given simple directions (e.g. menu) 
where they can set their access settings easily. 
The steps for the data accessing process are as follows. 
1. Dr. S logs in to the EHR system as an HCP 
a. Dr. S sends the login credential to the EHR system. 
b. The EHR system authenticates Dr. S and creates a new session 
2. Dr. S initiates a data usage request with the usage query service of the 
EHR system 
a. Dr. S initiates a data request 
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b. The PEP requests the required details from Dr. S in the form of 
a usage query 
c. Dr. S sends the usage query 
d. The PEP sends the usage query to the PDP 
3. The policy decision point validates the usage query 
a. The PDP checks Dr. S’s sensitivity level with the policy store 
i. If the sensitivity label is incompatible the sequence ends 
here and a denial response is sent to PEP and go to step 
4b 
b. The PDP checks the usage purposes in the usage query with the 
purposes store 
i. If the purpose(s) are invalid the sequence ends here and 
a denial response is sent to PEP and go to step 4b 
c. If steps (a) and (b) are satisfied the PDP fetches the EHR data 
from the EHR store and sends it to PEP and go to step 4a 
4. PEP sends query result to Dr. S 
a. PEP sends EHR data to Dr. S if query is policy compliant 
b. PEP sends a denial notice to Dr. S 
The SDL diagrams for the agents in this sequence are given below. 
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Figure 5.14 SDL for HP Service 
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Figure 5.15 SDL for policy enforcement point (PEP) 
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Figure 5.16 SDL for policy decision point (PDP) 
A sequence diagram for this process is shown in the Figure 5.17. 
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Figure 5.17: Usage request and data retrieval 
5.4.6 Information Sharing Example 
In our case scenario let us assume that Dr. P, using the PBAC module defined 
within the portal for authorised users, initiates a request to share Patient X’s sexual 
health details with another health professional Dr. C for the benefit of Patient X. This 
capability fulfils eHealth requirement 3 in section 1.2.6. Here however, Dr. C should 
have the relevant access clearance by the health authority to access the type of data 
specified by the requester. This default access level is set using the RBAC and MAC 
modules of the access control model. It is not necessarily required that the receiving 
health professional be in Patient X’s ACL which is defined by Patient X through the 
DAC and MAC modules since it is a request by an authenticated user. It is important 
to note that Patient X’s consent for sharing information is already given to Dr. P by 
the policies set by the patient and the health authority. Patient X can give any health 
professional the right to share his health information without his consent with other 
health professionals. If Dr. C accepts the request she becomes an authorised user of 
the system with the relevant access level. Patient X has the right to remove Dr. C 
from the ACL at a later time. Patient X is notified of the actions of the users at 
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relevant times to make the system transparent. It is important to note that information 
is shared for the benefit of the patient. Information must not be misused by the users. 
Trust plays a major role in the information sharing process. Furthermore, such 
processes are traceable and accountable. An EHR system using this protocol must 
have the capability to prevent users from misusing information, which is discussed in 
chapter six. 
5.5 A PROTOTYPE IMPLEMENTATION 
A prototype of the proposed access control model was developed. The 
prototype is a Web based system developed using PHP aimed at testing the presented 
protocols. This implementation is focused only on demonstrating the proposed access 
control protocol. We are not focused on actual system usability at this stage. Figure 
5.18 shows a portion of the prototype that allows patients to set and manage their 
privacy policies and healthcare professionals to access EHR information. The 
prototype serves two main purposes: it acts as a test vehicle for the policy 
formulation and manipulation process described in chapter five and six, and it 
demonstrates the policy representation that is discussed in chapter six. 
The prototype is developed to handle three types of users: patients, a healthcare 
authority and healthcare professionals. The patients and the healthcare authority can 
set privacy and access policies and the final policies are formulated according to the 
protocol discussed above. A MySQL database is used to hold the policies and the 
data in the EHR. The relationships between the EHR data and the intended purposes 
are also maintained in this database. Healthcare professionals can lodge access 
requests that consist of access purposes and will be processed according to the 
protocol using the intended purposes managed by the health authority. The prototype 
adheres to the SDL specification given earlier in the chapter and is also capable of 
handling information sharing processes. 
For further clarity of the operations of the prototype, we relate it to our case 
scenario presented in chapter two. First, Dr. P, Dr. S, Dr. B, Dr. M, Dr. C and all 
other HCPs who are under that jurisdiction of StateHealth register as HCPs by 
specifying their healthcare role, e.g. General Practitioner (GP), Dermatology 
Specialist, Sexual Specialist, and Mental Health Specialist. Once an HCP registers in 
the system, StateHealth is notified. At this point a representative of StateHealth 
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processes each registration by assigning a default access policy for each of the HCPs. 
For example, Dr. P will be assigned the role of a GP and Dr. S will be assigned the 
role of a dermatologist. The policies will contain all required access levels for each 
healthcare role. This activity fulfils eHealth requirement 1 in section 1.2.6. Once 
StateHealth completes the registration of a HCP, that HCP becomes available for 
patients, Patient X in our case scenario, to be added to his/her ACL to have access to 
their EHRs. Patient X selects the HCPs whom he/she wants to have access to his/her 
EHR, and defines his/her privacy policies for each of them, thus fulfilling eHealth 
requirements 6 and 7. Before the policies are finalised (i.e. before an HCP is added to 
the patient’s ACL), the privacy policy defined by Patient X for Dr. S will be 
compared with the default policy defined by StateHealth for Dr. S. The policies are 
amalgamated according to Algorithm 1. If conflicts exist, Patient X is notified before 
Dr. S is added to his/her ACL to give him/her the option to alter the policy or select a 
different HCP. The healthcare access policies set by StateHealth will prevail over the 
Patient X’s privacy policy such that healthcare information requirements are not 
hindered, thus fulfilling eHealth requirement 4 in section 1.2.6. Once an HCP is 
included in Patient X’s ACL, he/she can lodge usage requests to access information 
in Patient X’s EHR. Each access request is accompanied by the access purpose 
specified by the HCP. Access is granted by comparing the access purposes and the 
intended purposes in the database. We assume that StateHealth manages an up-to-
date list of purposes associated with each EHR data type. 
The access policies that are defined in each of the SLs assigned for the HCPs 
cannot be overridden by the HCPs in the current state of the prototype. This 
capability is implemented in the extension of the prototype discussed in chapter six, 
which also uses a rights expression language for the formal representation of SLs. A 
detailed description of the policy formulation, representation and manipulation 
process is given in chapter six.  
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Figure 5.18 Prototype for access control model demonstration 
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5.6 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Access control has been a fundamental security measure of information 
systems for many years. Amongst many different models DAC, MAC, and RBAC 
are the most popular. These models come in many different variations and are used 
in different contextual domains. In this chapter we discussed how we can make use 
of the characteristics and principles of these models to facilitate a suitable access 
control model for electronic health records. eHealth requirements of eHealth 
stakeholders identified in chapter two were addressed using the novel access control 
model that used characteristics of prominent access control models. A DAC based 
model is used to capture the access settings for users by patients. Patients maintain an 
ACL of their trusted health professionals and use a variation of the MAC model to 
assign access levels (or sensitivity level as discussed above) for them. A MAC based 
model is used to define access levels of healthcare professionals who can access data 
in an EHR. A central health authority uses a RBAC approach and the MAC based 
approach to set default access levels for health professionals. A simple PBAC 
approach is used as a usage control module to capture the access purposes of 
information users. The current prototype is capable of demonstrating the process of 
setting the access levels by the patients and the health authority and processing 
access requests by health professionals. We have tested the prototype to demonstrate 
various scenarios of policy settings and data access. Further development and testing 
is required to investigate how this model would behave in a real healthcare setting. 
Rather than being used as a standalone security model, the final goal of this model is 
to harmonise the access control model with the information accountability 
framework (IAF) for eHealth. The IAF uses DRM technologies to represent the 
access and usage policies set by the users in a Rights Expression Language. 
A Web based prototype of the designed model was implemented and tested in 
different scenarios and the access control protocols were successfully validated. The 
results of chapters three and four revealed favourable results towards aspects of the 
designed access control model such as patient control of health information, which 
further validates the underlying concept. Although presented separately, the access 
control mode is not intended to be used on its own without the accountability 
measures presented in chapter six. It is a means of gathering the requirements for 
AeH systems and supports the model presented in chapter six. 
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Further to what has been discussed in this chapter we propose the following 
additions. Purpose definition is an important part in our model. Building a 
comprehensive set of purposes and maintaining them is vital. These definitions must 
capture medical knowledge as well as system requirements. The health details of 
family members and relatives are an important resource for the caring professional. 
These additions are left for future work to be addressed once a prototype of the IAF 
is implemented to be tested in a real life healthcare setting. We also extended the 
proposed model to support explicit actions and providing non-restrictive access to 
health information for the authorised persons while incorporating information 
accountability so that health information would not be used inappropriately. 
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Chapter 6: An Architecture and Policy 
Framework for Accountable-
eHealth Systems 
 
In this chapter, we present and validate a technical architecture and a policy 
framework for Accountable-eHealth systems. The components of the architecture are 
focussed towards the policy manipulation of AeH systems thus do not focus on 
external communications with other aspects of operational system components. The 
chapter clearly demonstrates the policy protocols presented in chapter five through 
policy representation and manipulation using a rights expression language, the Open 
Digital Rights Language (ODRL). The designed architecture is validated using an 
extension of the prototype developed in chapter five to handle the ODRL policies 
and transaction logs to demonstrate the operational capability of the model and a 
model checking approach to validate the internal communications of the architecture. 
The chapter will also include a detailed account of how the presented eHealth model 
can be technically implemented using available technologies. Research objectives 3 
(b) and 3 (c) are addressed in this chapter. 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
eHealth systems are built on Web architectures. The vulnerability of the 
information in the system depends on how secure the architectural elements of the 
system would be. When dealing with the use of information within the system we 
make the assumption that the architectural components that the system is built on are 
secure. Therefore, the IA principles for eHealth have to be integrated in to the secure 
architecture on which the systems are built. 
The existing concerns in healthcare information management such as 
information security and information privacy become paramount issues with the use 
of the Internet to manage health information. This raises questions as to what the 
relevant security measures are and how an assurance of privacy can be given to the 
stakeholders (consumers and healthcare professionals). 
Unlawful disclosure of personal information contained in EHRs could cause 
the subject of the information embarrassment and may affect insurability, child 
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custody cases, and even employment (Cannoy & Salam, 2010; W. Pratt, K. Unruh, 
A. Civan, & M. M. Skeels, 2006b). To this end, we have already established that a 
certain degree of control must be given to the patients such that their privacy 
requirements can be expressed in the form of information privacy policies. A 
considerable degree of control over ones personal information is an essential aspect 
to protecting information privacy (Daniel J. Solove, 2008). But, due to the disparity 
of data ownership in healthcare, giving control of the data must be handled with care. 
Various methods have been proposed to address the privacy conundrum 
ranging from strict access control to privacy-preserving algorithms. From what was 
discussed section 5.2.1 in chapter five, we establish that access control mechanisms 
either permit or deny access, there are no intermediate states (Kagal & Pato, 2010). 
They may also hinder the actions of legitimate users of an information system (Kagal 
& Pato, 2010). Therefore, relying solely on access control mechanisms to protect 
sensitive information would be inadequate for privacy protection  (Kagal & Abelson, 
2010). 
In this chapter, a mechanism for information privacy is presented that is neither 
a preventive nor proactive approach but a non-restrictive and reactive approach. As 
established in chapter two, the presence of information accountability can deter users 
from unlawful acts due to the fear of penalties. 
6.2 RELATED WORK 
Privacy preservation in eHealth is a highly active research area. As it has been 
pointed out in section 1.2.5, they encompasses issues such as anonymity, 
authentication, authorisation, confidentiality, deniability, unlinkability and EHR data 
structure (Slamanig & Stingl, 2010). Despite these efforts, information privacy still 
hinders the proliferation of eHealth systems. Anonymisation (Bayardo & Agrawal, 
2005; Sweeney, 2002) is the property of not being identifiable with respect to a set of 
actions inside a group of people. In relation to EHRs, anonymity has been defined in 
terms of anonymous communication, sender-receiver-anonymity and data anonymity 
(Slamanig & Stingl, 2010). Although in some circumstances these types of 
anonymisation are appropriate, they may discourage honest and legitimate users from 
accessing data required to fulfil genuine tasks and also hinder the physician-patient 
relationship. Deniability refers to the capability of a person to deny the existence of 
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specific information. This may be applicable in situations where the disclosure of 
sensitive health information is not a requirement (i.e. non-healthcare related 
activities). It is stated that deniability should be a capability provided for the users of 
an EHR system (Slamanig & Stingl, 2010). However, this requirement does not 
entirely apply when dealing with information manipulation within the healthcare 
domain. Issues such as unlinkability, which refers to the links with data objects 
within an EHR, are also not significant in a system that is transparent and 
accountable. The structure of the EHR play an important role in the authorisation 
process (Slamanig & Stingl, 2010) (see chapter five for the structure used in this 
study). 
Haas et al. (2011) present a model that addressed privacy aspects of a 
centralised EHR system. They use digital watermarking to address privacy issues 
arising from enterprises disclosing health information to third parties such as other 
doctors, healthcare service providers and drug stores. They propose a model where 
patients are allowed to express their preferences when disclosing their information to 
third parties. Their model prevents an organisation providing EHRs from accessing 
the health information and also prevents them from establishing a profile about the 
patient. Their model however is not related towards day to day EHR access of 
healthcare professionals towards healthcare delivery to the patients. 
A privacy preserving EHR model has been proposed by Demuynck et al. 
(2005) which allows patients to control who has access to their EHRs by maintaining 
a private key. Only the doctors who know this key may access the EHR data and 
without this the different health records cannot be linked together. Their model also 
allows doctors to be anonymous when interacting with the central authority only 
revealing the doctors status. Although patients can control access to their EHR, they 
cannot prevent them from accessing specific fields of the EHR. They also assume 
that the healthcare professionals do not misuse the system. This model for privacy 
management therefore, does not allow for patient requirements as identified in 
chapter five. It also does not address data misuse that can occur from within the 
system. 
Information accountability is not extensively studied in the eHealth domain. 
Work by Ferreira et al. (2003) focus on  the hardware security appliance (HSA) 
model to ensure that the accountability data such as audit logs cannot be altered by 
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system operators such that the integrity of the system is maintained. Their focus is 
not on patient privacy policies nor is it patient centric. More recently, one study that 
uses information accountability principles for privacy management in EHRs was 
proposed by Mashima et al. (2012; 2012) that describes accountable update, 
accountable use and protection of honest entities of EHRs. In their approach, the 
authors assume the presence of a monitoring agent that the users interact with for the 
activities with the EHR system. Although the system is patient centric, it does not 
describe the involvement of the patient in the policy formulation process nor does it 
include details of redress in the event of a policy violation. Although the system 
adopts information accountability for privacy management, the system is not entirely 
non-restrictive. 
Policy override is considered an important aspect of healthcare information 
systems. With similarity to our work,  Ferreira et al. (2006) presents a system where 
healthcare professionals can override policies within a hospital setting. The system 
notifies the users when they are about to override a policy to avoid unintentionally 
accessing the wrong data. At the time of overriding the policy, the users must 
provide a valid reason for the action. All policy overrides are notified to a relevant 
supervisor. The fact that healthcare professionals have to provide a justification 
before they override a policy restricts their freedom to a certain degree. In their 
approach patients’ are not capable of expressing their privacy policies. Their access 
policies are formulated by a system administrator by considering only the 
organisational aspects. A similar approach to this has been presented by Weber-
Jahnke and Orby (2012). They develop a system to preserve privacy in peer-to-peer 
exchange of medical information. They consider the patient’s consent in their 
policies. 
Our approach in the utilisation of information accountability in healthcare 
involves several additional aspects than what is already done in that area. Our 
approach is towards EHRs rather than local EMR systems, which are becoming the 
most targeted aspect of current eHealth solutions. We clearly show how patients can 
express their own privacy policies. In our approach, these policies are overlooked by 
a healthcare authority to guarantee that legitimate healthcare professionals have the 
appropriate access to the relevant healthcare information. This aspect is not present 
in previous approaches. In situations where policies are overridden, the patients are 
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notified. Additionally, they are allowed to directly interact with the healthcare 
professional to resolve possible disputes resulting in greater transparency that also 
act as an incentive for healthcare professionals to abide by the rules, which in turn 
would increase patients’ confidence in the system. We also show how the said 
policies can be formally expressed and managed. Our approach deals with after-the-
fact accountability to maximise the availability of information to the healthcare 
professionals, which is the primary goal of EHRs. 
6.3 TECHNICAL ARCHITECTURE FOR AeH SYSTEMS 
In the previous chapter we presented and validated an access control model 
suitable for eHealth systems which capture requirements to fulfil accountability 
capabilities in an eHealth application domain which utilise a central EHR system. 
Here we present a technical architecture for AeH systems. It can be considered as an 
extension to the access control model described above. The policies defined in the 
access control model act as the underlying policies to which the users must comply 
to but do not prevent users from accessing data. This is to facilitate unrestricted 
access to health information for authorised users as mentioned in eHealth 
requirement 2 in section 1.2.6. Active and user accessible policy-aware transaction 
logs and after-the-fact inquiries and justifications are introduced to the eHealth 
domain that facilitate for information accountability. 
Prior to presenting the designed model, it must be stressed that functionalities 
such as the availability of the system, the confidentiality of data transmission 
between users and the system, and the integrity of the stored data are crucial for any 
EHR system (Slamanig & Stingl, 2010). It is therefore assumed that the architecture 
is built upon a secure and trustworthy central EHR system that is managed by a 
central healthcare authority. 
6.3.1 Accountable-eHealth System Architecture 
Here, we present a technical architecture for the accountability model seen in 
chapter two Figure 2.5 that support the accountability capabilities. The access control 
model presented in chapter five is extended and additional components are 
introduced.  
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Figure 6.1 Schematic AeH system architecture (Gajanayake, Iannella, & Sahama, 2012) 
A schematic architecture is shown in Figure 6.1. The architecture is divided 
into two categories of services; external services and internal services and has three 
types of users; patients (P), a healthcare authority (HA) and healthcare professionals 
(HCP).  
Internal services consist of a policy aggregation service, the information 
accountability services, a messaging service, a data service, policy storage and the 
EHR Purpose storage. External services of the architecture include patient services, 
health authority services, health professional services and the external EHR storage. 
Detailed descriptions of these services are given in the following sections. 
6.3.2 Internal Services 
Information accountability services consists of policy storage (PSIAS), policy 
aware transaction logs (PATLIAS) and policy services containing a usage query 
service (UQSIAS) and a policy reasoning service (PRSIAS). PSIAS stores the policies it 
receives from the policy aggregator service. UQSIAS processes the usage queries it 
receives from health professional services requesting access to EHR data. Once the 
policy service receives an inquiry query from patient services PRSIAS send a request 
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to the health professional service requesting a reasoning query for a particular 
information usage instance. The reasoning queries are processed with the use of 
PATLIAS which contains all past transactions of the system. 
Other internal services include a policy aggregator service (PASIS) which 
amalgamates the policies from PPSP and APSHA as discussed in section 5.4.4 in 
chapter five, a data service (DSIS) which is the only component with access to the 
EHR storage, a messaging service (MSIS) that sends out the relevant messages to 
other services and an EHR purposes storage (EPSIS) which consists of the intended 
purposed of each of the data types in the EHR. The EPSIS is managed by HA. 
6.3.3 External Services 
External services are used by the end users to give inputs to the internal 
services and receive results from them. External services consist of patient services, 
health authority services, health professional services and the EHR storage. 
Patient services are used by a patient to manage their EHR. The patient 
services consist of an access control service (ACSP), privacy policy service (PPSP), 
messaging service (MSP) and a usage inquiry service (UISP). A patient maintains an 
access control list (ACL) with the use of ACSP. The patients set their privacy policies 
using PPS and assign sensitivity levels for trusted health professionals in the ACL. 
These policies are then amalgamated by the policy aggregation service (PASIS) with 
the policies of the health authority and stored in PSIAF. Patients receive notifications 
and can send messages to HCPs through the MSP from the internal services. 
Notifications include regular updates on the EHR, notifications of information access 
by HCPs, warnings of potential information misuse and messages from HCPs. All 
messages need to go through the internal services for them to be recorded in the 
Transaction logs. 
Health authority services are used by a central health authority to manage 
access settings for health professionals. Health authority services consists of a role 
based access control service (RBACSHA), an EHR purpose management service 
(EPMSHA) and access policy service (APSHA). The HA set minimum access levels for 
HCPs using APSHA together with RBACSHA. These policies are combined with the 
patient’s privacy policies according to the access control protocol in chapter five.  
HA uses EPMSHA to manage the EHR purposes in EPSIS. 
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Healthcare professional services are used by health professionals to access 
patient EHR information. HCPs are able to perform actions such as read, write and 
update. HPs are also able to initiate information sharing requests in order to share 
patient health information with other HPs to make informed decisions. Health 
professional services include a usage query service (UQSHCP), a reasoning query 
service (RQSHCP) and a messaging service (MSHCP). HCPs can lodge usage queries 
using UQSHCP requesting access to EHR information. These queries contain purposes 
for which information is required. The queries are processed by the UQSIAS and if 
they are policy compliant access is granted. If the usage queries are not policy 
compliant a warning notification is sent to the requester at which point he can either 
comply with the warning or disregard it. If the warning is disregarded and the data is 
accessed by the HCP, a message is sent by the MSIS to MSP notifying the patient of 
potential information misuse. At this point the patient may initiate a usage inquiry 
using UISP. As a result PRSIAS sends a request to RQSHCP. The HP then has to send a 
justification of the use of information in the form of a reasoning query through the 
RQSHCP. The justification is processed by the PRSIAS. If the provided justification is 
valid the incident is resolved. If not, further action (such as legal action) would be 
taken which we would not discuss in this thesis. PRSIAS should have the capability to 
deduce whether a provided justification is valid. This process of inquiries and 
resulting justifications enables the system to detect intentional misuse of data by 
users. 
6.3.4 Information accountability service 
The IA service is the core of the IAF which processes user requests. It contains 
a policy aggregator service (PASIAS), a policy storage (PSIAS), a usage query service 
(UQSIAS), a policy aware transaction logs (PATLIAS), a policy reasoning service 
(PRSIAS), a messaging service (MSIAS), a data service (DSIAS) and an EHR purposes 
storage (EPSIAS). 
PASIAS amalgamates the policies set through PPSP and APSHA in such a way 
that the patient’s privacy requirements are met and the health authorities’ policies 
also be satisfied. The policies are stored in PSIAF. UQSIAS processes the usage queries 
it receives from HCPs requesting access to EHR data. The queries are processed 
using PSIAS and EPSIAS which consists of the intended purposed of each of the data 
types in the EHR and is managed by HA. All transactions are stores as policy-aware 
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transaction logs in PATLIAS. Once an inquiry query is received from patient services, 
PRSIAS sends a request to the health professional service requesting a reasoning 
query for a particular information usage instance. The resulting justifications or 
reasoning queries are processed with the use of PATLIAS. DSIAS retrieves data from 
EHR storage. This is the only component with access to the EHR data. MSIAS sends 
out messages to external services. 
6.4 IA PROTOCOLS 
The functionality of the IA services is depicted in a Specification Description 
Language (SDL) diagram in Figure 6.2. 
 
Figure 6.2. SDL diagram for the IA services 
A message sequence of the IA service in the event of possible information 
misuse by an HCP is shown below in Figure 6.3. 
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Figure 6.3. Message sequence of IA service in the event of a possible misuse of information
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6.5 FEASIBILITY 
In this section we present solutions for the policy related aspects mentioned 
throughout the thesis. We use an open standard policy language, namely; the Open 
Digital Rights Language (ODRL) to show how the policies discussed in chapter five 
are expressed in AeH systems. The prototype presented in chapter five was used to 
implement an extension to the ODRL core model to enable a transaction logging 
capability. We give an account as to how the transaction logs and the policies are 
formulated and expressed in ODRL. 
6.5.1 Overview 
The initial reviews done on the approaches to information accountability in 
chapter two revealed that policy formulation and representation are key aspects of 
accountable-systems. For this reason, the main focus of this chapter will be policy 
representation in the IAF. The Semantic reasoning capabilities of the IAF are 
discussed but will not be addressed in terms of a technology solution. Rather, a 
possible implementation approach is discussed with the use of Semantic Web 
technologies. Current research in the Linked-Data arena shows that these capabilities 
are not far away from being readily available to end users (Berners-Lee, Hendler, & 
Lassila, 2001). 
6.5.2 Digital rights management 
The IAF is policy driven. The proper representation of the policies is thus vital. 
In this section we will give an account of the technical aspects to policy 
representation. The data elements in the EHR can be considered as digital assets and 
the policies can be set on those assets to manage their usage. As a technical solution 
for this, we look to technologies in the digital rights management (DRM) arena. 
Apart from their applications in copyright protection of media files, etc on the 
Internet, DRM technologies are becoming a prominent resource in protecting private 
information of individuals (Feigenbaum, Freedman, Sander, & Shostack, 2002). 
DRM has many similarities to the traditional access control model but differs in that 
they require information to remain protected even after access is granted to 
authorised users. DRM thus deals with controlling the usage of an information 
resource by authorised users, i.e. enforcing usage policies. Each piece of information 
is protected by a usage license created by the digital rights holder. DRM can benefit 
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eHealth technologies by providing a means to manage the use of EHRs. Although 
DRM mainly deals with policy enforcement as previously mentioned, our approach 
is focused on the use of the open standard policy language for the expression of 
policies that can be used for accountability rather than their enforcement. 
6.5.3 Open Digital Rights Language 
The Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) (Iannella, 2002) is a Rights 
Expression Language (REL) based on XML and provides a syntax and semantics to 
express policies related to digital assets. The ODRL core model is formally specified 
in UML and the language syntax is defined XML schema. The ODRL Requirements 
document contains requirements for the language that have been gathered since 
ODRL Version 1.1 has been released. An ODRL Vocabulary document specify the 
potential terms (vocabulary) used by the Core Model for policy expression needs 
across communities. In early 2009, ODRL Version 2.0 was released. The core model 
of ODRL V2 is shown in Figure 6.4. 
 
Figure 6.4 ODRL Version 2 Core Model (ODRL Initiative, 2012) 
The ODRL Version 2.0 is a major update from Version 1.1 and provides is 
endorsed by the W3C ODRL Working Group as appropriate for widespread 
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deployment and use by the wide community. ODRL has been endorsed by a number 
of prominent organisations including Nokia and Open Mobile Alliance (OMA).  
We have chosen ODRL as the policy language for AeH systems because it is 
independent of implementation constraints and it is capable of expressing a wide 
range of policy-based information. The semantics of ODRL falls neatly in line with 
the protocols we have developed for the policy formulation and representation. For 
example in the AeH system architecture, we deal with policy assigners and 
assignees, permissions and prohibitions, usage constraints, purposes and actions. 
ODRL supports all of these aspects. 
6.5.4 An extension to the Core Model 
It was previously established that transaction logs in an accountability system 
need to be policy aware. To make this feasible, we have extended the current model 
of ODRL. 
In accountability systems, policy violations and after-the-fact accountability 
are key aspects. In order to identify and redress violations, a policy-aware transaction 
log is maintained.  The current ODRL core model is incapable of supporting audit 
logs. We present an extension to the current ODRL model to capture the required 
semantics necessary for policy-aware transaction logs and later for policy reasoning. 
We have extended the core model to be able to store policy-aware transaction logs 
using ODRL. The logs have to capture data such as what data was accessed, the 
intended purpose of the access or usage, the underlying policy for access and usage. 
Furthermore they need to capture the identity of the data consumer, nature of 
transaction, time of transaction, location of the transaction (e.g. through a doctor’s 
local EMR), the status of the transaction (valid or invalid). The logs are read only 
and immutable. We assume that the transaction logs are encrypted and secure in 
order to protect their integrity. 
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Figure 6.5 Extended ODRL Core model 
A new entity ‘Transaction’ is introduced to the ODRL core model (see Figure 
8.3). Together with the current ODRL semantics, additional semantics are introduced 
to the Transaction entity. 
Semantics of “Transaction” 
The Transaction entity deals with information related to past transactions and 
contains the following attributes: 
uid: the unique identification of the Transaction entity 
valid: indicates the transaction to be a valid or invalid transaction. This will 
identify the transaction as potential misuse of data or violation of a related policy. 
Allowed values are True or False. 
type: The transactions may be of the following types. This list is not 
exhaustive. 
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generalUse – authorised users using assets 
sharedUse – usage resulting from sharing requests sent by authorised users 
dateTime: indicates the date and time of the transaction 
location: the EMR/device/location used to access the data 
The Transaction entity refers to Action, Asset and Party entities to identify and 
store the relevant data of a transaction. A transaction is accompanied by its 
corresponding usage policy. Transaction entity captures the actions performed by the 
user on a retrieved asset. In an auditing instance, a single transaction log contains 
sufficient information to make a comparison with a violated policy without having to 
retrieve the policy itself. This is useful in events where policies may evolve with 
time. 
A transaction may contain more than one action on an asset retrieved by a user. 
One transaction may only have one asset and one or more actions performed on that 
asset by one party. A user can perform many actions on a set of data retrieved 
through one access request. This is different to the current ODRL models’ semantics. 
6.5.5 ODRL Policies 
Consider the healthcare scenario presented in chapter two. Patient X allows Dr. 
S to access his EHR but restricts her from accessing his sexual health details and 
mental health details. Below is an ODRL V2 XML instance of this policy. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/privacy" uid="policy-use-ehr" conflict="o:prohibit"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:Patient X" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  </o:permission> 
  <o:prohibition> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:sexualHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:mentalHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:Patient X" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  </o:prohibition> 
</o:policy> 
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The conflict attribute of the policy above is set to “prohibit” indicating that 
prohibitions take precedence in the policy. The health authority can set an access 
policy for Dr. S which is given below. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= "http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh= "urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/agreement" uid="policy-use-ehr"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:dermatHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:sexualHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:health:authority" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
 
The health authority is responsible for setting default access policies for 
healthcare roles, in this case for the role of a dermatologist. In the policy above HA 
gives Dr. S the permission to access Patient X’s dermatology details and sexual 
health details. Note here that Patient X’s settings prohibit Dr. S from accessing his 
sexual health details. But we assume a hypothetical scenario where a relationship 
between skin conditions and STDs exist, and every dermatologist should have access 
to the patient’s sexual health details. The health authority is aware of this fact and 
allows all dermatologists access to patients sexual health details. According to the 
access control protocol in section 3, the settings by the health authority always 
prevail over patient settings. The final policy will be a combination of the two 
policies and hence the requirement for PASIS in the IAF. The amalgamated policy for 
Dr. S is given below. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= " http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/privacy" uid="policy-use-ehr" conflict="o:prohibit"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:Patient X" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  </o:permission> 
  <o:prohibition> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:mentalHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:Patient X" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  </o:prohibition> 
</o:policy> 
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This final policy is stored in PSIAS and is used by other services. Updates are 
done to the policies in PSIAS accordingly. HCPs in already in the ACL can lodge 
usage requests to the EHR system. 
Information sharing 
Information sharing is an important aspect of healthcare and is facilitated in the 
IAF. HCPs who are already in the ACL can initiate sharing requests. 
<o:policy xmlns:o="http://odrl.net/2.0" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request" uid="policy-share-ehr"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:dermatHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:sexualHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:action name="o:share"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
    <o:constraint name="o:recipient" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="urn:healthPro:sexualHealth:Dr. B"> 
  </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
 
In the policy above Dr. S initiates a request to share Patient X’s dermatology 
details with Dr. B. Dr. B accepts this request by lodging the following access request 
to read Patient X’s dermatology details. Requests resulting from sharing requests are 
allowed (holding to general access policies) since the initial request was from a HCP 
already in the ACL. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= " http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" type=" 
http://w3.org/ns/odrl/2/request" uid="policy-use-ehr"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:dermatHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X:sexualHealthCare" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:sexualHealth:Dr. B" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:sexualHealthcare/investigate"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:dermatHealthCare"> 
  </o:permission> 
</o:policy> 
 
In the usage request above, Dr. B requests Patient X’s dermatology and sexual 
health information from the EHR system. The purpose for Dr. B’s data access is an 
investigation related to Patient X’s sexual health. 
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Audit logs 
Below is an ODRL transaction log is a result of a successful access request by 
Dr. S to access Patient X’s dermatology details for the purpose of 
dermatHealthCare. The audit log contains the existing access policy for Dr. S. 
<o:policy xmlns:o= " http://odrlextension.org/ns/odrlx/2x" xmlns:eh="urn:ehealth.gov" 
type=" http://odrlextension.org/ns/odrlx/2x/privacy" uid="policy-use-ehr" 
conflict="o:prohibit"> 
  <o:permission> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:Patient X" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="oe:read"/> 
    <o:constraint name="o:purpose" operator="o:eq" 
rightOperand="eh:dematHealthCare"/> 
  </o:permission> 
  <o:prohibition> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:mentalHealthCarePatient X" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:patient:Patient X" role="o:assigner"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:assignee"/> 
    <o:action name="o:read"/> 
  </o:prohibition> 
  <o:transaction uid = "transaction-use-ehr" valid = "o:true" type = "o:generalUse" 
dateTime = "o:164001072012" location = "urn:emrlocation.org/Dr. S"> 
    <o:asset uid="urn:ehr:Patient X" relation="o:target"/> 
    <o:party uid="urn:healthPro:dermatHealth:Dr. S" role="o:user"/> 
    <o:action name="o:dermatHealthCare/patientVisit"/> 
  </o:transaction> 
</o:policy> 
 
The policies at the time of action are attached to every transaction log. This 
enables an efficient auditing process not having to retrieve past policies that may 
have changed after the actions have occurred.  
Although policies can be successfully represented and managed using ODRL 
as shown above, in order for the reasoning capability of the IAF to be technologically 
feasible, we have to consider ODRL in the Semantic Web domain. Next we will 
present a technology overview of how we can use ODRL in conjunction with 
semantic web technologies and how we can attain the reasoning capabilities 
proposed in the IAF. 
6.5.6 Implementation on the Semantic Web 
Although it is proposed as a semantic reasoning process, the reasoning 
capabilities of the IAF are not technically validated in this thesis. However, we give 
an overview of the semantic technologies that can be used to address this capability 
as a technical solution. The technologies in question are Semantic Web technologies. 
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The Web is gradually transforming to what is called “the Semantic Web” 
where the traditional Syntactic Web is leveraged towards a distributed knowledge 
repository. The semantic web is based on the Resource Description Framework 
(RDF) (Lassila & Swick, 1999) for metadata semantics and the Web Ontology 
Language (OWL) (McGuinness & van Harmelen, 2004) for web ontologies. These 
technologies enable the development of Web based information systems that are 
capable of automated reasoning, impossible with the syntactic web. They open new 
avenues for eHealth systems. 
ODRL is a solution to move DRM to the Internet. But in order to enforce the 
semantics of the policies in conjunction with ODRL, a corresponding ontology is 
required. The present ontology (Iannella, 2012) need to be extended to capture the 
semantics of the ODRL extension discussed earlier. The ontology for the policies can 
be represented using OWL. Such an ontology allow us to achieve the reasoning 
capabilities proposed in the IAF. 
EPSIS contains an ontology representing the relationships between the EHR 
data themselves and eHR data and the intended purposes. This ontology together 
with a comprehensive medical ontology enables us to infer facts otherwise would not 
be available. For example, the presence of the fact that Patient X has a particular 
allergy in the EPSIS can lead to the inference of the fact that a particular medication 
has the tendency to be harmful to Patient X. This fact would not have been available 
to the EHR system without a specific external input specifying this or if Patient X 
has had an illness which is usually treated by this particular medication. The 
inferences are updated with new data and facts available to EPSIS. The policies in 
PSIAS are stored in RDF with vocabularies from the ODRL ontology. The queries 
made by UISP and PRSIAS are made in a RDF query language like SPARQL 
(Prud'hommeaux & Seaborne, 2008). Data stored in PATLIAS is also in RDF allowing 
mining to be done using SPARQL. Together with these services and a policy aware 
reasoner, PRSIAF allow us (with a suitable natural language translation middleware) 
to process queries such as “Why did Dr. S read my sexual health details?” by Patient 
X. Similarly, Dr. S will be able to justify why she read Patient X’s sexual health 
details. The validity of the justification is determined after mining the PATLIAS and 
PSIAS. Provided justification holds if the facts confirm with the available knowledge. 
Note here that as mentioned above, the patient can only lodge an inquiry query if 
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there has been a possible misuse of data i.e. some underlying policy has been 
violated by the user. The justification is on why the user has done so. The ontologies 
defined enable us to infer facts that validate the justification. For example, in an 
emergency situation the treating health professional will access all necessary 
information from the eHR regardless of the privacy and access policies. This will be 
recorded in PATLIAS. For any inquiry made by the patient to clarify data usage related 
to this episode of care, the fact that the incident was considered and recorded as an 
emergency would validate the justifications given by the health professionals. 
6.6 A PROTOTYPE FOR THE ODRL POLICIES 
We extended the previously mentioned Web prototype as a test vehicle to 
demonstrate the use of ODRL. This prototype does not demonstrate the Semantic 
Web technological model described in the previous section. Policy setting and 
computation is done according to the model described in chapter five. All usage 
requests and communications with the system by end users are logged using the 
extended ODRL model. The system determines possible inappropriate use of data 
and the patients are capable of lodging inquiries about possible misuse of data. 
The purpose of the prototype was to demonstrate the protocols and to validate 
the designed technical architecture in terms of the policy management and to validate 
the ODRL extension. Further work is required before the Semantic reasoning 
capabilities of the IAF can be integrated into a working solution. 
6.7 PROTOCOL SIMULATION 
Model checking is used as a technique of automatically debugging complex 
reactive systems (Vaandrager, 2011). The system specifications are expressed as 
logic formulas and efficient symbolic algorithms are used to traverse the model 
defined by the system and check if the specification holds thus allowing the analysis 
of models that capture the dynamic behaviour of systems. In this section we use a 
model checking approach to validate the protocols of the architecture and show that 
it behaves as intended. We use the model checking tool UPPAAL for this task. 
6.7.1 Overview of UPPAAL 
UPPAAL is a toolbox for verification of real-time systems developed as a 
result of joint efforts by the Department of Information Technology at Uppsala 
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University in Sweden and the Department of Computer Science at Aalborg 
University in Denmark (Behrmann, David, & Larsen, 2004; Vaandrager, 2011). 
Using UPPAAL, it is possible to verify systems that can be modelled as a collection 
of interacting communicating timed automata (Alur & Dill, 1994). UPPAAL has 
been successfully used in case studies ranging from communication protocols to 
multimedia applications (Behrmann, et al., 2004) and is available for free academic 
use and for licensed commercial use. 
The UPPAAL graphical user interface consists of three main parts: the system 
editor that is used to construct models, the simulator that is used to simulate the 
behaviour, and the verifier that is used to analyse the behaviour of the model. A 
model of a system can be expressed using a graphical notation with global and local 
variables, clocks and synchronisation channels. Synchronisation channels consists of 
output channels, represented as VarName!, and input channels, represented as  
VarName?, and are used to synchronise two automata in the system, where VarName 
is the name of the synchronising variable. Once VarName! is invoked, VarName? is 
triggered. 
The system model can be run automatically or selected transactions can be 
manually triggered. The behaviour of the system can be checked via a message 
sequence chart corresponding to the transactions generated by UPPAAL from within 
the simulator. Further analysis can be done using the verifier where specific 
characteristics of the system can be checked using queries. These queries can be used 
to check whether a specific property of the system holds or not. UPPAAL uses 
Brute-Force to do exhaustive searches to validate these queries. 
6.7.2 UPPAAL Model for the Architecture 
The system model consists of eight automata that represent each interacting 
agent: the patient service, the healthcare professional service, the usage query 
service, the reasoning query service, the policy store, transaction logs, the data 
service and the message service.  We present the main component of the model here 
and the simulation results in the form of message sequence charts. The rest of the 
automata are included in Appendix F.  
We assume that usage policies are already created and stored in the policy 
store. Therefore the healthcare authority is not modelled into the system in this 
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instance. The relevant services for information access and usage and the resulting 
accountability services are modelled. The usage query service receives usage 
requests from healthcare professionals and processes the requests. Figure 6.6 shows 
the UPPAAL model for the usage query service. 
The healthcare professional service handles operations such as usage requests 
and receive and response of messages from the EHR system. Figure F.1 in Appendix 
F shows the UPPAAL model for the healthcare professional service. Although in the 
AeH model the reasoning process involves the healthcare authority, we have 
modelled it as an automated service as proposed in section 6.5.6. The UPPAAL 
model for the policy reasoning service is shown in Figure F.2 in Appendix F. 
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Figure 6.6 Usage Query Service UPPAAL model 
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6.7.3 Simulations 
Simulations begin by assuming that the relevant usage policies are available in 
the policy store (EHR purposes and policies are regarded as one combined entity). A 
healthcare professional initiates a usage query through the Healthcare Professional 
Service that is sent to the Usage Query Service. The Usage Query Service validates 
the query by checking the HCPs usage policy by retrieving the policies from the 
Policy Service. The result is modelled as a random update of a variable. If the usage 
request is policy compliant, the requested data is retrieved from the EHR data store 
and forwarded to the HCP. The event is logged by the Transaction Logging Service. 
If the request is not policy compliant, the HCP is issued with a warning message 
through the Message Service, which the HCP has to acknowledge before continuing. 
The HCP has the option to either terminate the usage request or continue with the 
information access. If the prior occurs, the event terminates here and the event is 
logged by the Transaction Logging Service. If the later occurs, the data from the 
EHR will be retrieved via the Data Service and passed on to the HCP and a 
notification is sent to the Patient Service by the Message Service informing of a 
possible misuse of information by the relevant HCP. The information access is 
logged by the Transaction Logging Service. The patient is given the option to inquire 
about this event in the form of an inquiry query sent to the HCP. The HCP is 
required to send a justification to this inquiry query, which is validated by the Policy 
Reasoning Service. The justifications are validated by retrieving the transaction logs 
contained in the Policy-Aware Transaction Logs via the Transaction Logging 
Service. The outcome (whether policy compliant or not) is notified to the patient and 
the HCP. The procedure for redress after this process is outside of the technical 
architecture of the IAF. There is a possibility of continuous misuse of information by 
HCPs. To address this, a property was implemented where if an HCP misuses a 
patient’s information, that HCP cannot access further details of that specific patient. 
The only action that HCP can perform is justification of the misuse in responding to 
the patients query. 
Several possible scenarios were simulated and the model behaved as intended. 
The model is capable of handling data access by multiple HCPs. Unique transaction 
threads are used to handle information access requires by different HCPs. 
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After the simulations were performed, the Verifier of the UPPAAL tool was 
used to check whether specific states are reached in the model that must be reached if 
the protocols work as intended. The result of the Verifier is either “Property is 
satisfied” or “Property is not satisfied”. 
First, the model was tested for deadlocks by running the following query in the 
Verifier. 
A[] not deadlock 
The result indicated that the property is satisfied. After establishing the model 
was deadlock free, multiple simulations were observed to identify possible livelocks. 
None were found. Further queries were then tested to verify that the model is 
working as intended. For example, the fact that a healthcare professional cannot 
access information if a misuse has occurred can be tested using the following query. 
E<> (HealthProfessional(0).RequestingEHRData && 
HealthProfessional(0).misuseEvent == true) 
The query asks if a state exists where the Healthcare Professional Service can 
be in the state where it request EHR Data whilst there has been a misuse of 
information by the same HCP previously that has not being resolved. The result of 
the Verifier indicated that “Property is not satisfied”, which indicated that our goal is 
achieved. Similarly patient notifications at the point of misuse can be checked using 
the following query. 
E<> (HealthProfessional(0).misuseEvent == true && 
HPQuery.InitiatingMisuseWarning) 
The Verifier indicated the “Property is satisfied”, indicating that when an HCP 
misuses information a warning is sent to the patient by the Usage Query Service 
(HPQuery is the identifier given to the instance of the Usage Query Service in the 
UPPAAL model). Also, the requirement that an HCP has to give a justification for a 
possible misuse of data can be verified through the following query. 
E<> (PatientX.RequestingJustification && 
HealthProfessional(0).JustifyingAction) 
The result returned by the Verifier was “Property is satisfied”, as expected. A 
MSC of from an UPPAAL simulations is given in Figure 6.7. 
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Figure 6.7 Simulation results for a scenario of possible misuse of information by an HCP 
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6.8 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, we have presented a technical architecture for the information 
accountability framework (IAF). In our model we used ODRL as the policy language 
and discussed how we can represent the different privacy and access policies in the 
IAF. An extension to the current ODRL core model was also presented to facilitate 
for policy-aware transaction logs, which are essential for accountability systems. The 
architecture presented here focus on the internal communications of the system that 
are related to the IA principles presented in chapter two. We assumed that all 
communication channels are secure. The use of ODRL for policy representation was 
validated using an extension of the Web prototype used in chapter five. The entire 
architecture was modelled using UPPAAL and the behaviour was simulated as a 
validation.  
Policy reasoning is a characteristic of AeH systems. Although this process can 
be managed by an accountability advocate, an automated procedure was proposed. 
Currently the only technologies that provide such capabilities are Semantic Web 
technologies. We discussed how we can use these technologies such as OWL 
ontologies and RDF to develop the presented architecture. It is clear that developing 
a comprehensive EHR system with an IAF is an immense undertaking. But with the 
level of technology currently at the disposal of developers it is without a doubt 
feasible task. Semantic Web based policy management has been studied by many and 
some attractive solutions have been proposed (Kagal, Finin, & Anupam, 2003; 
Kagal, Finin, & Joshi, 2003; Tonti et al., 2003). However, we chose ODRL as the 
policy language for our model to give us the flexibility needed to extend the existing 
model to suit the capabilities introduced in our model. 
The architecture presented in this chapter enables transparent use of health 
information and to detect when possible misuse of information occurs. It is the 
patients right to pursue the violators for compensation or other remedies. The patient 
may seek assistance from the authorities responsible for managing the EHR to react 
to such situations. The patient may choose to ignore minor incidents which he or she 
sees are insignificant. But the patient always has the capability to inquire past 
incidents whenever a negative effect occurs which may be linked to EHR data 
misuse by health professionals. Further to this model, a medical practitioner’s trust 
level can be determined with the use of techniques such as those of Alhaqbani and 
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Fidge (2009), Salim and Dulleck et al. (2011) and Salim and Reid et al. (2011). 
Continuous misuse of information in a system as this can be reduced by introducing 
an appropriate threshold for the trust level and preventive access to individuals when 
the threshold is exceeded.  
In eHealth, accountability systems will enable the use of health information in 
a more free but controlled manner. This will allow health professionals to access 
relevant information at any point without the restrictions currently present in eHealth 
solutions. We believe that the presence of the IAF will increase the confidence level 
of the patients towards eHealth systems and would result in eHealth systems being 
better adopted. Barriers still exist in our venture towards building a working system 
with the capabilities introduced. Building a comprehensive EHR system is not our 
goal. Our goal is to show that with IA capabilities the current state of eHealth 
systems can be improved to a more open and trusted healthcare oriented state from a 
security and privacy oriented state. 
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Chapter 7: The IAF in the Australian 
eHealth System: A Case Study 
 
In this chapter, we present a case study of the IAF within the Australian 
eHealth system to show how each component of the presented IAF would fit within 
the constraints of the existing eHealth infrastructure. This chapter will serve as a 
proof of the applicability of the IAF within an existing eHealth system. The case 
study was carried out by focussing on the infrastructure, access policies, nature of the 
data, legislation, data flow, and cost (financial, labour, time) of implementation. The 
main focus of this chapter is towards the legal issues related to Accountable-eHealth 
systems in Australia. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION  
Australia’s healthcare system is under considerable reform with the 
introduction of eHealth, an ICT enabled approach to providing safe, reliable and 
efficient healthcare for all Australians (EHealth, 2012). eHealth aims to centralise all 
health information from general practices, hospitals and specialist clinics across 
Australia and provide patients with a single Personally Controlled Electronic Health 
Record (PCEHR). It is accepted that the move from fragmented local medical 
records to centralised electronic health records will reduce costs and result in safer 
healthcare; however there are concerns over how this sensitive information can be 
properly managed to ensure patient privacy without hindering healthcare providers in 
administering time-critical care.  
eHealth currently relies on preventive security measures such as access 
controls to provide information security. While this purely preventative approach 
may be appropriate in the business setting, it is accepted that such an approach is 
inadequate in the health setting as it can restrict healthcare providers from accessing 
information necessary for administering high-quality medical care (Feigenbaum, et 
al., 2012; Kagal & Abelson, 2010). In the previous chapters we presented and 
validated an after-the-fact Information Accountability Framework (IAF) that holds 
healthcare providers accountable for all uses of a patient’s sensitive health 
information. By tracking all information transactions and automatically checking 
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those transactions against the relevant privacy policies, the IAF will deter breaches 
with penalties instead of trying to prevent all possible breaches with pre-emptive 
access controls. This approach is similar to law enforcement in the offline world 
(Feigenbaum, 2010) and is likely to achieve a much better balance between the need 
for information privacy and the need for information access. 
There are significant benefits to be gained from the implementation of eHealth; 
the Australian Government could save not only $7.6 billion in healthcare costs by 
2020, but also 5000 deaths, two million primary care and outpatient visits, 500,000 
emergency department visits and 310,000 hospital visits each year (Peiris, 2012). 
While these benefits are well recognised, without participation in masse by 
Australian consumers and healthcare providers alike, who have been reluctant to 
involve themselves to date due to privacy and information access concerns, they will 
not be realised. It is thus imperative that adequate information security measures are 
implemented that increase stakeholder trust and confidence, encourage greater 
participation in the system and allow the Australian Government to fully capitalise 
on the financial benefits that eHealth has to offer. 
This case study will investigate the current state of eHealth in Australia and 
critically analyse the PCEHR system to ascertain how effective current information 
security measures are at balancing the need for information privacy of consumers 
with the need for information access of healthcare professionals. Details of the IAF, 
its underlying concepts and its ability to rectify the downfalls of the current eHealth 
system will be discussed and an argument will be put forward as to why the IAF 
should be implemented.  Finally, an explanation of how the IAF can be integrated 
with existing infrastructure and health information laws will be given.   
7.2 eHEALTH IN AUSTRALIA 
7.2.1 History 
Australian eHealth emerged in the 1990s as a way of overcoming the ‘tyranny 
of distance’ for isolated health consumers and professionals (Jolly, 2011). Originally 
termed Telehealth, the concept aimed to alleviate some of the problems of remote 
and rural Australians in accessing medical care, through forms of technology such as 
facsimiles, videos and medical images (Lonie & Lyle, 1993).  However it also 
promised many other benefits, such as: 
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Easing overall pressures within the health system, in particular rapidly 
escalating health costs; 
• Keeping an ageing population out of institutions; 
• Addressing some of the health inequity experienced by specific groups; 
• Affording more flexibility in the delivery of services; 
• Reducing unnecessary duplication of services, waiting times for patients 
and medical errors (Jolly, 2011). 
Political parties were enthusiastic about the potential benefits for Australia’s 
healthcare system, but from the very outset there were problems that threatened to 
derail the concept. In 1997 the Standing Committee on Family and Community 
Affairs (SCFCA) released a report, Health on line, which listed many substantial 
barriers in the development of a national eHealth system; privacy, support from the 
medical profession and national coordination were among the most prominent 
dilemmas. Politicians soon realised that the development and introduction of 
successful eHealth policies was a complex process (Jolly, 2011) that required a 
paradigm shift in medical systems and the attitudes of all participants. 
Despite these challenges, the Australian Government continued to further the 
eHealth cause and established the National Health Information Management 
Advisory Council (NHIMAC) in 1999. NHIMAC was given a number of interrelated 
tasks intended to address barriers to eHealth identified in the SCFCA Health on line 
report (Jolly, 2011). One branch of NHIMAC, the National Electronic Health 
Records Taskforce, was tasked with evaluating the benefits and difficulties with 
adopting national electronic health records and proposing a plan for their 
introduction (Jolly, 2011). In 2000 the taskforce proposed the HealthConnect project.  
The Better Medication Management System (BMMS) was one part of the 
HealthConnect project that was trialled in 2001, 2002, 2003 and 2005 with limited 
success. It was found that policies were needed to encourage consumer and provider 
participation. Privacy issues also needed to be addressed; it was thought that the most 
popular consent model for consumers and providers was that providers assume 
consent unless otherwise notified (Jolly, 2011). Despite the findings of the BMMS 
trials and SCFCA Health on line report, many of the issues have still to be resolved. 
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In 2004, the Howard Government formed the National EHealth Transition 
Authority (NEHTA) to advance the eHealth agenda through the development of 
standards, clinical terminologies and patient and provider identifiers (Jolly, 2011, 
p24). Despite making progress in the collaboration of states and territories and 
raising awareness of eHealth on a national level, NEHTA was criticised for its ‘cycle 
of criticism, defensiveness and isolation’ (Boston Consulting Group, 2007).  In 
Boston Consulting Group’s (BCG) view: 
Where engagement did occur, it appears often to have been one way, with 
little acknowledgement of stakeholder requirements or suggestions, and little 
patience with their lack of pre-existing understanding. Two thirds of 
stakeholders said that NEHTA did not acknowledge or respond to their 
feedback when they had engaged (Boston Consulting Group, 2007).  
Similarly:  
Two thirds of external stakeholders complained that NEHTA was not 
transparent enough. NEHTA has also delayed seeking important feedback 
from users until relatively late in the process, potentially missing out on 
practical advice on how to make solutions work in local contexts, or over-
engineering aspects of them beyond what was required (Boston Consulting 
Group, 2007). 
Criticisms of this nature have continued to surface. There have been 
suggestions that NEHTA should have been replaced by a more inclusive and 
powerful body that may have been better able to support eHealth initiatives, target 
investment funding, help identify solutions and coordination opportunities and 
encourage adoption of, and compliance with eHealth strategies (Deloitte, 2008).  
Despite its criticisms, when the Howard Government left office in 2007, NEHTA 
had laid the foundations on which the future of eHealth would be developed (Jolly, 
2011). 
Success elsewhere 
Implementing a national eHealth system is an extremely complex and delicate 
task, requiring collaboration between all states and territories and the integration of 
localised hospital, general practice and specialist clinic infrastructure and software 
services.  NEHTA CEO has likened the task to putting man on the moon; but it is 
achievable (Jolly, 2011). Around the world, numerous countries have attempted to 
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implement electronic health systems with varying degrees of success; Denmark is 
widely considered to be the shining example in this regard. 
Denmark’s national eHealth system is the result of four individual strategies 
implemented since 1996 that each aimed to provide value to patients and providers in 
the healthcare sector. Importantly, these strategies built on each other (Jolly, 2011).  
Sundhed.dk, the national eHealth portal launched in 2005, provides a single access 
point for consumers to book appointments with medical practitioners, order 
medications and renew prescriptions, review medication records, access health data 
and communicate with healthcare authorities. Healthcare providers can also use the 
portal to communicate about specific patients, access excerpts of records from 
hospitals and view other information such as laboratory results and data from 
electronic patient records (Jolly, 2011). Another initiative, MedCom, has allowed for 
a single form of communication between primary care physicians across 5000 health 
institutions and 50 vendor systems (Jolly, 2011). Denmark’s national eHealth system 
is an undeniable success, with 98% of all primary care practices using these systems 
to make full use of the clinical functionality of electronic medical records (Jolly, 
2011). 
Australia’s approach to a national eHealth system is not dissimilar to that of 
Denmark, with both systems revolving around a centralised health information 
network with a single point of access for consumers and healthcare professionals 
(Jolly, 2011). There are however some important differences between Denmark’s 
system and Australia’s. A number of laws are in place in the Danish system to 
protect patients’ rights and patients are able to prevent the gathering or 
communication of their health information for use in their treatment. Denmark also 
has a much smaller, tech-savvy population of 5 million citizens compared with 
Australia’s 22 million, and is geographically more condensed which has lessened 
interoperability challenges. The Danish medical profession has been engaged when 
determining the content of electronic health records and setting standards for data, 
and training has been provided to assist healthcare providers in the adoption process.   
Perhaps the most important difference though is the high level of trust that 
Danes place in the federal government to firstly maintain a purely public health 
sector, and secondly to implement a national eHealth system within that sector (Jolly, 
2011). This trust and confidence in governmental strategies which appears to have 
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underpinned the success of the Danish system is sorely lacking in Australia (Jolly, 
2011) and must be addressed if Australia’s eHealth system is to be a comparable 
success. 
7.2.2 Current State 
Australia’s health care system is comprised of a complex mix of public and 
private care providers, funded through a combination of payments by the Australian, 
State and Territory Governments, private health insurance and consumers (Deloitte, 
2008). Healthcare is one of Australia’s largest and most complex industry sectors.  In 
2006, around 750,000 people were employed in the health services industry, 
including 39,000 general practitioners, 16,300 pharmacists and 12,700 dentists 
(Deloitte, 2008). As Australia’s healthcare sector has grown, states and territories 
have been burdened with ever increasing healthcare costs. In the 1990’s, the 
Australian Government looked at ways in which skyrocketing health expenditure 
could be reduced without lowering the quality of medical services; eHealth was 
identified as a viable solution and the concept was established. 
The Australian Government has since implemented numerous pilot trials and 
implementation strategies that have been aimed at furthering the eHealth cause, using 
ICT enabled technologies to deliver safe, reliable and efficient healthcare for all 
Australians (EHealth, 2012).  The National EHealth Transition Authority (NEHTA) 
was established in 2005 to coordinate these efforts on a national level (Deloitte, 
2008). NEHTA has received a total of $366.2 million in federal government funding 
allocations to develop eHealth standards, clinical terminologies and patient and 
provider identifiers. This funding has been used to implement the Unique Health 
Identifier (UHI) service, National Authentication Service for Health (NASH), and 
the Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system.   
Australia’s eHealth strategy is currently being deployed in all states and 
territories, with each state and territory at different stages in the transition process.  
NEHTA is overseeing this transition and despite increased levels of eHealth activity 
at the national, state and territory levels, ranging from infrastructural initiatives to 
clinical information system initiatives, Australia has not been able to keep pace with 
developments overseas (Deloitte, 2008). Interoperability issues have caused 
significant delays as variations in legislation, medical systems, infrastructure, and 
social norms have had to be resolved at the local level in each jurisdiction.  NEHTA 
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has successfully launched the PCEHR system, one of the more important 
components of eHealth, with consumers able to apply for their own record from July 
1, 2012. Adoption of the PCEHR system has however been slow from consumers 
and healthcare providers alike - it is yet to be seen whether or not participation 
figures can be increased to a level that delivers the benefits initially promised. 
It could be argued that although eHealth has been on the political agenda for 
close to two decades, the barriers initially identified are still in place today. For 
instance, in 1997 the Standing Committee on Family and Community Affairs 
concluded that the protection of patient privacy would not be affected by the 
introduction of electronic health records; consumer and privacy groups disagreed at 
the time (Jolly, 2011). In the PCEHR Concept of Operations consultation process, 
submissions relating to security and privacy made up almost a quarter of all those 
received (Jolly, 2011). Similarly, Newspoll research indicates that 41% of consumers 
are not confident that their personal details will remain confidential under the 
PCEHR system (Cresswell, 2012). Despite the Government’s assurances that privacy 
protections and appropriate security measures are critical aspects of the PCEHR 
system and that a combination of technical, policy, governance and legislative 
safeguards will be in place to facilitate legitimate information access, these privacy 
concerns have yet to be resolved to consumers’ full satisfaction (Jolly, 2011). 
Australia’s eHealth system has come a long way since its conception in the 
1990’s, but it remains a work in progress. Some of the more important aspects of 
eHealth such as the UHI service, NASH and PCEHR system have been 
implemented, but lack the full range of functionality initially promised. They also 
appear to have been developed without stakeholder engagement; as such, support for 
eHealth is lacking and participation rates remain dismal. Facets of eHealth are 
reaching a degree of maturity within their development, but without positive 
direction these ventures will not produce the improvements in healthcare that could 
be possible (Curtis, 2007). 
7.2.3 Privacy vs. Information Access 
In previous chapters a discussion on information privacy and information 
requirements in the eHealth domain was presented. Here we will restate some of the 
issues discussed that are relevant to the IAF. 
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Information Privacy 
Privacy is a fundamental principle underpinning quality healthcare in Australia 
(Office of the Australian Privacy Commissioner, 2005). Privacy is one aspect of 
confidentiality (Holloway, 2004) that provides that information collected, used and 
stored should only be used for the purpose for which it was collected; it differs to 
confidentiality in that it is assumed that the subject of that information has provided 
it voluntarily (Whitman & Mattord, 2010). Privacy is about giving users control over 
how their information is managed. In the medical setting, this refers to the obligation 
by healthcare providers not to disclose personal information given by the patient or 
resulting from examination of the patient, to any other person or organisation without 
first obtaining consent (Holloway, 2004).   
Privacy in health information systems is particularly important given the 
sensitivity of health information and its deeply personal nature (Office of the 
Australian Privacy Commissioner, 2005). Electronic health records contain sensitive 
personal information about a patient’s sexual and mental health, addictions, abortions 
and an array of other diseases and illnesses that may cause embarrassment, 
discomfort, social isolation and effect self esteem if unlawfully disclosed.  
Depending on the circumstances, disclosure of this information may also affect a 
patient’s employability or be used against them in family law matters or insurance 
claims (Cannoy & Salam, 2010; Pratt, et al., 2006a). 
During the PCEHR system’s public consultation and feedback process, privacy 
was one of the top two concerns raised by Australian consumers (Australian 
Government Department of Health and Ageing, 2011). It was found that without 
proper mechanisms in place to ensure that personal information remains confidential, 
consumers are reluctant to involve themselves in electronic health systems and may 
avoid treatment altogether, putting their lives or the lives of others at risk.  Effective 
privacy measures are a key part of any successful electronic information system but 
are particularly important in health information systems that manage sensitive 
personal information. For eHealth to encourage widespread consumer participation 
(Jolly, 2011), more effective privacy measures must be put in place for the 
collection, storage or use of patient information. 
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Information Access 
Information access in the health setting is of utmost importance, as it enables 
healthcare providers to make fully informed medical decisions required to correctly 
diagnose, treat and manage patients (Gajanayake, Iannella, & Sahama, 2012). Given 
the time-critical nature of healthcare, it is crucial that health information systems 
provide access to this information in a timely manner. 
Information access falls under Pfleeger’s (2003) third pillar of security, 
availability, which is concerned with ensuring that information is available to 
authorised users when they need it. Electronic information systems are often 
considered a double edged sword in this regard; whilst technologically capable of 
providing access to disparate pieces of information in a time-efficient manner, they 
can also be the source of unnecessary delays when the underlying security policies 
do not accurately reflect the goals and requirements of system users. Security 
policies must balance the needs of all users whilst taking into consideration the 
context in which the system operates if an appropriate level of information access is 
to be achieved. 
Information access in the health setting refers to a healthcare providers ability 
to access all parts of a patient’s complete, accurate and up-to-date health record, 
necessary for the given treatment scenario. Timely-access to this information in the 
medical environment is crucial due to the time-critical nature of healthcare and the 
grave consequences that delays can have on patient safety (P. A. Williams, 2007). 
This is particularly true of treatment scenarios where the patient is unable to provide 
information themselves due to injury, illness or lack of consciousness (Lehnbom, 
McLachlan, & Jo-anne, 2012). Without timely-access to complete patient records, 
healthcare providers are faced with a challenge not dissimilar to completing a jigsaw 
puzzle with half the pieces missing; it becomes an impossible task unless the quality 
is reduced. 
Electronic information systems used in the health environment must ensure that 
information security measures assist rather than hinder healthcare providers in 
accessing complete patient records in a time-efficient manner. If appropriate security 
measures are not employed, the functionality and potential benefits of these systems 
will be severely limited and healthcare providers will be unable to provide the high-
quality medical care that patients require. 
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7.2.4 Finding a Balance  
All information accountability systems must balance the need for privacy with 
the need for information, taking into consideration user goals and requirements that 
are specific to the context in which the system must operate as discussed in chapter 
two. Within the health context, these user goals and requirements are as complex as 
the consequences for failing to find the correct balance are severe. Inadequate levels 
of information privacy can result in the unauthorised disclosure of patients’ sensitive 
health information, while inadequate levels of information access can result in delays 
in treatment that put patient lives at risk. 
Health information is perhaps the most intimate, personal, and sensitive of any 
information maintained about an individual (Gostin, 1995). Patients expect 
information gathered about them during episodes of medical care will remain 
confidential and only be used for the purposes for which it was originally collected. 
The primary concern of medical practices however is the welfare and treatment of 
patients, not the security of personal information (P. A. Williams, 2007). As such, 
healthcare providers need to be guaranteed that they will have timely-access to 
complete health records, necessary in making fully informed medical decisions as to 
the diagnosis, treatment and management of patients.   
Information privacy and information access are competing concerns; an 
increase in one invariably results in a reduction in the other. For most information 
systems, the balance between these concerns is not critical. In the health setting 
however, there is no room for error as the functionality of these systems depends on 
the support and participation of consumers and healthcare providers alike. System 
developers must properly capture the intentions of users so that appropriate usage 
policies can be defined for data objects that accurately reflect user’s strategic goals 
(Bresciani, et al., 2004). Failure to engage specialist healthcare knowledge in this 
development process is likely result in an inadequate balance between the need for 
privacy and the need for information that will severely limit the functionality and 
effectiveness of any resultant electronic health information systems. 
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7.3 PCEHR SYSTEM  
7.3.1 Overview  
Australia’s eHealth system aims to provide safe, reliable and efficient 
healthcare for all Australians (EHealth, 2012); the Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Record (PCEHR) system is a key component of the national eHealth strategy 
that provides patients with a single, electronic health record (EHR) that summarises 
the detailed information contained in local electronic medical records (EMR). The 
PCEHR system gives a degree of personal control to patients by allowing them to set 
access controls to determine which healthcare providers have access to which parts 
of their health record (Foo, 2012). Authorised healthcare providers are able to access 
patient records from anywhere in Australia, and over time patients will be able to 
contribute their own information to append the PCEHR health summaries (National 
E-Health Transition Authority, 2012). The Australian Government initially allocated 
$466.7 million to developing the PCEHR system but this figure has since blown out 
to $760 million (Dearne, 2012a). Despite the money invested in the PCEHR system 
to-date, it has failed to achieve widespread adoption. 
The Australian PCEHR system is an opt-in system. From July 1, 2012, 
consumers have been able to apply for their own electronic health record online, by 
calling a toll free number, submitting an application in writing or at their nearest 
Medicare branch. In its first week of operation, only 803 consumers signed up to the 
PCEHR system (McDonald, 2012) – at this rate it will take over 540 years to register 
Australia’s current population of 22.6 million. There are many reasons for this slow 
rate of adoption, but for the purposes of this discussion it is sufficient to look at the 
components of the PCEHR system that have failed to engender trust and confidence 
in stakeholders. Detailed discussions of the pre and post views on the PCEHR system 
are given next. 
Pre-launch views on PCEHR 
There was much hype prior to the release of the PCEHR in July 2012 by 
commentators concerned that such a central, personally controlled record of sensitive 
health information was an accident waiting to happen and a honey pot for malicious 
intent. Most of the concerns were related to patient safety that may be unduly 
affected by incomplete or inaccurate records, however fears also extended to privacy 
and cyber-attacks by information thieves. Chair of the AMA (WA) Council of 
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General Practice supported the PCEHR, provided they were implemented correctly 
and took into account feedback from health and information management 
professionals. However he raised concern over the PCEHR access controls, stating: 
“Where many will get uncomfortable is the ‘access’ restrictions set by 
consumers, which don’t pass the safety, common sense or inclusiveness test. 
I fear that individuals could limit access wherever they like.” (Wilson, 2011) 
Negative view about the lack of feedback being taken onboard during the 
development process have been expressed (Dearne, 2012b): 
"All over the world, large-scale health IT projects have been plagued with 
major delays, cost overruns and a failure to deliver much in the way of 
improved clinical outcomes... It is disappointing that politicians have chosen 
to ignore the concerns of people with specific expertise in health IT and have 
not made substantial adjustments and corrections in response to that clear 
advice." 
It should be noted that such negative press has been common in the pre-launch 
stage of other large electronic information systems worldwide, with many of the 
concerns later being found to be irrational as pointed out below. 
 “There are International and Australian precedents for this initiative and the 
absurdities and initial paranoia have rationalised into what has become a 
good EHR, but none on such a scale.”(Dearne, 2012b) 
Current views on PCEHR 
There are two main stakeholders that are likely to be affected by the launch of 
the PCEHR system; consumers (patients) and healthcare providers (organisations and 
professionals). While there was much speculation about how the PCEHR would 
work prior to their launch on July 1st 2012, since their launch only a small number of 
reviews as to their success have been published. This may be due to the fact that 
many of the fears were unwarranted, or because it is too close to the launch date for a 
sufficient analysis to have been made. 
It is generally assumed that increasing patients’ ability to view and share their 
medical histories will result in reductions in treatment and medication errors, and 
improved healthcare (Mandl, Simons, Crawford, & Abbett, 2007). However 
preliminary results of studies on overseas PCEHR systems, such is Indivo, reveal 
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that there is poor knowledge and understanding about the PCEHR among consumers 
that is likely to restrict uptake en masse (Lehnbom, et al., 2012).   
Some of the perceived benefits of the PCHER identified by Lehnbom et al. 
(2012) in their study, include safer healthcare brought about by a more holistic 
approach, timely access to information, savings in time and costs, and easy access to 
information when attending to unconscious people or people with dementia. One 
doctor, identified only as ‘Doctor 9’ in the study, was quoted as saying: 
“Well the benefit is that the particular health professional that the patient is 
attending has a full picture of what the current situation is, whether it’s with 
medications, whether it’s with investigations, whether it’s with diagnosis, so 
that a holistic approach can be made with patient management” (Lehnbom, 
et al., 2012) 
While this may be true of the Indivo system, Australia’s PCEHR system only 
gives Health and Event Summaries. This limits the usefulness of the health records 
as detailed raw data, necessary for doctors to make an educated and informed 
decision, is still stored in local medical records. An Assistant in Nursing at the Prince 
Charles Hospital, stated: 
“Even nurses rely on accurate and complete patient data – how can you get 
that sort of detail from a health summary?” 
A number of concerns about PCEHRs were related to privacy, not being a 
complete health record, not wanting every healthcare provider to know everything 
and a perception that maintaining PCEHRs would be time consuming (Lehnbom, et 
al., 2012). 
There are some noticeable differences in opinion between participants of the 
Lehnbom et al (2012) study with regards the benefits and concerns of PCEHRs. For 
instance some regarded the holistic approach as a benefit, while others considered 
not having a complete health record a concern. Similarly, some participants believed 
PCEHRs would provide timely access to information and thus save time, while 
others believed maintaining those records would be time consuming. This reiterates 
the point that there is a general lack of understanding and knowledge about PCEHRs 
among healthcare providers and consumers. 
 230 Chapter 7: The IAF in the Australian eHealth System: A Case Study 
In another study by Weitzman et al (2009), similar results were obtained with 
participants demonstrating low levels of awareness about Personally Controlled 
Health Records (PCHR). Participants also appeared to overestimate the extent to 
which personal health information is available and flowing electronically within 
provider systems, with many assuming that such information flow already occurs. 
With regards the privacy of PCHRs, it was found that a moderate level of 
concern about privacy existed with many participants feeling that some privacy 
issues were unavoidable. Several specific threats to privacy were identified 
including: 
• Intentional identity theft; 
• Disclosure and misuse of information by insurance companies; 
• Accidental mix-up of records and their contents; 
• Mismatch of medical records data with personal health records; 
• Misuse and inappropriate viewing, including attempts by healthcare 
professionals to “snoop” on former patients or co-workers. (Weitzman, et 
al., 2009) 
These perceived risks were offset by an understanding that privacy is also 
risked in paper information, and risks were discounted by the high value placed on 
ready access to health information. 
Consumers expressed a high amount of interest in the concept of greater access 
and control of their health information, however many viewed such autonomy as a 
double-edged sword. Discomfort among some users about patient annotation was 
echoed by healthcare providers and service administrators who viewed such control 
as a concern in terms of quality of care, completeness of records, and risks for 
liability (Weitzman, et al., 2009) given the potentially serious impact of errors in the 
healthcare setting (P. A. Williams, 2007). It was noted that if the PCEHR was to 
become the sole health record, these problems may be resolved. 
Healthcare providers were uncertain about responsibility for clarifying the 
meaning and contents of records and concerned about time requirements to address 
patient questions. While observed levels of problems were lower than anticipated, 
they were exacerbated by gaps in health and technological literacy. Providers were 
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not always well positioned or resourced to respond to consumers’ questions and 
older persons in particular encountered technical barriers around system access. The 
large divide between lay and technical vocabularies also caused anxiety and dismay 
among users who saw unfamiliar or frightening content in records (Weitzman, et al., 
2009). 
Technological literacy also appears to be an issue with the maintenance of 
electronic health records by some healthcare providers. Karen Lohrey, a Head Nurse 
at Prince Charles Hospital stated: 
“eHealth is supposed to be good, but where I work it hasn’t really filtered 
down to the floor staff.  Many of the nurses are aged and lack computer 
literacy too, so they can’t interact with what’s there anyway.  It’s left to staff 
higher up to keep the electronic records up-to-date.” (Weitzman, et al., 2009) 
It is evident from these studies that a lack of understanding and knowledge 
about PCEHRs, together with privacy risks and the potential for incomplete or 
inaccurate records to adversely affect the health of consumers, is likely to limit the 
adoption of PCEHRs in Australia if the current system is not improved. 
7.3.2 Components 
Preventative Approach 
Australia’s PCEHR system utilises a preventative approach to information 
security that aims to ensure the privacy of patient’s sensitive health information by 
imposing rigid access controls that prevent users from accessing information that 
they are not authorised to access. Although access controls provide an adequate level 
of information privacy in the business setting, it is accepted that these preventative 
measures are inadequate in the health setting (Feigenbaum, et al., 2012; Kagal & 
Abelson, 2010).    
Preventative approaches that make use of rigid access controls work well in the 
business setting where the scenarios that may give rise to privacy breaches are 
predictable.  Preventative measures are not suitable in the health setting however as 
the complexities of the health environment are dynamic and un-predictable; 
restricting healthcare providers from accessing complete patient records denies them 
the ability to make fully informed medical decisions that in turn results in reduced 
medical outcomes for patients (Jolly, 2011).   
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These preventative measures have failed to engender trust and confidence in 
stakeholders to date. Consumers feel burdened with the task of setting their own 
access controls and checking their own audit logs in order to ensure the 
confidentiality of their sensitive health information (Australian Healthcare and 
Hospitals Association, 2012). Healthcare providers are concerned that the degree of 
personal control given to patients will result in inaccurate and incomplete health 
records (Gostin, 1995). It seems unlikely that an increase in stakeholder support will 
occur while these preventative measures remain in force. 
Rigid Access Controls 
Rigid access controls are the main technological measure used to enforce the 
PCEHR system’s preventative approach to information security. NEHTA has 
identified several types of roles with different capabilities in the PCEHR system; 
individuals, nominated representatives, authorised representatives, providers and 
nominated providers (National E-Health Transition Authority, 2012). These roles are 
used to define access controls that aim to prevent unauthorised access to patient 
information by healthcare providers. While successful in the business setting, the use 
of these access controls in the health setting has caused concern for consumers and 
healthcare providers alike, and contributed to the slow adoption rate of the PCEHR 
system.  
Access controls give patients control over which healthcare providers can 
access which parts of their health record. There has been much concern expressed by 
the medical profession over the level of control given to patients in editing what 
information is included and what information is left out of their health summaries 
(Gostin, 1995), as a patient’s health record must be complete and readily accessible 
for it to be useful to healthcare providers. Consumers should be encouraged to 
openly share their health information with healthcare providers. Unfortunately, 
privacy concerns and a lack of consumer trust remain distinct obstacles in the uptake 
of this approach. 
While it is true that a ‘break the glass’ mechanism is in place in the current 
PCHER system that allows healthcare providers to override access controls in 
emergency situations, it is feared that this mechanism will only be used as a last 
resort. As such, situations that would benefit from access to complete patient health 
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records, but do not require it, are likely to result in reduced quality medical outcomes 
for patients.   
Concern has also been expressed by consumers who fear that the access 
controls they implement will not adequately protect their sensitive health information 
(Australian Healthcare and Hospitals Association, 2012). Setting pre-emptive 
restrictions on what information can and cannot be accessed by healthcare providers 
requires specialist medical knowledge that most consumers do not possess. When 
consumers feel burdened with protecting their sensitive health information, or do not 
trust the technological measures utilised, they have a tendency to set strict access 
controls. This in turn denies healthcare providers timely-access to complete health 
records, vital when dealing with life-threatening medical situations.   
Another problem with relying on rigid access controls is that information 
transactions may be authorised semantically, but not logically. For instance a general 
practitioner (GP) may be authorised to access a patient’s sexual health history, but if 
the GP accesses this information in a period when the patient did not consult a doctor 
or need medical treatment, then it is likely to be an inappropriate use of information. 
Relying on purely preventative access controls and thus not implementing adequate 
after-the-fact measures, such as interactive audit logs and notifications for breach, 
means that inappropriate uses of this nature are not prevented by the system and are 
only detected if consumers are vigilante in protecting their sensitive health 
information. 
Inactive Audit Logs 
At present, all information transactions are recorded in the PCEHR system’s 
audit logs that can be viewed by consumers via the health record portal. These logs 
record basic information such as the date, time, type of interaction and the IHI of the 
healthcare organisation, but not the individual professional responsible which is 
likely to make identification of inappropriate uses difficult for consumers 
(Consumers Health Forum of Australia, 2011). The biggest letdown however is that 
these audit logs are inactive; there is not automatic checking of these logs, no 
notifications for breaches, and consumers are unable to interact with these logs to 
view further details or query a particular transaction.   
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As discussed earlier, a particular information transaction may be authorised 
semantically but not logically. Inactive audit logs require consumers to be vigilante 
in protecting their sensitive health information, by manually checking their audit trail 
on a regular basis to detect any inappropriate uses not detected by the system. This 
requires consumers to firstly remember and then find the time to check their audit 
logs, and secondly, it requires them to be able to interpret the information contained 
in these transactions. Furthermore, if they wish to query a particular transaction they 
must lodge a formal complaint with the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC).   
While it is true that repeated use of the ‘break the glass’ mechanism is 
automatically monitored by the current PCEHR system, this is just one form of 
inappropriate use. Consumers should not be burdened with protecting their sensitive 
health information. Audit logs should be automatically checked, notifications 
provided for potential breaches and consumers should be able to interact with those 
audit logs to query such breaches. Inactive audit logs of the current PCEHR system 
do not provide any of this functionality and thus further discourage widespread 
adoption of eHealth in Australia. 
7.4 INFORMATION ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK 
7.4.1 Overview 
Australia is currently in the process of implementing eHealth, an ICT enabled 
approach to providing safe, reliable and efficient healthcare for all Australians 
(EHealth, 2012). The potential benefits of eHealth are significant (Peiris, 2012), but 
without participation on masse from consumers and healthcare providers alike they 
will not be realised. It is thus imperative that a new approach to information security 
is implemented that increases stakeholder trust and confidence, encourages greater 
participation in the system and allows the Australian Government to fully capitalise 
on the financial benefits that eHealth has to offer. 
The Information Accountability Framework (IAF) aims to alleviate the 
concerns of stakeholders by rectifying the information security downfalls of the 
current system. The IAF is an after-the-fact approach to information security that will 
make all uses of a patient’s health information transparent, holding healthcare 
providers accountable for any inappropriate uses by tracking and automatically 
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checking all transactions against context-aware privacy policies. Potential violators 
will be deterred with the threat of penalties for misuse so rigid access controls will no 
longer be required. Instead, demarcation lines will be used that warn healthcare 
providers when they are about to access information that they are not authorised to 
access but allow them to proceed if they feel that their actions are justifiable. When 
potential breaches occur, notifications will be automatically sent to consumers that 
direct them to the transaction in question and allow them to view further details or 
resolve the issue using the query/response justification mechanism. 
Principles of information accountability underpin the IAF. Information 
accountability is a fairly new concept to computer science that focuses on the way 
users participate in a given system and the policies associated with the data elements 
they use. Accountability begins where responsibility ends, extending beyond 
identification and allowing actions to be tied to consequences and violations to be 
tied to penalties (Feigenbaum, et al., 2012). The main goal of accountability systems 
is to be non-restrictive; they aim to provide information to legitimate users without 
rigid access restrictions while at the same time imposing penalties for misuse.   
The IAF’s after-the-fact approach will alleviate the concerns of consumers and 
healthcare providers alike, by providing an adequate level of information privacy 
without restricting healthcare providers in delivering high-quality, time-critical 
medical care. Eliminating the need for rigid access controls will give healthcare 
providers timely-access to complete health records, while the active audit logs and 
notifications for breach remove the burden currently imposed on consumers in 
ensuring the confidentiality of their sensitive health information. Both stakeholders 
are also likely to seek comfort from the parallels that can be drawn between the IAF 
and law enforcement in the offline world (Feigenbaum, 2010). By achieving a better 
balance between the need for information privacy and the need for information 
access, the IAF is likely to achieve support from consumers and healthcare providers 
alike, thus increasing participation levels and encouraging widespread adoption of 
the eHealth system. 
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7.4.2 Components 
After-the-Fact Approach 
Health information is perhaps the most intimate, personal, and sensitive of any 
information maintained about an individual (Gostin, 1995). Traditional approaches to 
information security have aimed to prevent this sensitive information from escaping 
beyond appropriate boundaries, with minimal measures in place to deal with 
breaches when they occur (Weitzner, et al., 2008). As the nation’s healthcare system 
grows in size, scope, and integration, the susceptibility of health information to 
disclosure will also increase (Gostin, 1995). As such, information security measures 
must be implemented that aim to both prevent breaches and deal with them when 
they do occur. After-the-fact approaches use the principles of transparency and 
accountability to do just this. 
Transparency provides that all relevant users must be able to observe how 
information is used and by whom. In the health context, this means that all uses of a 
patient’s information by healthcare providers are visible to the required entities and 
can be traced back to an individual organisation or professional. Making information 
transactions transparent eliminates the need for strict pre-emptive access controls, as 
users are given an incentive to abide by the policies put in place, knowing that all 
transactions will be automatically checked for policy compliance (Weitzner, et al., 
2008). Accountability extends beyond identification and exposure and allows actions 
to be tied to consequences and violations to be tied to penalties (Feigenbaum, et al., 
2012).  In the health setting, this means that all information transactions are tracked, 
checked against context-aware privacy policies and then traced back to individual 
healthcare providers who can then be held accountable for any misuse (Weitzner, et 
al., 2008).   
The IAF alleviates the concerns of consumers by tracking all information 
transactions, automatically checking them for conformance with context-aware 
privacy policies, and imposing penalties on healthcare providers for proven cases of 
misuse; these measures ensure patient privacy. The IAF also alleviates the concerns 
of healthcare providers by removing the rigidity usually associated with access 
controls that often prevents timely-access to complete patient records necessary for 
making fully-informed medical decisions; these measures ensure timely and 
complete access to patient information. It can therefore be seen that the two 
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competing stakeholder concerns that have caused so much frustration in the 
formation of eHealth policies to date, are appropriately balanced by the IAF’s after-
the-fact approach and are thus likely to gain the support of consumers and healthcare 
providers alike.   
Demarcation Lines 
The IAF will still make use of access controls, but these access controls will 
act more as demarcation lines than rigid barriers. A trusted authority (TA) with a 
broad medical knowledge base will set blanket access controls that account for a 
multitude of different treatment scenarios. Healthcare providers will be able to access 
all parts of a patient’s health record as is deemed appropriate by the TA, but if they 
choose to use that data for any non-prescribed purposes they will be required to 
justify their actions at a later date. This approach will still hold healthcare providers 
accountable for their use of patient data, but will not get in the way of their 
performance of time-critical medical tasks. 
The primary concern of medical practices is the welfare and treatment of 
patients, not the security of personal information (P. A. Williams, 2007). Timely-
access to this information in the medical environment is crucial due to the time-
critical nature of healthcare and the grave consequences that delays can have on 
patient safety (P. A. Williams, 2007). This is particularly true of treatment scenarios 
where the patient is unable to provide information themselves due to injury, illness or 
lack of consciousness (Lehnbom, et al., 2012). Consumers will still be given a degree 
of personal control over their health record, but only to extend consent on the access 
controls put in place by the TA. Having a medically knowledgeable TA set the 
access controls will prevent problems associated with consumers implementing 
restrictive access controls without the specialist knowledge required to know what 
information is required in a given treatment scenario. 
To ensure that these demarcation lines are effective and supported by the 
medical profession, the notifications accompanying unauthorised access will be fine-
grained and give healthcare providers all the information they need to make an 
informed decision as to whether or not they should proceed. These notifications will 
also be accompanied by a non-reputable confirmation that will prevent accidental 
breaches and help provide data provenance for any subsequent legal actions.  
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Active Audit Logs 
Australia’s current eHealth system relies on preventative measures to ensure 
information privacy. As such, there are very few mechanisms in place for holding 
healthcare providers accountable for any inappropriate uses of a patient’s sensitive 
health information after-the-fact. The IAF has a number of measures that provide 
after-the-fact functionality, one of these being active audit logs. Inactive audit logs 
can be used to determine who accessed what information when and where; active 
audit logs utilised by the IAF will be able to provide the missing why.  
Under the current PCEHR system, consumers are burdened with the 
responsibility of checking their audit logs on a regular basis (Australian Healthcare 
and Hospitals Association, 2012) to identify any potentially inappropriate 
transactions that were authorised by their access controls, but were not required for 
their treatment. If they wish to query the validity of a particular transaction they must 
lodge a formal complaint with the Office of the Australian Information 
Commissioner (OAIC) outside of the system. As such, these inactive audit logs do 
not allow for user interaction which deprives consumers of a sense of control over 
how their sensitive health information is being managed. 
Conversely, the active audit logs used by the IAF will automatically check all 
transactions against context-aware privacy policies, thereby identifying potentially 
inappropriate uses automatically. Consumers will then be given the opportunity to 
view further details or query the transaction in question, and healthcare providers 
will be given the opportunity to resolve the issue promptly by responding with their 
justification. This query/response mechanism will give consumers an important sense 
of control over how their sensitive health information is being managed that is likely 
to increase their trust and confidence in the eHealth system (D.J. Solove, 2008). 
In addition to providing a time-efficient and effective query/response 
justification mechanism, active audit logs used in the IAF will provide data 
provenance. Provenance is an important aspect of information accountability systems 
that refers to the history of transactions performed on a particular data object. 
Provenance allows users to decide whether or not they trust a particular set of 
electronic data and is crucial when holding violators accountable at a later date, as it 
dictates the trustworthiness of data pertaining to a particular transaction. The IAF’s 
active audit logs will ensure data provenance, further assuring consumers that 
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healthcare providers will be held accountable for any inappropriate uses of their 
health information at a later date. 
Fine-Grained Notifications 
It is a requirement of any effective information system that users should be 
well informed. In health information systems, consumers should be notified of any 
potentially inappropriate uses of their sensitive health information, while healthcare 
providers should be informed when they are about to access data that they are not 
authorised to access along with the penalties for proceeding. Both stakeholders 
should be provided with these details by the system; fine-grained notifications fulfil 
this requirement under the IAF. 
Under the IAF, fine-grained notifications will be automatically sent to 
consumers to inform them of any potentially inappropriate uses of their health 
information. These notifications will include a detailed description of the transaction 
in question that lists the date, time, healthcare professional, data element accessed 
and the treatment scenario that the access is likely to relate to. Providing consumers 
with this detailed information will allow them to make an informed decision as to 
whether or not the transaction in question requires justification.  
Similarly, healthcare providers will be presented with notifications when they 
are about to access data that they are not authorised to access, that informs them of 
the data element they are trying to access and the penalty for proceeding.  Fine-
grained notifications of this nature will serve two purposes. It will ensure that 
healthcare providers are informed of the latest policies before an action occurs so that 
they are fully aware of the ramifications for not complying with these policies and it 
will help in facilitating non-repudiation, a significant aspect of information security.   
Query/Response Justification 
A key component of the IAF’s active audit logs is the query/response 
justification mechanism. Consumers will receive automatic fine-grained notifications 
whenever an inappropriate use is detected by the system that will direct them to the 
transaction in question and allow them to view further details or query the 
transaction. If the consumer chooses to query the transaction, the healthcare provider 
in question will be required to submit a response that justifies their use of that 
information.     
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The query/response justification mechanism is premised on the notion that 
many of the potentially inappropriate uses will in fact be justifiable by the healthcare 
provider in question. Given the dynamic and complex range of treatment scenarios 
that occur in the health setting (Weitzner, et al., 2008), access controls cannot be set 
to account for all possible scenarios. Therefore, when a transaction occurs that 
infringes on these access controls it is not necessarily conclusive as to the validity of 
the transaction. The IAF’s query/response justification mechanism will provide a 
means by which consumers and healthcare providers can resolve any potentially 
inappropriate uses in an informal way, without resorting to the time consuming and 
daunting process of lodging a formal complaint with the OAIC. Avoiding the 
involvement of the OAIC will also prevent healthcare providers from unfair 
prosecution. 
The IAF’s query/response mechanism will hold healthcare providers personally 
accountable for any inappropriate uses of a patient’s health information and will give 
patients a sense of control by allowing them to take part in this process. Consumers 
will benefit from the knowledge that healthcare providers will be held personally 
accountable for any inappropriate uses of their sensitive health information. 
Healthcare providers will benefit from the ease with which potential breaches can be 
resolved. As such, this query/response justification mechanism is likely to be 
supported by consumers and healthcare providers alike. 
7.5 JUSTIFYING THE IAF  
eHealth is a worthwhile initiative that holds great potential for Australian 
healthcare. It is capable of resolving issues associated with the tyranny of distance 
between consumers and healthcare providers, reducing costs associated with caring 
for an ageing population (Peiris, 2012), and reducing errors in the treatment of 
patients (Jolly, 2011).  eHealth initiatives have been implemented worldwide with 
varying degrees of success; Australia is at a critical point in its transition.  
Consumers are concerned about the privacy of their personal information while 
healthcare providers are concerned about the quality of information and their ability 
to access complete patient records in a timely manner. Without widespread support 
from both consumers and healthcare providers, the benefits of Australia’s eHealth 
system will not be realised and the project as a whole is likely to fail (Jolly, 2011).  
There is however a solution that alleviates the frustrations of consumers and 
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healthcare providers alike while providing transparency and accountability, key 
components of the National eHealth strategy (Deloitte, 2008); the IAF. 
Australia’s eHealth system to date has been an expensive exercise; the PCEHR 
system alone has cost taxpayers more than $760m, far higher than the initially 
allocated budget of $466.7m (Dearne, 2012a). Despite the financial support, 
participation rates have remained dismal with only 860 consumers signing up to the 
PCEHR system in its first week of operation (McDonald, 2012). Healthcare 
providers have also been reluctant to adopt the system.  If successfully implemented, 
eHealth could save the Australian Government not only $7.6 billion in healthcare 
costs, but also 5000 deaths, two million primary care and outpatient visits, 500,000 
emergency department visits and 310,000 hospital visits each year by 2020 (Peiris, 
2012). These benefits however are entirely dependent on participation on masse by 
Australian consumers and healthcare providers. 
eHealth to date has failed to achieve the participation rates necessary for 
widespread adoption. There are many issues with the current eHealth system, some 
more complex than others, but many of those issues relate to the competing interests 
of participants in the PCEHR system. Consumers are concerned about the privacy of 
their personal information while healthcare providers are concerned about the quality 
of information and their ability to access complete patient records in a timely 
manner. The preventative approach to information security employed by the current 
PCEHR system is inadequate in the health setting (Feigenbaum, et al., 2012; Kagal 
& Abelson, 2010) as it places these concerns in direct competition with one another.  
Rigid access controls effectively form a seesaw of access rights; an increase in 
information privacy invariably results in a decrease in information access, and vice 
versa. As long as a preventative approach is employed, stakeholder concerns will 
continue to compete with one another and widespread support for eHealth will not be 
achieved. 
The IAF’s after-the-fact approach to information security is capable of 
providing access to information in a time-efficient manner while still maintaining an 
adequate level of privacy. This is achieved by making all information transactions 
transparent, preventing breaches with the threat of penalties (Weitzner, et al., 2008) 
and holding healthcare providers accountable for their actions.  This approach 
eliminates the need for rigid access controls that can restrict healthcare providers’ 
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from accessing complete patient records in a timely-manner, and is thus likely to 
alleviate healthcare provider concerns relating to information access. The IAF is also 
likely to alleviate consumer concerns relating to information privacy as strong 
parallels can be drawn between after-the-fact measures and law enforcement in the 
offline world (Feigenbaum, 2010).   
Healthcare systems require both human and technical interaction and cannot be 
considered independently. Thus, increasing participation in the eHealth system will 
require a holistic approach that not only implements technological measures, but also 
educates consumers about the policies that protect their health information, and 
educates healthcare providers about the ways in which eHealth can assist them in 
accessing up-to-date, accurate and complete patient records in a timely manner. The 
IAF is a complete package; it provides a framework that includes technological 
measures such as comprehensive transaction monitoring and the query/response 
justification mechanism, but it also provides measures that aim to increase 
stakeholder trust and confidences such as active audit logs, demarcation lines and 
fine-grained notifications. These measures have been designed around the notions of 
transparency and accountability that were identified as key components of the change 
and adoption streams of the national eHealth strategy (Deloitte, 2008).   
Without significant reform, Australia’s eHealth system is unlikely to achieve 
widespread adoption and subsequently the benefits that were initially promised will 
not be realised. The IAF provides a get out of jail free card for the Australian 
Government, by rectifying the downfalls of the current system and adding 
functionality that will ensure long-term support from consumers and healthcare 
providers alike. It is imperative that the Australian Government seriously considers 
the IAF as a viable solution before the eHealth reputation becomes tarnished, and the 
project as a whole fails. 
7.6 IMPLEMENTING THE IAF 
In this section, we will present facts that support the successful implementation 
of the IAF within the existing infrastructure including legal requirements. 
7.6.1 Legal issues relating to health information management 
The developing eHealth landscape raises a number of important legal 
challenges, particularly in relation to the establishment of an effective system for 
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sharing eHealth records. The two principal areas of legal relevance are, firstly, the 
law of information privacy - especially within the realm of sensitive information 
such as health information and secondly, the appropriate governance and regulatory 
mechanisms necessary to manage, monitor and control the system established to 
provide for shared eHealth information. 
Health information has existed for many years prior to the invention of 
computers – unauthorised disclosure of health information is not a new concept, but 
the introduction of electronic health information systems has made more patient data 
available to more healthcare providers in more geographic locations. A serious 
concern for information accountability systems is a lack of formal legal foundations 
relating to health information management in Australia.  Whilst Acts like the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) do cover health service providers (OAIC, 2012a), they do not have 
national jurisdiction which is needed for the national eHealth system. Without 
adequate legislative measures relating to mandatory notifications and penalties for 
inappropriate uses of a patient’s health information, the IAF will not succeed. 
Confidentiality of medical information is an absolutely essential part of 
national healthcare reform (Gostin, 1995). Consumers that are confident that their 
sensitive health information will remain confidential are more likely to access the 
health services they need (OAIC, 2012a) without fear that their personal information 
will be used inappropriately.  As discussed earlier, confidentiality is closely linked to 
privacy. Privacy is an issue that has been present in our society for many years, 
however it is only since the late 1990s and the widespread use of the internet that it 
has become a serious issue.  Since this time, rapid advances in technology and 
electronic information sharing have outpaced advances in privacy legislation. It is 
not surprising therefore that current legislation does not adequately cater for 
information privacy.   
In Australia, different states and territories have implemented different privacy 
legislation but there is no uniform federal law that applies to all organisations in all 
states and territories. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) comes close to achieving national 
coverage, but does not bind all public health services and lacks sufficient penalties to 
deter potential violators. The ability of any health care system to function effectively 
depends in part on the accuracy, currency, completeness, and availability of health 
data (Gostin, 1995). In addition to privacy legislation, the Australian Government 
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needs to enact health information management legislation that addresses the need for 
mandatory data notifications and penalties for inappropriate uses of health 
information. Until such legislation is implemented, the development of the IAF will 
be hindered.   
Australian information privacy law 
As indicated earlier, measures relating to the protection of information privacy 
at the federal level are set forth in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) ("Privacy Act," 1988), 
which establishes a comprehensive statutory scheme based on 11 Information 
Privacy Principles (IPPs) and 10 National Privacy Principles (NPPs) which govern 
the retrieval, compilation, storage and use of personal information by federal 
government agencies and private sector organisations respectively. Under the Act, 
‘health information’ forms part of a subset of personal information defined as 
‘sensitive information’ - which is given a higher level of protection under the NPPs 
(but not the IPPs). IPP/NPP 4 contains the fundamental “Information/data security” 
obligation which requires agencies and organisations to take reasonable steps to 
secure personal information. Monitoring and compliance functions under the Act are 
undertaken by the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC). 
Measures of protection provided under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) are 
essentially limited to federal government agencies and private sector organisations. 
At the same time, various forms of statutory and non statutory measures exist at the 
State and Territory level for the protection of information privacy. This has resulted 
in a somewhat complex web of overlapping and inconsistent provisions inimical to the 
development of a comprehensive and uniform national regime of protection and 
control. 
A nationally consistent approach to information privacy and health information 
management in particular is therefore vital and to that extent, the Commonwealth 
government’s acceptance of recommendations contained in a report by the Australian 
Law Reform Commission (ALRC) For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law 
and Practice (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2008) promises to achieve this. 
Major amendments to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) are now imminent, aimed at 
achieving national consistency in information privacy protection. The principal 
change will bring the IPPs and NPPS together to create one uniform set of Australian 
Privacy Principles (APPs), ensuring in the process that additional protections exist 
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for health information (as a category of sensitive information) regardless of whether 
it is held by government agencies or private sector organisations. 
Health information is defined in the Act to include any information collected 
about a patient’s health, including notes of symptoms, diagnosis and treatments, 
specialist reports and test results, appointment and billing details, prescriptions, 
dental records, genetic information, healthcare identifiers and any other information 
about a patient’s race, sexuality or religion that is collected by healthcare providers 
(Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000, s16(6)(1)).   
Initially, the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) only applied to federal and ACT public 
organisations. However an amendment to the Act, the Privacy Amendment (Private 
Sector) Act 2000 (Cth), extended the coverage of the Privacy Act to cover all private 
health organisations throughout Australia (OAIC, 2012a). This amendment 
recognises the particularly sensitive nature of health information and places extra 
protections around its handling, including enforcement mechanisms to deal with 
breaches of the privacy standards. Government organisations must comply with the 
11 IPPs while private health organisations are expected to comply with the 10 NPPs.  
It is hoped that the Privacy Amendment (Private Sector) Act 2000 (Cth) will 
complement the existing culture of confidentiality that is fundamental to many health 
service providers' professional practice obligations (OAIC, 2012a).   
Penalties for breach of privacy legislation must be significant if they are to 
deter potential violators. The Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) does not impose penalties for 
breach of the IPP’s or NPP’s.  Disclosure of information is covered in section 80Q 
(1) but the maximum penalty is a mere 60 penalty units or 1 year imprisonment.  
This is not a sufficient deterrent and does not accurately reflect the serious 
consequences that a breach of sensitive health information can have on an 
individual’s life. New federal legislation needs to be introduced that targets health 
information specifically and imposes penalties severe enough to deter potential 
violators before they commit a wrongful act. 
More specifically in relation to eHealth, the Personally Controlled Electronic 
Health Record Act 2012 (Cth.) ("Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records 
Act 2012," 2012) contains provisions which link that legislation with the privacy 
protection measures contained in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth.). In this respect, the 
OAIC becomes the independent regulator of the privacy and personal data protection 
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issues arising in relation to the regime established for eHealth information sharing by 
the PCEHR. 
Regulation of the eHealth sharing regime 
As indicated earlier, the second area of legal relevance concerns the need to 
ensure that appropriate governance and regulatory mechanisms exist to oversee, 
monitor and manage the eHealth sharing regime. Following the development of a 
number of electronic health information systems across Australia, the National E-
Health Transition Authority (NEHTA) was established in 2005 as a joint initiative by 
the Australian, State and Territory governments. NEHTA’s charter included setting 
national standards for the electronic collection and exchange of   health information 
and encompassed the design of a system for Shared Electronic Health Records 
(SEHRs) based on the development of Unique Healthcare Identifiers (UHIs). 
ALRC Report No 108 of 2008, referred to earlier, advised that the 
establishment of a national SEHR scheme would required the development of 
sufficient oversight and regulatory controls sufficient to ensure public trust and 
confidence in the system. Reference was made earlier to the enhanced role to be 
undertaken by the OAIC in relation to privacy protection arising in relation to the 
PCEHR. In addition to this, the OAIC will have the role of receiving and inquiring 
into data breaches which arise as a result of the operation of the PCEHR which the 
relevant entities are obliged to report. At a broader level of regulation, the PCEHR 
also establishes a number of entities with specific advisory and monitoring functions, 
including the Jurisdictional Advisory Committee and the Independent Advisory 
Council. The jurisdictional advisory committee is responsible for advising the system 
operator of the PCEHR system on matters relating to the interests of the 
Commonwealth, States and Territories where as the independent advisory council 
has the function of advising the system operator on the operation of the PCEHR 
system, participation of the PCEHR system, clinical, privacy and security matters 
relating to the operation of the PCEHR system and similar matters set down by the 
regulations ("Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012," 2012).  
Mandatory Notifications 
For there to be widespread stakeholder support for the IAF, mechanisms must 
be put in place to notify healthcare providers when they are about to breach a 
particular privacy policy and to notify consumers when a potentially inappropriate 
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use of their health information has occurred. Legislation must make the 
implementation of these notifications mandatory for all interactions within the 
eHealth system. 
Healthcare providers should be warned when they are trying to access 
information that they are not authorised to access. These warnings should require a 
non-reputable confirmation such as entering login details to prevent accidental 
dismissals of the warning messages, or inappropriate uses by healthcare providers on 
another healthcare providers account. Healthcare providers should also be notified of 
the penalties for breaching each warning, so that they are fully aware of the 
ramifications if they choose to ignore the message and proceed to access the 
unauthorised data. 
Similarly, patients should be informed of any potential breaches immediately, 
even if it is likely that the healthcare provider in question will be able to sufficiently 
justify the use of that information. Notifications for breach should include specific 
details about the transaction such as the date, time, healthcare professional in 
question, data element accessed and the treatment scenario that the access is likely to 
relate to. 
The Australian Government released a set of guidelines on data breach 
notification in April 2012.  Data breach is defined on page 2 of the guide: 
“Data breach means, for the purpose of this guide, when personal 
information held by an agency or organisation is lost or subjected to 
unauthorised access, use, modification, disclosure, or other misuse.” (OAIC, 
2012a). 
These guidelines recommend that if a data breach creates a real risk of serious 
harm, then the consumer affected should be notified of the breach (OAIC, 2012a). 
Notification is regarded by the OAIC as an important mitigation strategy that has the 
potential to benefit both the organisation and the individuals affected by a data 
breach. However caution must be exercised when issuing notifications as providing 
information about low risk breaches can cause undue anxiety and de-sensitise 
individuals to future notifications (OAIC, 2012a). 
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More recently, the Australian Privacy Commissioner responded to a discussion 
paper released by the Federal Attorney General, titled Australian Privacy Breach 
Notification: 
“Privacy breach notification is an important issue that needs community 
debate, and I’m sure there will be a wide range of views expressed on 
whether this notification should be mandatory.” 
“It is very concerning that many of these incidents may be going unreported 
and customers are unaware that their personal information may be 
compromised.”  
“All organisations must embed a culture that values and respects privacy.  I 
believe that mandatory data breach notification will go some way to 
achieving this.” (Pilgrim, 2012) 
At present, organisations are encouraged but not required to notify individuals 
when there has been a data breach; mandatory notifications need to be enacted in 
legislation for them to become effective. With the release of the OAIC’s guidelines, 
and more recently the release of the Australian Privacy Breach Notification paper, 
Australia is displaying positive signs that mandatory data breach notification laws 
will soon be enacted.   
Penalties for Breach 
For information accountability systems to be effective there must be 
ramifications for any inappropriate use of a patient’s health information in the form 
of legally enforceable penalties. These penalties must be explicit; actions that 
constitute a breach must be clearly defined along with the penalties for each type of 
breach. Users should also be notified of these penalties when they are about to access 
data that they are not authorised to access, with the financial, professional, social or 
legal consequences being severe enough to deter potential violators. 
Legislative measures must be implemented so that penalties associated with 
inappropriate use of a patient’s sensitive health information in the online world are 
the same as they are in the offline world. The fact that the information is electronic 
and thus not physically tangible should not act as a barrier against prosecution.  
Engaging a trusted medical body such as the Australian Medical Association (AMA) 
in the development of these legislative measures will ensure the formation of clearly 
defined and precise penalties that take into consideration the complexities of the 
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medical environment. It will also ensure that healthcare providers are not unfairly 
targeted and do not refrain from accessing patient health information necessary for 
delivering high-quality medical care for fear of prosecution.  
Resolving Cases of Potential Misuse 
The IAF aims to facilitate the resolution of potential cases of misuse using the 
query/response justification mechanism. However for this mechanism to be effective, 
it must be supported by relevant legislative measures. Healthcare providers must be 
required by law to respond to a patient’s query about a potential misuse of their 
health information within a reasonable time, or face the associated consequences. To 
avoid unfair prosecution, healthcare providers should also be reminded of their 
obligation to respond prior to the due date. It should be noted that although the 
informal query/response mechanism will be utilised, consumers will still be able to 
further any unsatisfactory outcomes to the OAIC for a formal investigation. 
7.6.2 Legal issues related to the IAF 
In this section, more specific legal requirements for the IAF and consequently 
for Accountable-eHealth (AeH) system implementation are discussed in detail. 
Data ownership and patient control of health information 
Protecting the public’s interest through legislative reform and ensuring people 
retain control over who has access to their personal health information is crucial 
(OAIC, 2008). According to Australian federal legislation, health information is 
generally owned by the HCP who creates and manages the data. But despite this 
ownership by HCPs, patients retain the right to access their health records. These 
laws do not cover the full extent of data ownership and the information control issues 
with regards to health information. However, in light of the newly enacted PCEHR 
Act, patients can define access control settings for all their clinical documents and 
nominate HCPs who can access them. This offers a certain degree of ownership to 
the patients similar to what is required by AeH systems. 
Access and use of health information 
The ALRC recommends a nationally consistent policy for handling health 
information (Australian Law Reform Commission, 2008). In the PCEHR Act, a 
definition of the use and disclosure of health information in a consumer’s PCEHR is 
given which states that the users (including HCPs) of the PCEHR system should 
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adhere to the access controls set by the registered consumer (patient) at all times 
when collecting, using and disclosing health information except in some 
circumstances as stated in the Act ("Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records 
Act 2012," 2012). Use and disclosure of health information (mostly health 
identifiers) is also handled by parts of the Health Identifiers Act 2010 ("Healthcare 
Identifiers Act," 2010).  
The most significant aspect of the IAF is that health information is made 
available to the relevant HCP without rigid access restrictions. They also recognise 
explicit purposes for which data can be accessed. Even though an underlying access 
policy exists, an HCP is allowed to override the existing policy given his 
professional role. But intentional misuse is entailed by negative consequences that 
act as an incentive not to misuse health information. Hence the IAF require laws 
which explicitly define how electronic health information should be accessed and 
used by HCPs. 
Data breach notification 
Data breach notification is crucial for the IAF, since consumer trust is gained 
through transparency which entails that all participants are kept well informed of 
how information is managed. The concept of data breach takes its focus from events 
such as computer hacking, theft of storage equipment, the inadvertent publication of 
personal information and the improper decommissioning of storage equipment. 
However, misuse of personal information by organisational employees can also be 
considered a form of data breach (Burdon, et al., 2010; Kierkegaard, 2011). 
Data breach notification plays a significant role in relation to information 
privacy law since information subjects, with certain degree of control of their 
information, clearly deserve the right to be informed about breaches of their personal 
information – particularly those occurring within specific settings such as healthcare. 
In terms of data breach notification generally, the Australian Government, although 
aware of its significance, has not been as active as other jurisdictions such as those in 
the US and the EU. At this stage in Australia, there has been no enactment of a 
general statutory data breach notification law (Burdon, Lane, & von Nessen, 2012) 
although one now appears imminent (see below). In the meantime and in the absence 
of such a law, the OAIC re-issued voluntary notification guidelines to assist and 
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encourage stakeholders to maintain appropriate security measures, report breaches 
and generally to promote a culture of notification (OAIC, 2012a).  
In ALRC Report No 108 of 2008, the ALRC recommended an amendment to 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), to create a statutory reporting obligation based on a two-
stage notification trigger requiring, firstly a reasonable expectation that there has 
been an unauthorised acquisition of specified personal information (which would 
include both personal information and sensitive personal information - such as health 
information) and secondly, a real risk of serious harm as a result of such disclosure to 
an affected individual (Recommendation 51-1). 
More recently and as part of its 2nd Stage Response to ALRC Report No 108 of 
2008, the Australian Government finally released a Discussion Paper, Australian 
Privacy Breach Notification (Commonwealth of Australia Attorney-General’s 
Department, 2012) which announced the government’s intention to legislate in 
response to the ALRC recommendation. The Paper outlines relevant issues and 
options with respect to the nature and wording of a mandatory data breach 
notification regime and invites submissions from the public. 
Although the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) has not yet been amended to include a 
general data breach notification obligation, the Australian government was prompt in 
establishing a specific mandatory data breach notification regime for eHealth 
information. This regime, set forth in the PCEHR Act, establishes a legal obligation 
to report data breaches in the circumstances set forth in the statute. To assist 
stakeholders in understanding and complying with their legal obligation to report 
data breaches under the PCEHR system, the OAIC has published draft guidelines, 
Mandatory Data Breach Notification in the eHealth Record System (OAIC, 2012b). 
Transaction logs 
Earlier in the thesis, provenance was identified as a key characteristic of the 
IAF. Information about how data is used by HCPs is crucial especially when 
validating justifications by HCPs. The transaction logs of one’s own EHR must be 
accessible to the patients. It must be clearly stated in appropriate legislation how the 
logs are maintained and who, how and for what reasons they can be accessed and 
used. Currently, the PCEHR Act identifies the access to audit logs in the PCEHR 
system only as a system operator’s obligation. The “PCEHR concept of operation” 
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document however, contains detail of the consumers’ rights to access audit logs 
(National E-Health Transition Authority, 2011a). But we contend that in the IAF (if 
not for the PCEHR system) the patients should also retain the right to access 
transaction logs in their own EHR and must be formally established through 
legislation.  
Resolving disputes 
A consumer of an AeH system, within the IAF, is entitled to make inquiries 
pertaining to certain usage of their health information by a HCP which the system 
determines that could be potentially harmful to the consumer. The HCP in question is 
required to make a valid justification of his or her use of the consumers’ health 
information. It is the invalid justifications that are followed by legal penalties. The 
PCEHR Act defines several scenarios where participants (including HCPs) of the 
PCEHR system can collect, use and disclose health information outside of the access 
controls set by the consumers. But these scenarios are mostly for special 
circumstances and do not cover general use of health information, and in turn, do not 
cover what is required by the IAF. 
In the case of a dispute between a patient and an HCP relating to inappropriate 
use of health information, a defined method for resolving that dispute is required. 
Unlike cases of medical negligence, which are already addressed by law, resolving 
disputes relating to health information usage are not well defined within the legal 
framework. A clear definition of legal penalties for misuse of information is required 
for the IAF because they rely heavily on deterrence trough incentives. The penalties 
must be unambiguously defined and expressed such that they are well understood by 
all participants of the system. However, without covering all other aspects relates to 
intentional data breaches, the definition of these penalties is unlikely. 
As mentioned earlier, the IAF defines a protocol for inquiries and justifications 
for potential misuse of information. This acts as the initial dispute resolution 
protocol. Issues can be resolved if a justification given by an HCP is deemed valid by 
the system and if the patients concur. But there are no IAF explicit protocols defined 
for situations where HCPs fail to provide a valid justification. Although the IAF 
protocols give some incentive (in the form of transparency) for HCPs to abide by 
usage policies, the yet undefined penalty measures are the real accountability 
measures that would deter HCPs from intentionally misusing health information at 
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the same time increase patient confidence in sharing their health information with 
HCPs. 
7.6.3 Stakeholder Involvement 
It is suggested that one of the key reasons for the failings of the current eHealth 
system is that stakeholders were not involved from an early stage (Jolly, 2011, p25), 
with NEHTA being criticised for its ‘cycle of criticism, defensiveness and isolation’ 
(Boston Consulting Group, 2007). As a result, several aspects of the eHealth system 
were developed without regard for the goals and requirements of users in the medical 
environment that has contributed to the poor participation rates of the eHealth system 
to-date. Conversely, Denmark’s eHealth system appears to have benefited from the 
high priority placed on engaging stakeholders in determining the content of health 
records and setting standards for data (Jolly, 2011).  
While the IAF has been designed with the best interests of consumers and 
healthcare providers in mind, it is important to engage both parties in the 
development of the finished product.  Increasing trust and confidence in the eHealth 
system is the number one priority for the IAF. It is hoped that by engaging 
stakeholders in the development process, the need for alterations will be mitigated as 
user goals and requirements will be properly captured first-time round. It is also 
hoped that engaging stakeholders in the development process will increase their 
participation in the finished system. 
7.6.4 Integration with existing Infrastructure 
Implementing the IAF will not require a radical overhaul of existing services 
and infrastructure. Already implemented services such as the PCEHR’s audit logs, 
access controls and notification system will instead be modified to accommodate the 
IAF’s functionality. 
The PCEHR audit logs record the date, time, IHI of the healthcare organisation 
in question, and the type of data accessed. These logs will be modified so that the 
individual healthcare provider in question is identified, along with the fine-grained 
data element rather than just the type of information accessed. They will also be 
modified so that they can automatically detect potentially inappropriate transactions 
using a medically knowledgeable semantic database of acceptable data types, roles 
and uses. The query/response justification mechanism will require the 
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implementation of new functionality. Access controls will remain in force but will no 
longer be rigid, instead acting more as demarcation lines. They will also be set by a 
medically knowledgeable trusted authority (TA) and consumers will only be able to 
extend consent, not impose further restrictions. 
The PCEHR’s notification system, currently limited to notifying healthcare 
officials of repeat use of the ‘break the glass’ mechanism, will be modified to support 
fine-grained notifications. As discussed earlier, these notifications will inform 
healthcare providers when they are about to access information that they are not 
authorised to access, and inform consumers when there has been a potentially 
inappropriate use of their health information. 
Modifying the audit logs of the current PCHER system to allow for automatic 
detection of potentially inappropriate uses will be the most challenging aspect of the 
integration process, as it will require the formation of context-aware privacy policies.  
These context-aware privacy policies will need to accurately map the complex 
relationships and interactions of the health domain without restricting the free flow 
of information that is necessary for high-quality medical care.  
As we have already established, it is important for information systems to give 
users a significant degree of control over their personal information (D.J. Solove, 
2008) however users should not have to agree to complex policies with unpredictable 
outcomes in advance. Similarly, users should not be given choices about every single 
request to use their personal information as the frequency of those choices may 
become overwhelming (Weitzner, et al., 2008) and cause unnecessary delays for 
authorised users legitimately trying to access information. Conversely, a lack of 
constraints on the initially voluntary disclosure of sensitive personal information may 
reduce information privacy (Sloan & Warner, 2010) and create a strong incentive for 
users to avoid participation in the eHealth system (Office of the Australian Privacy 
Commissioner, 2005). Thus, an acceptable set of privacy rules must be developed 
that balance the benefits of widespread information sharing against the loss of 
information privacy.   
“Like the emotive word ‘freedom’, ‘privacy’ means so many different things 
to so many different people that it has lost any precise legal connotation that 
it might once have had” (McCarthy, 1987). 
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Agreeing on a set of generally accepted privacy rules is a difficult task when 
dealing with several different laws, organisational procedures and social norms. If 
the privacy rules implemented by an accountability system are not generally accepted 
rules, then the accountability system is not a representation of peoples’ opinions but 
an attempt to impose a view about what should be private (Sloan & Warner, 2010).  
Conversely, there is a risk that the health community will be reluctant to adopt these 
accountability measures if they feel they are too strict or unfairly subject healthcare 
providers to misconduct and negligence litigation. Thus, privacy policies must also 
ensure that healthcare providers are not subjected to excessive checks. 
Once a set of generally accepted privacy rules have been enacted, a medically 
knowledgeable semantic database can be developed that maps these privacy rules to 
the multitude of different context-aware treatment scenarios that occur in the health 
setting.  This database can then be used to automatically detect potential breaches, set 
access controls and issue fine-grained notifications. 
7.7 DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
Australia is currently undergoing significant health reform with the 
establishment of eHealth, an ICT enabled approach to providing safe, reliable and 
efficient healthcare for all Australians (EHealth, 2012). eHealth utilises numerous 
technologies regarded by the ICT industry as best-practice; however the current 
preventative approach to information security employed by the Personally Controlled 
Electronic Health Record (PCEHR) system falls short of stakeholder expectations. 
eHealth to date has been big on promise but light on delivery, in large part due 
to a lack of participation from stakeholders. Consumers are concerned that their 
sensitive health information will not remain private, whilst healthcare providers are 
concerned that rigid access controls used in the PCEHR system will prevent them 
from accessing complete patient records in a timely manner (P. A. Williams, 2007).  
eHealth has the potential to provide Australia with many well recognised benefits 
(Peiris, 2012) but without participation on masse from consumers and healthcare 
providers alike, these benefits will not be realised. 
Preventative approaches to information security, such as those utilised by the 
current PCEHR system, are inadequate in the health setting (Feigenbaum, et al., 
2012; Kagal & Abelson, 2010). Consumers are burdened with setting access controls 
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that require specialist medical knowledge to be implemented properly and healthcare 
providers are restricted from accessing complete patient health records, necessary for 
administering high-quality medical care. This preventative approach puts the 
information privacy concerns of stakeholders in direct competition with the 
information access concerns of healthcare providers; unless a different approach to 
information security is employed, stakeholder support will remain dismal. 
The Information Accountability Framework (IAF) holds healthcare providers 
accountable for all uses of a patient’s sensitive health information. By tracking all 
information transactions and automatically checking those transactions against the 
relevant privacy policies, the IAF will deter breaches with the threat of penalties 
instead of trying to prevent all possible breaches with pre-emptive access controls.  
This approach is similar to law enforcement in the offline world (Feigenbaum, 2010) 
and is likely to achieve a much better balance between the need for information 
privacy and the need for information access. 
The IAF is meant to address the privacy conundrum by balancing competing 
concerns of healthcare stakeholders. Although the IAF, and therefore, AeH systems 
have not yet been fully implemented, they have the potential to operate as an 
effective countermeasure for privacy threats. We have demonstrated that adequate 
legislative foundations are critical for the IAF. Yet at this stage, it would appear that 
the current Australian legal framework relating to health information management 
falls short of what is necessary and appropriate for the proper implementation of the 
IAF through AeH systems. 
Specifically, in order for the IAF to function effectively in the Australian 
context, a privacy breach protocol (Cavoukian, 2006) may be formulated that 
addresses AeH system characteristics and capabilities supported by existing and new 
legislation. Although some general guidance is provided by the recently updated 
Guide to Handling Personal Information Security Breaches (OAIC, 2008) and the 
more specific Mandatory Data Breach Notification in the eHealth Record System 
(OAIC, 2012b), there is currently no active and detailed privacy breach protocol in 
Australia. However, with the imminent enactment of a general data breach 
notification law, the foundations for developing such a protocol sufficient to 
underpin the IAF are slowly being laid. 
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The IAF is capable of rectifying the information security downfalls of the 
current eHealth system that have opposed widespread adoption to-date. Minimal 
modifications are required to the existing eHealth infrastructure for it to be 
implemented and, provided the appropriate legal framework is in place, it will 
increase stakeholder trust and confidence, encourage greater participation in the 
eHealth system and allow the Australian Government to fully capitalise on the 
financial benefits that national electronic health reform has to offer. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions and Future Work 
In this chapter, we present a summary of the work presented in this thesis with 
a list of contributions and possible future directions. 
8.1 THESIS SUMMARY 
This thesis has addressed the information privacy conundrum in the eHealth 
domain. The concept of information accountability was proposed as a solution and 
was successfully demonstrated to have the capabilities to address this problem. The 
thesis addressed five main research questions relating to eHealth requirements, 
information accountability, technology acceptance of stakeholders, and general 
applicability in an eHealth environment. Three main aspects related to information 
accountability were addressed in this thesis, namely: social aspects, technical aspects 
and legal aspects, which create an Information Accountability Framework (IAF). 
eHealth is a complex and sensitive informatics domain. The main information 
resources in eHealth are electronic health records (EHR), which are still in their 
developing stages. One of the main impediments to EHR and therefore eHealth 
adoption was seen as information privacy concerns. Many available solutions to this 
problem were preventive measures that restrict access to healthcare information to 
the information users. But it was put forward that for a specialised, knowledge driven 
domain such as healthcare these preventive measures are inappropriate. Legitimate 
users, i.e. healthcare professionals, given their professional roles, must have the 
capability to access information that is both relevant and necessary for healthcare 
decision making. To that end, information accountability show favourable potential 
as a responsive conduit. 
Given the embryonic state of information accountability in computer science, 
ICT and in eHealth, there were no guidelines that would enable system utilising 
information accountability to reach their intended goals. Such systems; accountable 
systems, enforce appropriate-use of information by providing incentives for 
information users to abide by the usage policies via after-the-fact accountability 
measures and for information owners by providing control of information and 
providing adequate transparency and the capability to inquire about possible 
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inappropriate uses of information. As regards to these goals, a series of information 
accountability principles were derived and were contextualised to eHealth giving rise 
to Accountable-eHealth (AeH) systems. AeH systems are a new form of eHealth 
applications where the subjects of the information have control of how their 
information is being used. Importantly however, the healthcare process is not 
hindered by this consumer control of information, like in previous approaches, due to 
the presence of a governing healthcare authority in the policy formulation process.  
System adoption by domain stakeholders is a factor that affects eHealth 
applications where low adoption has seen the downfall of many systems. A two part 
questionnaire survey was conducted following a successful pilot survey to measure 
the perceived adoption and attitudes of future healthcare professionals and 
consumers towards AeH systems. The first phase of the survey focused on medical 
and health students from three academic institutes in Queensland, Australia. The 
results indicated that the attitudes towards the capabilities and the characteristics of 
the respondents were favourable. An empirical research model capable of predicting 
the future adoption of AeH systems was also designed and validated. 
The second phase of the survey tested the same dimensions of AeH systems as 
the first phase but focused on the consumers’ perspective with additional information 
privacy related aspects. Non-healthcare related students from the Queensland 
University of Technology (QUT) were utilised for this phase of the survey. The 
results revealed that information privacy concerns affect the perceived adoption of 
eHealth systems and the presence of information accountability measure alleviates 
those concerns. Although the presence of information accountability measures in the 
EHR system did not positively affect the adoption of the system they were highly 
correlated with other aspects that affected system adoption. The respondents strongly 
believed that information accountability measures should be present in eHealth 
systems that manipulate sensitive information. An empirical research model was also 
designed and validated. The model is capable of predicting the perceived acceptance 
of AeH system by eHealth consumers. 
The main technical challenges relating to the use of information accountability 
in eHealth were identified as policy formulation, representation and management. To 
that end, a novel access control model was developed that is capable of capturing the 
eHealth stakeholder requirements such that the healthcare and privacy oriented usage 
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policies can be formulated. The proposed capabilities of the model were validated 
using a Web based prototype. The prototype was capable of handling three types of 
users: consumers, healthcare professionals and a representative of a healthcare 
authority. All relevant functionalities were demonstrated successfully. 
The access control model architecture was extended to facilitate for 
information accountability capabilities such as transparency, misuse detection and 
misuse inquiries and justifications. The architecture was modelled in the model 
checking tool UPPAAL to validate the designed protocols. Different scenarios were 
simulated and the protocols were successfully validated. The policy representation 
and management of the architecture was done separate to model checking using an 
extension of the previously developed prototype. 
Digital rights management (DRM) was adopted as a solution for policy 
representation and management in the architecture. The rights expression language 
(REL) used was the Open Digital Rights Language (ODRL) Version 2, which is an 
XML based REL. The stakeholder requirements gathered from the access control 
model were transformed to ODRL policies. These policies were successfully used to 
manage the access and usage requests by healthcare professionals, which were also 
represented in ODRL. 
In the IAF, access to information, although governed by the usage polices set 
by the stakeholders, does not prevent legitimate, traceable users from accessing 
required information. Adequate notification is given to the users to avoid 
unintentional access of irrelevant information and to facilitate non-repudiation. All 
information transactions are recorded in the form of transaction logs. To make the 
logs policy-aware, the existing core model of ODRL V2 was extended to support the 
representation of transactions in ODRL. This additional capability made it possible 
for the transactions and the related policies at the time of the access be easily 
accessed and reasoned by end users, providing enhanced transparency. 
As a final validation of the developed IAF, a case study was conducted taking 
to account the Australian eHealth system. The case study showed that the IAF can be 
successfully integrated into the existing eHealth infrastructure in Australia. It also 
highlighted necessary legal requirements for the IAF to be implemented in Australia. 
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8.2 CONTRIBUTIONS 
This thesis makes a number of practical and theoretical contributions to the 
existing body of knowledge of information privacy in eHealth and the application of 
information accountability to eHealth. Following a literature review that fulfils 
research objective 1, 
• First, we presented a set of principles that must be followed in the 
development of accountability systems, which successfully fulfils research 
objective 2 (a). 
• Second, we contextualised the IA principles in the eHealth domain and a 
novel model for accountable-eHealth systems was presented. This 
successfully fulfils research objective 2 (b). 
• Third, we presented the results of a survey that measured the attitudes of 
future healthcare professionals towards AeH systems. Thus, we 
successfully fulfil research objective 4 (a). 
• Fourth, we presented and validated an empirical research model capable of 
predicting the perceived adoption of AeH system by healthcare 
professionals. 
• Fifth, we presented the results of a survey that measured the attitudes of 
consumers towards AeH systems. Thus, we successfully fulfil research 
objective 4 (b) 
• Sixth, we presented and validated an empirical research model that is 
capable of predicting the perceived adoption of AeH systems by 
consumers. 
• Seventh, we presented and validated a novel access control model capable 
of capturing the requirements of eHealth stakeholders of eHealth systems, 
through which we successfully fulfil research objective 3 (a). 
• Eighth, we presented and validated a technical architecture for the IAF and 
for AeH systems. Hence, we successfully fulfil research objective 3 (b). 
• Ninth, we presented and validated a novel approach of representing usage 
policies in the IAF by utilising a novel extension of the DRM technology 
ODRL. We successfully fulfil research objective 3 (c). 
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• Tenth, we presented a case study of the Australian eHealth system that 
investigates the applicability of the developed IAF within the existing 
eHealth infrastructure and the legal framework. Through this, research 
objective 5 is fulfilled. 
Collectively, the above outcomes addressed our overall research question in 
section 1.5.1. We conclude that information accountability can successfully address 
the issues related to healthcare information requirements and healthcare information 
privacy requirements in the eHealth context. 
8.3 LIMITATIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
The contributions of this thesis had laid the foundations for AeH systems to be 
successfully implemented in the near future, thus fulfilling our research objective. 
However, there are several limitations and possible future research directions arising 
from this work following the limitations identified. 
As mentioned earlier, in this thesis we have addressed information privacy of 
eHealth consumers, which is a significant barrier to eHealth adoption, and provided a 
solution in terms of information accountability. We put forth foundations for 
implementing information accountability in eHealth and introduced Accountable-
eHealth systems. Although the provided insights into AeH systems are primarily 
based on consumer privacy, healthcare professionals’ privacy concerns are also 
significant aspects to consider in relation to AeH system. We acknowledge this 
limitation and believe that this would be an attractive future direction for research. 
We also identify several limitations and possible future prospects of the work 
presented throughout several chapters. 
First, the two empirical research models were validated using a student cohort, 
which requires them to be further confirmed with data acquired from a more suitable 
population. The access control protocols presented in chapter five were validated 
using a prototype used as a test vehicle. Although this was sufficient to establish our 
goals in the exploratory study presented in this thesis, we believe that the model 
could be tested in an actual healthcare setting using real clinical data, which could 
further establish the functionality of the model and highlight any limitations. 
Although the UPPAAL model that was presented in chapter six as a validation of the 
AeH system protocols demonstrated that the intended behaviour is achieved, the 
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model can be extended to include implementation constraints such as time for 
specific activities and the importance of specific activities. For example, depending 
on the type of misuse detected a priority level can be given for justifications, which 
could prove relevant in real life scenarios. 
The results of our exploratory analysis of the application of information 
accountability in eHealth have laid the foundations for generic AeH systems to be 
formalised using an appropriate representation. We believe this has opened an 
attractive future research direction. 
Some medical related aspects were assumed to be present in the development 
of certain aspects of the AeH system such as the relationships of EHR data types and 
intended purposes. A comprehensive knowledge base in the form of a semantic 
ontology may be developed, which would undoubtedly require the collaborative 
efforts of technology professionals and healthcare domain specialists. Finally, the 
core legal foundations relating to AeH systems were discussed in this thesis may be 
put forward as formal recommendations for consideration in future amendments and 
introduction of legislation. A possible future direction in relation to the case study 
presented is an investigation into the applicability of the IAF in jurisdictions other 
than Australia. 
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Survey - Ethical Clearance Certificates 
The ethical clearance certificates for the surveys are given below. 
 
 Figure A.1 Ethics certificate for pilot survey – page 1 
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 Figure A.2 Ethics certificate for pilot survey – page 2 
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 Figure A.3 Ethics certificate for survey phase 1 – page 1 
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 Figure A.4 Ethics certificate for survey phase 1 – page 2 
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 Figure A.5 Ethics certificate for survey phase 2 – page 1 
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 Figure A.6 Ethics certificate for survey phase 2 – page 2 
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Appendix B 
Survey – Survey invitation eMails 
Email Invitations sent to recruit participants for each phase of the survey are 
given below. 
B.1 SURVEY INVITATION EMAIL FOR PHASE 1 
Dear Student, 
In July 2012 the national PCEHR (Personally Controlled Electronic Health Record) system will be 
available for all Australians. Both patients and healthcare professionals are expected to be familiar 
with this new health record system.  
It is our pleasure to invite you to participate in an online survey on Electronic Health Record (eHR) 
system usage and acceptance. As future healthcare professionals of Australia, your participation in 
this survey is invaluable and greatly appreciated. The results from this survey will help develop better 
e-health services in the Australian healthcare sector. 
This survey is part of a joint project between the Queensland University of Technology and the 
National ICT Australia (NICTA).  The aim of the research is to design and develop an Information 
Accountability Framework for e-health systems. 
Participation is voluntary and there will be no reimbursements, payments or otherwise (e.g. gift 
vouchers) for completing the survey.  
This is an anonymous survey. Your participation and the answers you give cannot be traced back to 
you at any point during or after the survey.  
Please click on the link below:  
•  to access further information about the study to ensure your decision and consent to 
participate is fully informed  
•  to complete the survey which will take approximately 15 minutes of your time and 
become part of this valuable venture  
Web link to survey was here 
Once again, your response helps improve the development of e-health services and to identify the 
requirements of the present and future consumers of e-health systems. 
Thank you in advance. 
 Yours Sincerely, 
Randike Gajanayake 1, Dr. Tony Sahama 1, Adjunct Prof. Renato Iannella 1, 2 
1 Computer Science Discipline, Faculty of Science and Technology, Queensland University of 
Technology 
 2 Semantic Identity, Brisbane, Australia 
 
 288 Appendices 
B.2 SURVEY INVITATION EMAIL FOR PHASE 2 
Dear Students, 
It is our pleasure to invite you to participate in an online survey on Electronic Health Record (eHR) 
system usage and acceptance. Your participation in this survey is invaluable and greatly appreciated. 
The results from this survey will help develop better e-health services in the Australian healthcare 
sector. 
This survey is part of a joint project between the Queensland University of Technology and the 
National ICT Australia (NICTA).  The aim of the research is to design and develop an Information 
Accountability Framework for e-health systems. 
 Participation is voluntary and there will be no reimbursements, payments or otherwise (e.g. gift 
vouchers) for completing the survey.  
This is an anonymous survey. Your participation and the answers you give cannot be traced back to 
you at any point during or after the survey.  
Please click on the link below:  
• to access further information about the study to ensure your decision and consent to 
participate is fully informed  
• to complete the survey which will take approximately 15 minutes of your time and 
become part of this valuable venture  
Web link to survey was here 
Once again, your response helps improve the development of e-health services and to identify the 
requirements of the present and future consumers of e-health systems. 
Thank you in advance. 
 Yours Sincerely, 
Randike Gajanayake 
Computer Science Discipline, 
Science and Engineering Faculty, 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane, Australia 
 
Dr. Tony Sahama 
Computer Science Discipline, 
Science and Engineering Faculty, 
Queensland University of Technology 
Brisbane, Australia 
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B.3 SURVEY TOOL: PARTICIPANT CONSENT FORM FOR PHASE 1 
 
 
Figure B.1 Survey consent form: Part 1 
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Figure B.2 Survey consent form: Part 2 
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Appendix C 
Survey Tool for Questionnaire 
A screen capture of the online survey tool used for phase 1 is shown below. 
 
Figure B.3 Page one of the online survey tool 
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Appendix D 
Survey Phase 1 – Qualitative data table 
The comments from the survey respondents have been analysed and are summarised into categories. Table C.1 show the comments made 
by the respondents. 
Table D.1 Data from qualitative analysis 
Theme Comments 
Data 
Access/Availability 
I think access to patient electronic files should be the same as paper files. In a hospital setting many health care providers need access in order to 
provide the best possible treatment and outcome for the patient.  
Doctors often need to access patient records independently of current health care for research, auditing, checking how other similar patients 
have been treated, teaching other doctors and medical students etc. 
I believe information that is used for research that does not yield a personal profit should be able to be accessed to help identify causes of disease 
that can only otherwise be studied by intentionally placing a person in potential harm.  
I think that depending on what the patient states as to whether or not their case, without revealing who they are, can be used for further research, 
as an example or for medical reports in the case of anomalies.  
...I work with high risk families, sometimes accessing information on clients helps build a better picture on risk vs. protective factors. Some 
clients may not want us to have access to this information? What is right? Especially when dealing with children. 
If the information is used for research then there is an issue regarding informed consent.   If the information is used for any reason other than 
patient care, or teaching within the facility/ward in which the patient is receiving care (which will influence their better care directly/indirectly) 
then there will have been a breach of confidentiality. 
Using an electronic health record would raise concerns about confidentiality. When placing information on the client's record, one would not be 
able to ensure that the information is confidential. Even if there were rules governing access, some professions may not abide by these, or may 
have different laws that regulate their handling of information. As a psychologist in this case I am legally responsible if someone else gains 
access to my client's health information without their consent - and I would not be prepared to take the risk that other health professionals would 
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respect confidentiality. Also, a great deal of client information is constructed only for a specific audience. For example, psychological reports 
will be written differently depending on whether they are intended for a parent, teacher, doctor or so on. As such, it would be inappropriate for 
other health professionals to have access to this information without having to go through the author.  
I think that all health professionals should have access to the patients full medical records. Knowing the medical history for a person is important 
not just to know what operations or conditions they have experienced etc, they are also important to let you know how many health difficulties 
they have been through, which can impact on their motivation, psychology and how important they may deem your service. It is all relevant, not 
only for medical understanding purposes but also for understanding how interested they may in what you have to say and what stage of 
behaviour change they may be. I think depriving health professionals of certain information could be extremely detrimental. All health cases are 
different and who's to say that certain information is relevant in one case but not relevant for another. That would be extremely complex to work 
out and I do not think health professionals will be very happy with it at all. I know I surely wouldn't. And I would feel as if my ability to treat the 
patient successfully was being compromised. I also think that government bodies need people’s health records (once individual information has 
been stripped) for research!! this is so important!! if we cannot monitor and research cases we are never going to have advances in health 
services and treatments, and how will we know where to focus our health campaigns?! 
The information given should only be used for the reason that it is given. 
confidentiality and respect for persons are strong values of the health industry, therefore personal information should be treated how you would 
like your own treated/accessed 
I think eHR is defiantly a good thing but patient information needs to be kept save and should not be access by people outside the health field like 
insurance companies for example 
Health information should be kept private and only patient and doctors who are treating the patient could access the patient's info...  
I believe that EHR should be freely accessible to health professionals, and that they should be able to access the patients’ complete medical 
history…. 
There are times when accessing information about episodes of care in a de-identified fashion is vital for health research that may lead to 
improved delivery of health care (e.g. epidemiological research)… 
It seems like a good idea but there has got to be some restrictions on the access of this information. That being said, it is sometimes necessary to 
look at the patients’ entire history to give them the best possible care. This includes looking at things in the past that may not seem to be clearly 
linked to the current issue. 
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To be fair, often information not pertaining to the current episode of care is required to be accessed to collate a comprehensive past history & 
formulate the bigger picture. This enables health professionals across the multi disciplinary team to better assess the patient when they may be 
unable or unwilling to communicate vital information 
Accountability 
Measures/ 
Information Misuse 
 
...I feel like I would like to know everything possible about the patient in order to give them the best possible care - however if patients are able to 
see which information I access, I would be hesitant to do so, in case it attracts litigation. 
...I agree strict usage policies should apply and heavy fines imposed on those who incorrectly use the system… 
Yes, because this information should be treated as confidential and private. No one has the right to misuse the information for other tasks other 
than the purpose of patient care. 
Privacy is a huge issue misuse use should be penalised strictly 
Misuse would breach patient privacy and, if done intentionally, the offender should be held accountable. 
Patient health information is confidential and it is unethical to misuse patient health information. If a health professional misuses patient health 
information then they should definitely be held accountable for their actions and should justify why they have misused the patient's health 
information. The health professional should receive appropriate punishment for this action as well. 
As in any other situation if information is misused for someone’s benefit other than the patient, then it is a breach in the patient’s privacy and 
trust also. 
...However with electronic information there can be an avenue for information misuse and I believe there should definitely be strict rules about 
who can access information and when. 
My father's health information and treatments were mysteriously removed from the system of the hospital where he was treated when he 
attempted to go to court over being negligently misdiagnosed which lead to extensive further damage to his body and longer recovery time. This 
information should not have been accessible, so therefore shouldn't have disappeared without knowing who had accessed them last. It should 
have been monitored. 
A tough and consistent rules, policies, regulations and punishment should be applied to anyone misusing patient's information, no exception at 
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all!! 
I think it is unethical to misuse a patient's health information. Health Professionals need to be people we can trust and if they misuse that trust, it 
will hamper further treatment for the future. 
 ...I also think that each time a person’s record is accessed it should be recorded and randomized audits of each time would ensure there is no 
misuse of this system… 
Patient Control  
...just don't like the idea that patients will restrict the type of information I can access. How is a patient to know if past medical history is relevant 
or not?     
The average patient does not know what information is relevant and what is not relevant to their health, whereas health professionals do have 
this knowledge. Therefore, allowing the average person to decide what medical history to show a doctor is going to have detrimental effects and 
could even cost someone their life. 
Duty of care to the patient.   It is there information and they should use their information confidentially and use it only for the service required 
not for anything else that was not prior requested by the patient. The patient should have the right to refuse. 
they first need patient permission 
...In terms of privacy settings I'm not quite sure how it would work, but choosing which health professionals can or cannot see their information I 
think is ridiculous because the patient doesn't always have the education to realise what role different health professionals play in the treatment 
of their condition.  
I think that the privacy settings should not be overridden by any health care professional without patient consent. Also while university educated 
professionals will find this technology easy to understand, some patients may not which will affect their abilities to set appropriate privacy 
settings to their will. 
Patient health information is personal and private and whether electronic or paper is susceptible to miss use by health professionals. Electronic 
sources are easier tag for login users. Letting patients put locks on information may inhibit care by omitting important info. Information may 
need to be shared between professionals to confer diagnosis. if patients are able to lock out information they must also realise there is 
accountability to themselves if healthcare is compromised due to this.  
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it depends on if that information from a previous admission or visit is relevant to this episode, but the patient may think it is not. 
...I do not think that there should be any need for patients to be able to pick and choose which information can be viewed freely or hidden as I 
believe it is all necessary for health professionals to be able to see it all in order to form a complete and accurate picture of the patient and to 
provide effective patient care. 
I think patients should have total control over their electronic record, but there could be pages for medical information and sharing amongst 
other health professionals. 
 There should be privacy settings but i think these should be only towards other people so that strangers can't access the users information. in 
regards to health professionals, all of the patients/consumers details should be readily accessible to determine the best possible care. 
I am involved in hospital infection surveillance activities. This would become very difficult and place patients and health care workers at 
increased risk if we were denied access by patients to their information, say if a patient blocked infection control professionals access to their 
information. Understanding what is happening when there is an increase in infection rates will also often require an understanding of the 
patients involved e.g. caesarean section risk factors for surgical site infection. Additionally, for larger data linkage studies etc it becomes very 
difficult when patient (de-identified) information is denied. This is really less than ideal, meaning that powerful, useful studies that will ultimately 
benefit patient outcomes are hindered or indeed made impossible. I fully endorse patient participation but I think it needs to be well thought 
through, as many in the public will not understand the problems caused by blocking access in some circumstances.  
If patients are setting privacy settings so that other (non-health workers) cannot see their history that is okay, but it is essential that the treating 
health care professional has access to the entire medical history.   
the current rules governing pt confidentiality and information sharing should still apply.  E records open up the possibility of a lot more people 
being able to access pt info so strict auditing will need to be applied.  Pts should not be able to restrict information relevant to their treatment or 
what’s the point of having an E record 
Attitudes on Overall 
System 
 
Overall I am for the idea, just don't like the idea that patients will restrict the type of information I can access. How is a patient to know if past 
medical history is relevant or not? I feel like I would like to know everything possible about the patient in order to give them the best possible 
care - however if patients are able to see which information I access, I would be hesitant to do so, in case it attracts litigation.     
Having seen the fallout from poor or no information sharing between professionals, trying to remedy situations without full access to the facts, 
and workers terrified to share information due to fear of breaching "privacy" (often with no clear understanding of what this means) I think this 
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system would be invaluable. 
Patient confidentiality is an extremely important part of building the trust that allows a patient to communicate openly with you as a health 
professional. Misuse of private patient information, regardless of whether it is in the interest of learning or sharing knowledge breaches this trust 
and patients have a right to know if this is happening. If this system prevents the misuse of private patient information then I think it is worthwhile 
software. However the issue of hacking needs to be given consideration, as computer programs are so easily hacked and information about 
patients could be taken and distributed or used inappropriately. 
I think this needs further debate 
I think that the EHR is a good idea, and would benefit healthcare enormously, through the connection of different health professionals and 
healthcare settings. The healthcare professional would be able to have a more comprehensive view of things, and this would be beneficial for the 
patient, and for the health professional in making informed decisions and providing better quality healthcare. I definitely think it should be 
implemented within contemporary healthcare settings 
...if you were to implement this great idea you would have to hold training session and prepare work places really well. Maybe even call centres 
for inquires and faults.  
Depending on the level of care-this system would benefit both parties-it can be up to the discretion of the patient to add more social networks. 
With the main source on client care and feedback say is in the bedside chart. But this should be locked for those viewers only. They can pretty it 
up and add family to see progress in certain boxes-fields. However this would mean allowing time for health care workers to follow issues or 
concerns. This can be viewed on a tablet-such as ipad and the health worker could have all clients/patients linked to that one account. Then only 
are they accountable for their actions onus is not on the next worker. Obviously there would be check boxes etc procedures to follow. 
An eHR will give more timely and accurate health care to clients. Improving health outcomes, and also future collection of medical history 
information for research purposes. It can never replace the need for bedside observations and notes for current health episode. Overall, however, 
I can’t believe this has not been implemented sooner 
Attitudes Towards 
EHR/eHealth 
 
eHR would significantly improve patient care flow, ensure same-time filing, ensure an accurate record of the patient consultation is recorded, 
allows access to previous history (should it be required i.e. surgeons) allows them to access information re: initial injury, follow-up and even to 
monitor post-op progress. It provides a holistic care structure where information can be safely stored. Reports and imaging can be directly 
uploaded on to the database and kept... ...I currently work for the ADF and I know that within this specific area, eHR would be an invaluable tool 
as members are constantly being posted and deployed to numerous locations around Australia and the World. It would save on "missing" 
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paperwork and delayed appointments/reviews due to constant chasing up and reprinting information/reports.  I strongly believe eHR are the way 
of the future and should be utilised within all health facilities. 
I hold currently hold qualifications in health promotion and health informatics and I'm very keen to see eHRs develop in Australia. 
The problem is one of health literacy and understanding my health professionals. The health system is extremely complex and most people have 
extreme difficulty navigating the system (as do the professionals). E health has the potential to improve the channels between professionals but 
there needs to be a change to the existing culture of destruct between professionals and the individual and between professionals. 
I believe that an electronic health care record would be very helpful in keeping patient records together and to save time from having to track 
down information from other professionals…. 
I only don't like the idea of having patient information electronically because it would provide more opportunities for hackers and therefore more 
invasions of privacy/confidentiality, since once something is online "out there", it's out there, rather than having paper records which would only 
be immediately accessed by the hospital/facility which contains it. Also if we are fully relying on technology to access patient information needed 
in order to better treat them, there are always times when there are problems with technology, it either crashes or freezes, something goes wrong 
etc., which then makes things much more difficult. 
Electronic EHR would be a great way to save time and man power but in other ways nothing beats holding a sheet of paper hard copy of 
information. Does this mean every health care professional will carry around an ipad. Technology changes alllll the time and upgrades would be 
regular... 
A system should  - be user friendly  - have safeguards  - involve the patient  - only be used in the interest of overall patient care    - should be 
developed with input from a range of health care professionals and organisations, not only one such as QLD health but also with input from 
public, private areas and orgs where this type of system is in place and highlights the positive and negatives of the system. 
...EHealth is only good for people who can/have access the internet. 
Even if health professionals are trained to use the system, not all professionals feel comfortable with using computers and therefore this could 
affect the quality of health care they can provide. If patients are also using the system there is the same problem. Some patients may not feel 
comfortable with the new technology.    
I do not trust that Queensland Health could effectively implement a eHealth record information system or guidelines for usage.  IT systems and 
processes in Queensland Health are often outdated, overly bureaucratic, and unresponsive to needs of end users.  These views are based on my 
personal experience with implementation of a clinical electronic system in Queensland Health.  The recent payroll issues would also highlight 
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lack of expertise, planning, problem solving in implementation of electronic solutions in Queensland Health and other Queensland Government 
entities.  I believe an electronic health record can work effectively to improve documentation and communication but would require huge 
expenditure and vastly improved systems for implementation to be effective.  
I think an effective eHealth network needs to be extremely user friendly with an easy to navigate user interface.  I think assurances need to be 
given about the quality of information storage and back-up retrieval systems if the eHealth network falls short i.e. during software patch updates.  
I don't think QLD Health could organise a meat-tray raffle let alone "formulate a comprehensive set of usage rules which would indicate what 
health data is required for a given episode of care".  Having this Utopian vision of a universal eHealth network is already flawed because there 
are so many versions of some form of e-documentation operating in so many hospitals.                                  
Can't wait for the eHealth record so it will reduce time and potential errors brought about by misinterpretation of handwritten orders/assessment 
Having worked on an eHealth system with QH (Queensland Health) I can recognise the limitations of a computer system.  It can often be 
incapable of performing a task required by clinicians in a simple way that is not cumbersome. 
Still being a student it is hard for me to comment on a lot of these things because I have not been out in the hospital work place and experienced 
it. I think that having electronic files would make things easier in the sense that paper things can go missing, its difficult to read peoples 
handwriting sometimes, and if its online anyone can access it regardless of where they are in the hospital (i.e. don't have to walk up into a certain 
level to get the paper records or anything) and it would be easy to then forward these records electronically onto someone’s 
GP/specialist/outpatient setting. It would also save space if everything is online and not on paper. 
Other  
First of all I think a comment section should have been included after every question as I wanted to make comments on a lot of them.  My main 
concern given my interest is in mental health that inappropriate labelling could be entered and follow a patient for life, e.g. one 'professional' 
may label a patient non-compliant because they didn't want to be put on drug therapy against their wishes and this would follow a patient 
regardless of the fact that the force of drugs is against basic human rights... but then that is something not totally acknowledged by the mental 
health system.  As for who monitors the system I think it needs to be a totally independent and accountable body and not the new 'mental health 
commission' as that is not independent it is just a change of name. 
Note: 
1. Some comments have been adjusted to eliminate spelling and grammatical errors. 
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Appendix E 
Survey Phase 2 – Tables 
The data table relevant to chapter four are given in the Appendix. 
Table E.1 Qualitative data from respondents 
Theme Comments 
Information misuse and 
Accountability measures 
Sometimes may need more than civil ($$) penalties, but there are many grey areas in health IT.  It is difficult to know what may happen without 
Australian court precedents. 
Jail time and fines should be given 
Other than times of emergency, even health professionals should have to provide sufficient reasoning as to why a patients information has been 
accessed. Without sufficient safeguards sensitive health information would be accessible to anyone. The term 'Sufficient reasoning' should be 
up to the end user, through privacy settings NOT Government Legislators. 
If they are misused in some insidious plot to cause harm or I dunno spread my info across the Internet yeah sure. But if their intent is too better 
treat a patient or use the data in some reasonable medical way(such as research), only they happen to break some small rule in information 
usage, meant only to ensure a patients impression of privacy while limiting practical use of data, then no, they shouldnt be punished, instead 
the rules should be adapted to the needs of  the health professionals. 
If they are found to have misused the information then that should be the same as breaking patient confidentiality. If they have used it for 
researching patients with conditions similar to one of their own, or to help the patientm then I do not think it is a bad thing. 
Misuse should be made a criminal offence to discourge it. 
This information is no different from a person's criminal record and police are held accountable if the access it without justifiable reason. 
Systems designed to manage health information more effectively should NOT be taken advantage of for other uses than originally intended. 
Would need to be reviewed against their intents and the potential harm to the patient. 
Of with their heads. Or a fine, either or. 
Any miss-use of private data regardless of where or how it was accessed, is still a breach of personal privacy and should be prosecutable under 
the full extent of the law regardless of who or what accessed the data… 
 Appendices 301 
Like everybody else, if you misuse data you should pay the penalty 
I believe a monetary fine would be most effective 
The penalty would depend on the misuse.  If my information is being used to sell to drug companies, without my permission for monetary gain.  
Then this should be a jail sentence… 
I believe that if a health professional used my personal health information for any other reason than for reference, clinical research or 
diagnosis then the person(s) responsible should be held accountable if they cannot legitimately justify their actions. 
If it is found to be used for something other than for medical reasons they should be accountable 
If they are doing wrong things intentionally and not in their "Duty of Care", then they must be held accountable 
If misuse is intentional then the health professional is violating the ‘Good Medical Practice: Code of Conduct’ guidelines for Privacy and 
Confidentiality. This is a breach of ethics regardless of the medium used to access the patient health information. 
Personal information in 
EHR 
…I see the value in other health care professionals having an anonymous set of records to help treat other patients.  I was about to type in 100 
years I still wouldn't want my name published with my health record.  But then I realised that is selfish as my descendants might benefit from 
it… 
…I believe the system should log the id and name of any enquiry into my health record.  I should have access to that information… 
Because it is personal, so it's important to keep it security. i agree that should take seriously. 
in conclusion, all people should manage their own health, if they can't its their responsibility to find their own health professional… 
Notification Misuse of health information should be reported to the health professionals registration authority. 
The electronic record should be able to be used in  a court proceeding if the misuse amounts to a criminal act. 
Unauthorised access There is never a circumstance when misuse can be excused. But that is not the same as unauthorised access for example. which may be 
required under life threatening circumstances 
It should be treated as fraud/breach if privacy… 
Privacy concerns Really depends on the seriousness of the misuse.  I haven't really thought too much about how health information could be misused, but I tend 
to worry less about privacy in this regard than most people.  Probably a fine for a minor misuse and potential loss of job for serious misuse. 
Misusing health information is an extreme breach of trust, akin to current patient privacy expectations. 
Electronic health record should remain secure and can be opened or viewed through a series of bio metric scanning or any other possible keys. 
I would never use an eHR system if it required JavaScript or proprietary software.    I would not trust a centralised government database for 
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health records; that would be like 1984. 
Access to information …A doctor/nurse treating a patient should have full access to the complete medical history of a patient. 
Health professionals are/should be obligated to follow a set of morals and ethics or a code of conduct to be able to become and stay a health 
professional. 
No way is any health professional sharing my health information with any other patient!!! 
While I believe to many privacy or security restrictions on health data would limit the effective use of the information by medical professionals, 
I believe misuse of such information privileges should not go unpunished. 
…If someone accesses my personal data without my conscious consent (fine-print doesn't count) then that should be classed as a prosecutable 
breach of privacy. That being said I have some faith in my fellow IT professionals and as such would have only slight hesitation using such a 
eHR system… 
…It would be good if I can see who has accessed my information including for research and the type of research. 
…I trust an authority to handle my health information, If proper security and restrictions on the eHR system is made, no one else would 
access… 
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Table E.2 Individual Item loadings 
Construct Indicators Loading 
Computer/EHR self-efficacy (CSE) CSE1 0.9112 
 CSE2 0.6983 
 CSE3 0.4604 
Computer/EHR anxiety (ANX) ANX1 0.7338 
 ANX2 0.8562 
 ANX3 0.8848 
 ANX4 0.8689 
Computer/EHR attitude (ATT) ATT1 0.7885 
 ATT2 0.7924 
 ATT3 0.7698 
Privacy Concerns (PC) PC1 0.9339 
 PC2 0.6099 
 PC3 0.7833 
 PC4 0.8988 
 PC5 0.7789 
Third party trust (TRT) TPT1 0.9062 
 TPT2 0.7259 
 TPT3 0.6882 
EHR Access (ACS) EA1 0.8357 
 EA2 0.9043 
EHR Sharing (SRE) ES1 0.4536 
 ES2 0.8488 
 ES3 0.8740 
Information governance (IG) IG1 0.7524 
 IG2 0.7683 
 IG3 0.6373 
 IG4 0.4958 
Information control (IC) IC1 0.8482 
 IC2 0.8660 
 IC3 0.8546 
Information accountability (IA) IA1 0.6906 
 IA2 0.6320 
 IA3 0.7379 
 IA4 0.8263 
 IA5 0.8000 
Perceived acceptance (ACC) ACC1 0.8526 
 ACC2 0.7483 
 ACC3 0.8476 
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Table E.3 Internal composite reliability and average variance extracted 
Construct AVE Composite Reliability 
Computer/EHR self-efficacy (CSE) 0.5100 0.7445 
Computer/EHR anxiety (ANX) 0.7023 0.9038 
Computer/EHR attitude (ATT) 0.6141 0.8268 
Privacy concerns (PC) 0.6221 0.7592 
Third party trust (TPT) 0.6073 0.8205 
EHR access (EA) 0.7581 0.8622 
EHR sharing (ES) 0.5634 0.7834 
Information governance (IG) 0.5210 0.7627 
Information control (IC) 0.7347 0.8471 
Information accountability (IA) 0.5487 0.8576 
Perceived acceptance (ACC) 0.7227 0.8390 
 
Table E.4 Correlation of constructs and square root of AVE 
 CSE ANX ATT PC TPT EA ES IG IC IA ACC 
CSE 0.714           
ANX -0.289 0.838          
ATT 0.310 -0.504 0.783         
PC -0.08 0.440 -0.601 0.788        
TPT 0.190 -0.068 0.274 -0.300 0.779       
EA -0.01 -0.05 0.189 -0.302 0.336 0.870      
ES 0.347 -0.284 0.459 -0.374 0.309 0.103 0.750     
IG 0.201 0.054 0.055 0.281 0.135 -0.220 -0.006 0.721    
IC 0.192 0.083 0.010 0.247 -0.286 -0.327 -0.057 0.218 0.857   
IA 0.245 -0.092 0.112 0.220 -0.057 -0.306 0.095 0.506 0.470 0.740  
ACC 0.414 -0.631 0.734 -0.508 0.236 0.107 0.516 0.074 0.042 0.120 0.850 
 
Table E.5 Cross loadings of constructs 
 
CSE ANX ATT PC TPT IG IC IA ACC 
CSE1 0.911 -0.350 0.328 -0.13 0.107 0.142 0.209 0.220 0.428 
CSE2 0.698 -0.130 0.175 0.021 0.153 0.163 0.088 0.203 0.228 
CSE3 0.460 0.044 0.058 0.001 0.288 0.199 0.053 0.062 0.123 
ANX1 -0.17 0.733 -0.356 0.297 -0.052 0.081 0.129 0.002 -0.451 
ANX2 -0.26 0.856 -0.402 0.327 0.005 0.036 0.011 -0.094 -0.479 
ANX3 -0.26 0.884 -0.444 0.35 -0.043 -0.03 0.061 -0.130 -0.578 
ANX4 -0.27 0.868 -0.473 0.475 -0.121 0.091 0.080 -0.074 -0.587 
ATT1 0.200 -0.444 0.788 -0.47 0.103 0.035 -0.03 0.053 0.537 
ATT2 0.320 -0.289 0.792 -0.46 0.35 0.125 0.143 0.174 0.664 
ATT3 0.199 -0.466 0.769 -0.50 0.165 -0.04 -0.10 0.025 0.514 
PC1 -0.07 0.439 -0.637 0.933 -0.280 0.234 0.213 0.180 -0.531 
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PC2 -0.07 0.206 -0.198 0.609 -0.181 0.235 0.191 0.190 -0.185 
PC3 -0.12 -0.082 -0.088 0.835 -0.192 0.275 -0.30 -0.277 0.049 
PC4 0.071 -0.024 -0.226 0.848 -0.372 0.138 -0.27 -0.260 0.127 
PC5 0.125 -0.063 -0.075 0.874 -0.280 0.169 -0.12 -0.089 0.104 
TPT1 0.099 -0.114 0.251 -0.35 0.906 0.016 -0.32 -0.145 0.224 
TPT2 0.042 0.038 0.142 -0.13 0.725 0.102 -0.25 -0.086 0.067 
TPT3 0.332 -0.040 0.234 -0.16 0.688 0.258 -0.07 0.149 0.236 
IG1 0.153 -0.052 -0.024 0.272 -0.015 0.752 0.211 0.517 0.045 
IG2 0.126 0.112 0.095 0.133 0.332 0.768 0.033 0.210 0.064 
IG3 0.174 0.034 0.029 0.232 -0.096 0.637 0.245 0.367 0.021 
IG4 0.121 0.017 0.022 0.187 -0.140 0.495 0.285 0.456 0.079 
IC1 0.199 0.034 0.079 0.205 -0.193 0.194 0.848 0.384 0.091 
IC2 0.132 0.106 -0.057 0.219 -0.294 0.180 0.866 0.420 -0.015 
IC3 0.123 0.111 0.027 0.129 -0.154 0.109 0.876 0.340 -0.032 
IA1 0.205 -0.133 0.149 0.127 0.051 0.498 0.330 0.690 0.108 
IA2 0.222 -0.132 0.154 0.058 -0.071 0.407 0.317 0.632 0.185 
IA3 0.141 -0.050 0.047 0.146 -0.180 0.197 0.423 0.737 0.066 
IA4 0.112 0.002 -0.009 0.249 -0.031 0.332 0.323 0.826 0.013 
IA5 0.246 -0.068 0.114 0.189 -0.005 0.455 0.369 0.8 0.1116 
ACC1 0.450 -0.388 0.696 -0.39 0.248 0.071 0.167 0.180 0.852 
ACC2 0.374 -0.488 -0.576 -0.245 0.210 0.067 0.129 0.102 0.865 
ACC3 0.252 -0.687 0.551 -0.47 0.152 0.054 -0.09 0.022 0.847 
 
Table E.6 Path coefficients of moderating variable Gender 
 
Gender 
 
 
Male Female 
 PC - R2 0.3638 0.3983 
 IG - R2 0.2456 0.1357 
 IC - R2 0.394 0.2693 
 IA - R2 0.1735 0.0265 
 ACC - R2 0.6773 0.7814 
 Path coefficients with significance Hypothesis 
CSE -> IC 0.1656 0.3279 H1 
CSE -> ACC 0.1466 -0.0092 H2 
ANX -> PC 0.1799** 0.1461 H3 
ANX -> ACC -0.2748** -0.1413 H4 
ANX -> IC 0.149 -0.011 H5 
ATT -> PC -0.3546*** -0.3874** H6 
ATT -> ACC 0.5548*** 0.7013*** H7 
ATT -> IC 0.362** 0.097 H8 
PC -> IG 0.5403*** 0.3621 H9 
PC -> IC 0.464*** 0.2652* H10 
PC -> IA 0.4312*** 0.1103 H11 
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PC -> ACC -0.1078 -0.0574 H12 
TPT -> PC -0.2942*** -0.3119 H13 
TPT -> IG 0.2067 -0.0148 H14 
TPT -> IC -0.2763** -0.2829 H15 
TPT -> IA 0.0411 -0.0829 H16 
TPT -> ACC 0.0581 0.2079 H17 
IG -> ACC 0.0784 -0.0413 H18 
IC -> ACC 0.0647 0.1188 H19 
IA -> ACC -0.0788 -0.02 H20 
 
Table E.7 Path coefficients of moderating variable Age 
 
Age 
 
 
17-21 22-31 32-65 
 PC - R2 0.5304 0.2812 0.3856 
 IG - R2 0.2141 0.3167 0.2988 
 IC - R2 0.4427 0.2941 0.3567 
 IA - R2 0.1173 0.1841 0.1126 
 ACC - R2 0.7215 0.7566 0.7691 
 Path coefficients with significance Hypothesis 
CSE -> IC 0.2459** 0.2335 0.3007 H1 
CSE -> ACC 0.118 0.0782 0.0592 H2 
ANX -> PC 0.3425** 0.1899 -0.0842 H3 
ANX -> ACC -0.147 -0.4328*** -0.1193 H4 
ANX -> IC -0.051 0.192 0.153 H5 
ATT -> PC -0.3635** -0.2919 -0.5133 H6 
ATT -> ACC 0.6453*** 0.4203*** 0.6375*** H7 
ATT -> IC 0.332* 0.263 0.388 H8 
PC -> IG 0.507** 0.5883*** 0.461* H9 
PC -> IC 0.5651*** 0.3498** 0.3965 H10 
PC -> IA 0.3761 0.4378*** 0.3724 H11 
PC -> ACC -0.0578 -0.1687 -0.1258 H12 
TPT -> PC -0.2667 -0.27* -0.1739 H13 
TPT -> IG 0.2433 0.2943 -0.1405 H14 
TPT -> IC -0.1839 -0.3345*** -0.1517 H15 
TPT -> IA 0.1629 0.0287 0.2936 H16 
TPT -> ACC 0.1124 0.141 -0.0404 H17 
IG -> ACC 0.1632 0.0152 -0.2035 H18 
IC -> ACC 0.1153 0.123 0.084 H19 
IA -> ACC -0.1447 -0.0345 0.1891 H20 
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Table E.8 Path coefficients of moderation variable Computer Literacy 
 
Literacy 
 
 
Excellent Good 
 PC - R2 0.3479 0.5267 
 IG - R2 0.2317 0.1937 
 IC - R2 0.3438 0.3019 
 IA - R2 0.0957 0.1884 
 ACC - R2 0.6931 0.6794 
 Path coefficients with significance Hypothesis 
CSE -> IC 0.2663** 0.1313 H1 
CSE -> ACC 0.1453 0.1292 H2 
ANX -> PC 0.1398* 0.1925 H3 
ANX -> ACC -0.321*** -0.5553 H4 
ANX -> IC 0.042 0.148 H5 
ATT -> PC -0.4228** -0.3984 H6 
ATT -> ACC 0.467*** -0.062* H7 
ATT -> IC 0.269** 0.435 H8 
PC -> IG 0.3989*** 0.1775 H9 
PC -> IC 0.2558*** 0.0355 H10 
PC -> IA 0.2155** 0.0864 H11 
PC -> ACC -0.0644 -0.1759 H12 
TPT -> PC -0.208*** 0.312 H13 
TPT -> IG 0.2427 0.3011 H14 
TPT -> IC -0.261*** 0.2401 H15 
TPT -> IA -0.031 0.5222 H16 
TPT -> ACC 0.0082 -0.0885 H17 
IG -> ACC 0.0873 0.2543 H18 
IC -> ACC 0.0602 -0.2856 H19 
IA -> ACC -0.0227 -0.1749 H20 
 
Table E.9 Path coefficients of moderating variable PCEHR awareness 
 
PCEHR 
 
 
Aware Not Aware  
PC - R2 0.4003 0.3753 
 IG - R2 0.223 0.4004 
 IC - R2 0.3903 0.2098 
 IA - R2 0.1269 0.0939 
 ACC - R2 0.7053 0.8001 
 Path coefficients with significance Hypothesis 
CSE -> IC 0.2089** 0.156 H1 
CSE -> ACC 0.1908** -0.1206 H2 
ANX -> PC 0.1955** 0.1161 H3 
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ANX -> ACC -0.338*** -0.3578 H4 
ANX -> IC 0.036 0.056 H5 
ATT -> PC -0.4485** -0.5678 H6 
ATT -> ACC 0.483*** 0.466 H7 
ATT -> IC 0.346** 0.166 H8 
PC -> IG 0.2313** 0.4532 H9 
PC -> IC 0.1745*** 0.302 H10 
PC -> IA 0.2628** 0.0028 H11 
PC -> ACC -0.0031 -0.0357 H12 
TPT -> PC -0.229*** -0.0594 H13 
TPT -> IG -0.258 0.4085 H14 
TPT -> IC -0.339** 0.0069 H15 
TPT -> IA -0.1387 0.2603 H16 
TPT -> ACC 0.045 0.3648 H17 
IG -> ACC 0.0611 -0.0606 H18 
IC -> ACC 0.0785 0.0892 H19 
IA -> ACC -0.155** 0.1722 H20 
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Appendix F 
UPPAAL Automata 
The UPPAAL automata for the modelling of the technical architecture in 
chapter seven are shown below. 
 
Figure F.1 Healthcare professional service UPPAAL model 
 
Figure F.2 Policy reasoning service UPPAAL model 
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Figure F.3 Patient Service model in UPPAAL 
 
 
Figure F.4 Policy Service model in UPPAAL 
 
 
Figure F.5 Transaction Logging Service in UPPAAL 
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Figure F.6 Data Service in UPPAAL 
 
 
Figure F.7 Message Service in UPPAAL 
 
 
 
